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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to estimate the total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
of the Indonesian petroleum industry utilising the growth accounting framework 
pioneered by Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956). To broaden the scope of this study, 
the productivity growth of the non-petroleum industries, together with estimates for the 
aggregate economy, will also be conducted. Utilising data from Indonesia‟s Central 
Board of Statistics and the Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Activity, this 
study explores the period between 1991 and 2010. The study found that during the 
period of 1991-2003, the growth rate of petroleum TFP was negative. This negative 
trend was reversed during the period of 2004-2010 where petroleum TFP showed 
significant positive growth. The reforms of the early 2000s appeared to have resulted in 
this acceleration of TFP growth. On the other hand, the growth of TFP in the non-
petroleum industries and the aggregate economy showed a declining trend after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. This decline in TFP growth was likely to be linked 
to three possible circumstances that could make productivity improvements in the 
economy very challenging: low institutional quality, declining investment in 
infrastructure and creeping economic protectionism. 
The examination of Indonesia‟s various production structures begins with a 
historical perspective not only because the counterfactual cannot be tested, but it would 
also set a background for productivity analysis carried out in the following chapters. In 
doing so, a much broader and deeper analysis of the evolution of technological progress 
(as captured by TFP growth) in Indonesia is provided. As Nelson (1996, p. 6) once 
wrote “…economists doing formal growth theory have, for the most part, paid far too 
little attention to the qualitative historical record”. 
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  Chapter 1
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The petroleum
1
 industry is a strategic industry in many countries, especially for an 
oil producing country such as Indonesia. This industry was once the backbone of 
Indonesian economic growth (Arndt, 1983; Barnes, 1995; Booth, 1992). However, 
during the past two decades the output of this industry has declined substantially. 
During this time period domestic oil production steadily decreased whereas domestic 
consumption of petroleum products increased. As a result, in 2004 Indonesia became a 
net oil importer and subsequently the country suspended its membership in OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 2008 (Pallone, 2009). 
Regarding this declining production output, while it is true that oil and gas are 
non-renewable resources, technical progress has been able to prove itself as the main 
factor behind the continuing availability of their supply to support modern civilisation 
(Watkins, 2006). However, there is a lack of information on the technical progress of 
Indonesia‟s petroleum industry during the last two decades. This represents a large gap 
in the knowledge required for the understanding of technical progress in Indonesia‟s oil 
and gas sector and its impact on the country‟s economy. Therefore, this thesis attempts 
to bridge this gap by investigating the technical progress in Indonesia‟s petroleum 
sector as well as in non-petroleum sectors. Further, the historical contexts of these 
technical progresses are also explored in order to identify the possible causes for 
fluctuations in productivity growth of both sectors.  
 
1.2 Gap in the literature 
1.2.1 Studies within the framework of the neoclassical model of growth 
 
The objective of this section is two-fold. The first objective is to identify the 
limitations that are usually embedded in cross-country quantitative analysis within the 
framework of the neoclassical growth model. Using the same analytical framework, the 
                                                 
1
 The term „petroleum‟ here refers to crude oil and natural gas. Hence, the terms „petroleum‟ and „oil and 
gas‟ will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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second objective is to identify the gap in the literature regarding the studies on 
Indonesia‟s economic growth. 
There are many studies that have applied the neoclassical model to determine the 
sources of economic growth of nations, however, the larger proportion of them take an 
aggregate level or national level point of view rather than focus on a specific economic 
sector or an industry level point of view. For example, using cross-country national 
level data Krugman (1994) and Young (1994) employed the neoclassical model to 
analyse the sources of the phenomenal economic growth of the East Asian countries. 
They found that the source of high economic growth rates experienced by those 
countries was due to the massive growth in capital and labour inputs. Furthermore, they 
argued that since the source of this growth was not derived from technological progress 
or total factor productivity (TFP), those countries would not be able to maintain their 
high rates of economic growth. This is because, in the long-run, adding more capital and 
labour inputs would result in a decrease in output per unit of input, brought about by the 
logic of diminishing returns (Solow, 1956, 1957). 
Other cross-country studies using different data, measurement methods and time 
periods have provided various results. For example, using data from 145 countries, 
Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006) found that the contribution of TFP in economic 
growth is much higher in western countries, Southern Europe and Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NIC) than in other regions. Based on data from 99 nations, P. C. Chen and 
Yu (2014) found that the production pattern of the majority of these countries showed 
the ability to take advantage of technological innovations. A study by Grosskopf and 
Self (2006) concluded that TFP appeared to be the driving force behind the economic 
growth of Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, while the economic growth of 
Indonesia and Malaysia could be explained by the accumulation of physical capital. 
Despite the analytical rigour and meticulous attention to detail, there are, however 
several limitations that need to be raised. One of them is linked to the limitations 
associated with cross-country analysis. Firstly, by grouping several countries together, 
country-specific socio-economic differences could lead to conceptual and statistical 
problems (Crafts, 1996; Levine & Zervos, 1993; R. J. Taylor, 2007). Secondly, 
estimating the growth rate of several countries altogether may not be appropriate due to 
the broad exogenous differences across countries such as the differences in human 
capital, government policy and natural resources (Quah, 1993).  
 Taking these limitations into consideration, it appears that a case study approach 
may be a better approach. Solow (1994, p. 53) argued that “…the best candidate for a 
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research agenda right now would be an attempt to extract a few workable hypotheses 
from the variegated mass of case studies…”. Similarly, according to Pack (1994, p. 66):  
 
Regardless of whether one is using a neoclassical or endogenous growth 
approach, it thus seems necessary to examine one country at a time, insofar as 
there is no identical international production function along which changes in 
capital exert their effect. 
 
Due to the inherent limitations of cross-country analysis, several empirical studies 
have focused their attention on the application of the neoclassical growth model within 
a country-specific context at the aggregate level and in the case of Indonesia it can be 
found, for example, in Alisjahbana (2009); Osada (1994); Van der Eng (2010). 
However, when these types of studies disaggregate the national level data into the 
industry level, more attention is usually paid to the Indonesian manufacturing industry 
rather than the petroleum industry (see, for example, in Aswicahyono and Hill (2002); 
Ikhsan (2007); Margono and Sharma (2006); Suyanto and Salim (2010)). 
Hence, although considerable research has been devoted to the analysis of the 
sources of growth in the Indonesian economy, less attention has been paid to the 
petroleum sector. A review of the literature regarding the role of the petroleum sector in 
the economy in general will be discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2.2 The petroleum industry and economic growth 
 
As one of the oldest oil producing regions in the world, Indonesia used to be a 
major oil producer. Before the Second World War, over 75 per cent of crude oil 
produced in the Far East came from Indonesia. However, at the time the capacity of the 
industry as an engine of economic growth was very limited (Hunter, 1966; Lindblad, 
1989).  
Windfall profits from the oil shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s successfully 
removed the country‟s acute balance of payments constraint and enabled the 
government to carry out its economic development programs (Arndt, 1983; Booth, 
1992). The end of the oil boom era forced the government to break the country‟s 
dependence on the oil and gas industry as the main engine of economic growth 
(Prawiro, 1998). However, economic deregulation policies which were taken to support 
this decoupling process became out of control and as such had added to the severity of 
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the crisis which hit Indonesia following the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 
(Bennett, 1999; Hill, 2000; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999).  
In the post-crisis era, declining domestic oil production could not cope with the 
increasing demand for the oil products. As a result, for the first time since oil was 
discovered in the 1800s, Indonesia became a net oil importer in 2004 (Pallone, 2009). 
With this background, it is important to find out how the productivity of the Indonesian 
oil and gas industry relates to the country‟s economic growth. 
However, mainstream research on the relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth is generally centred around the hypothesis of the „natural resources 
curse‟ – which is the proposition that the economic growth of resource-rich countries 
tends to be slower than resource-poor countries. This can be found, for example, in the 
works of Gylfason (2001); Gylfason and Zoega (2006); Ploeg (2011); Sachs and 
Warner (2001). Hence, studies on the relationship between the petroleum industry and 
economic growth mostly revolve around this hypothesis. 
Even though several studies have tried to explore the general role of the 
petroleum industry in the economic growth of resource-rich countries, little attention 
has focused on the productivity aspects of this industry. For example, using the 
theoretical framework of the neoclassical model in the context of Venezuela economy, 
Agnani and Iza (2011) proposed that even though Venezuelan is an oil abundant 
country, its economic growth is largely determined by its non-oil sectors and the 
behaviour of this non-oil production can largely be explained by the growth of its non-
oil total factor productivity (TFP). In addition, the study also finds a high positive 
correlation between oil rents and capital accumulation as well as TFP in the non-oil 
sectors during high economic growth periods, but a negative correlation during times of 
economic contraction or recession. 
A study by Espinoza (2012) found that the economic growth of some oil-rich 
countries in the Middle East region were hampered by the low contribution of aggregate 
TFP, where for some countries, TFP was actually declining. The study suggested that 
this low TFP condition exists because the capital that has been accumulated from the 
abundance of oil revenue is not fully productive due to the inadequate level of education 
of the labour force in the region. From a case study of Brazil‟s state-owned oil company 
(Petrobras), Bridgman, Gomes, and Teixeira (2011) argued that the TFP of Petrobras 
increased sharply when there was a threat of competition and privatisation, even though 
those threats eventually failed to materialise. This finding implies that the government 
or stakeholders could improve the productivity of their business units (or the state-
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owned companies) by increasing the competitive environment in which those 
businesses operate. This is relevant to the case of Indonesia where the state-owned oil 
company (Pertamina) holds a significant portion and function in the petroleum sector of 
the country. 
Even though petroleum is a non-renewable natural resource, it is possible to 
offset the depletion of oil and gas production through technological change as suggested 
by Managi, Opaluch, Jin, and Grigalunas (2004). Using microeconomic level industrial 
data of offshore oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico, they found evidence that an 
exponential growth in technological innovation could offset resource depletion. This 
finding has strengthened the argument that if a country wants to rely, either fully or 
partially, on its natural resources to support its long-term economic growth, then 
improving the productivity of the natural resources sector is an essential step (Barbier, 
1999; Stiglitz, 1974). 
In the case of Indonesia, there is a lack of information on the TFP growth of the 
country‟s petroleum sector as well as of the non-petroleum sector. To the best of the 
author‟s knowledge, the research carried out here would be the first that attempts to 
measure the TFP growth in the petroleum sector and in the non-petroleum sectors in 
Indonesia. 
 
1.3 Scope and aims of research 
 
The period 1991-2010 is selected as the scope of study because these are two of 
the most dynamic, turbulent decades in the history of Indonesia. There were events 
which had profound impacts on the economic development of the country. The years 
1991-1997 were the end years of the Soeharto regime, where efforts to release the 
country from its dependency on oil and gas were in full swing. The years 1998-2003 
were marked by severe economic, social and political crises in Indonesia which 
culminated in the fall of Soeharto (after ruling the country for over 30 years) and this 
event was followed by a period of instability. The years 2004-2010 was a period of 
political stability amid economic problems which still have to be faced by the country 
today. The year 2004 witnessed the change of status of the country from a net oil 
exporter into a net oil importer. Further, the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 
adversely affected the country‟s economic growth although its impact was less severe 
than the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998.  
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The main objective of this study is to estimate the TFP growth of the petroleum 
sector as well as of the non-petroleum sectors of the Indonesian economy. Hence, the 
research question that will be addressed in this study is: What is the TFP growth of the 
petroleum sector and of the non-petroleum sectors? 
Answer to this question would provide information on the productivity growth 
of Indonesia‟s petroleum sector and non-petroleum sectors during 1991-2010. With an 
overview of the historical backgrounds, possible causes for fluctuations in productivity 
growth of both sectors would be able to be identified. These would serve as valuable 
inputs to explore the policy implications for improving the productivity of the 
petroleum sector and non-petroleum sectors in the future. 
 
1.4 Methodology  
 
Secondary data on output, capital stock and labour are gathered from various 
publications of Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Board of Statistics), World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank and BPMIGAS (Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and 
Gas Activity). Additional data are also collected from Petroleum Report Indonesia 
published by United States Embassy Jakarta. All data, unless otherwise noted, are 
adjusted at constant 2005 prices (2005=100).  
Once data on output, capital stock and labour are collected, the next step is to 
derive an appropriate α value, i.e. the capital‟s share of the value of output. This is 
because estimations of TFP growth are sensitive to the estimations of α value (R. J. 
Taylor, 2007, p. 200). After the α value has been determined, by subtracting 1 (with the 
assumption of constant returns to scale), this will give labour‟s share. The last step is to 
estimate the TFP growth of the petroleum sector as well as of the non-petroleum sectors 
of the Indonesian economy. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction to 
the research and also examines the gap in the literature. Chapter 2 presents the 
theoretical framework of the study by overviewing the key concepts of the neoclassical 
model of economic growth. In particular, it aims to highlight the notion that 
technological progress is a pivotal factor in sustaining long-term economic growth as 
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well as in sustaining a continuous supply of non-renewable resources. Chapter 3 
presents the historical developments of Indonesia‟s petroleum industry as well as the 
general impacts of the industry on the country‟s economic development. To complete 
the analysis, this chapter also explores the government policy towards the development 
of this industry and of the economy in general. Chapter 4 provides an overview of three 
key variables in the neoclassical growth model – output, capital stock and labour.  
Chapter 5 presents the estimations for TFP growth in the aggregate economy, Chapter 6 
presents the estimations for TFP growth in the petroleum sector, and Chapter 7 provides 
estimations for TFP growth in the non-petroleum sectors as well as explores the 
relationship between TFP and output growth in Indonesia from the perspective of the 
New Keynesian‟s real business cycle framework. Chapter 8 discusses the research 
findings and highlights related policy implications, limitations of the study and provides 
any direction for further research. 
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  Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the key concepts found 
in the neoclassical model of long-run output growth. In particular, it aims to highlight 
the notion that technological progress is a pivotal factor to sustain positive long-run 
output growth. In addition, since economic growth requires the supply of natural 
resources, this chapter also discusses the role of technological progress in ensuring a 
prolonged supply of these resources, especially the non-renewable ones (in this case, oil 
and gas). Although the decomposition of output growth was originally developed to 
measure the aggregate level of the economy, it can also be adapted to measure a specific 
sector or industry. For instance, Aswicahyono and Hill (2002) examined the trends in 
and determinants of technological progress in 28 manufacturing industries in Indonesia.  
 
2.2 The neoclassical growth model of Solow-Swan2  
 
Four variables of the production function – output (Y), capital (K), labour (L) and 
technological progress (A) are the main focus of the Solow-Swan model (D. Romer, 
2001; Solow, 1956, 1957; Swan, 1956; R. J. Taylor, 2007). Hence the model can be 
summarised as: 
 
             (2.1) 
 
   
F denotes the function, which is assumed to have constant returns to scale. 
 In the model, the fraction of output that is saved (s) is assumed to be constant, 
therefore the rate of saving is given by sY. Thus net investment would be equal to the 
increase in capital stock dK/dt  or  ̇ as follows: 
 
  ̇     (2.2) 
   
                                                 
2
 The model gets its name from the independent, yet closely similar, works of Solow (1956, 1957) and 
Swan (1956). However, some authors prefer to name the model simply as the „Solow model‟. 
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Assuming that population growth is exogenous and at a constant rate, the 
available supply of labour at any one time is
3
:  
 
         
   (2.3) 
   
where    is the available supply of labour at time 0,   is the base of natural logarithm,   
is the population growth rate and   is time. 
With the production function of         , then Equation (2.2) can be written 
as: 
 
  ̇          
    (2.4) 
   
Equation (2.4) exhibits the time path of capital accumulation that should be followed in 
order to achieve full employment (and at the same time avoid excess capacity). 
With r representing the ratio of capital to labour (K/L), Solow (1956) showed 
that one would be able to check if the capital accumulation path in Equation (2.4) would 
always be consistent with the rate of growth of the labour force; hence,      
    
  . Differentiating with respect to time would give:  ̇     
   ̇       
  . 
Substituting this in Equation (2.4) results in: 
 
  ̇        
           
    
 
With the assumption of constant returns to scale, both variables in F can be 
divided by      
   as long as F  is also multiplied by the same factor. Hence: 
 
  ̇        
       
   
 
     
    
 
and by dividing both sides with    
   gives: 
 
  ̇             (2.5) 
   
 
 Equation (2.5) shows the output per worker as a function of capital per worker. 
It states that the increment of capital,        , and the increment of labour,   , will 
                                                 
3
 Also assuming that full employment is perpetually maintained (Solow, 1956, p. 67). 
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determine the rate of change of capital-labour ratio. Figure 2.1 shows Equation (2.5) 
diagrammatically. 
 
Figure 2.1  Output per worker as a function of capital per worker 
  
Source: Solow (1956, p. 70) 
 
  
As seen in Figure 2.1, if the initial capital-labour ratio resides at the left of r* (r  
< r*), then the growth rate of capital and output will outpace the growth rate of the 
labour force until r*  is approached. On the other hand, if the initial ratio resides at the 
right of r*  (r  > r*), then the growth rate of capital and output will be slower than the 
rate of growth of the labour force until eventually reaching r*.  
At the point of intersection,            and thus  ̇   . At this point, the 
capital-labour ratio is constant, therefore, since  ̇   , the growth rate of capital stock 
must be able to match the expansion of the labour force. If the capital-labour ratio, r*, 
should ever be in a state of equilibrium, then it will be maintained over time because 
both output and labour will grow at the same rate due to the constant returns to scale. 
Hence the ratio of output per labour unit will be constant and the equilibrium value of r*  
is said to be „stable‟. Thus, whatever the initial value of r, the system will tend to move 
towards a state of balanced growth (r*).  
One essential extension of the Solow model is related to technological change. 
In the model, technological change will multiply the production function by an 
increasing scale factor. Especially, when the share of capital in the production function 
is higher than   ⁄  then the rate of increase in output (due to the technological change) 
𝑟 0 r* 
nr 
sF(r,1) 
?̇? 
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would be faster than the rate of increase in labour and the technology itself. This is 
because higher output means higher rates of savings and investment, which adds to the 
rate of growth even more. 
 Swan (1956) introduced a similar type of technological progress
4
. In introducing 
technical progress, Swan (1956) put into place a third factor, land, which induces 
diminishing returns because its supply is assumed to be fixed. Hence, according to 
Swan (1956), technical progress is necessary in order for the economy to avoid a 
Malthusian catastrophe due to population pressures. Swan (1956) argued that in the 
absence of technical progress, although faster accumulation of capital might be able to 
raise the growth rate at every point in time, it would only temporarily interrupt the 
inevitable decline in the output-capital ratio once diminishing returns set in.  On the 
other hand, technical progress would be able to permanently increase the output per 
capital input and thus counter the effect of diminishing returns. Figure 2.2 exhibits the 
main concepts of Swan (1956) growth model. 
 
Figure 2.2  Swan’s growth model 
 
 
Source: Swan (1956). 
 
Basically the growth models of Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956) are 
similar; the main difference between them is explanatory: Solow (1956, 1957) focuses 
on the capital-labour ratio, whereas Swan (1956) focuses on the output-capital ratio and 
                                                 
4
 A more thorough analysis of technological progress and its empirical case study was provided by Solow 
in his subsequent (1957) paper. 
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rates of growth (Dimand & Spencer, 2009).  In Figure 2.2, the horizontal line represents 
the growth line of labour, n, as its growth is assumed to be constant. With s representing 
a given ratio of saving to output (Y), the rate of growth of capital is represented by the 
line  
 
 
; where K  denotes capital, and the slope is s. Assuming constant returns to scale 
and no technical progress, the rate of growth of output is represented by the line y1. At 
any point to the left of (1), output will grow faster than capital, so 
 
 
  is rising and 
moving to the right towards (1). To the right of (1), capital is growing faster than output, 
so 
 
 
  is falling and moving to the left towards (1). Hence, without technological 
progress the economy will always be in motion towards the equilibrium at point (1). 
 Now suppose technical progress boosts the growth of output at a rate of m per 
cent annually beyond the contribution of capital and labour. Hence the new growth line 
of output in Figure 2.2 increases to y2 and it will intersect the growth line of capital  
 
 
  
at point (2) which is now the new equilibrium point. At this new equilibrium, output per 
unit of labour is permanently higher and perpetually rising with a rate of increase (the 
distance between n and y2) that is greater than the contribution of technical progress (m) 
itself. This is because technical progress will be able to provide higher levels of capital 
contribution. Nevertheless, in his article Swan (1956) warned the anti-accumulation, 
pro-technology school of thought that the role of capital accumulation in economic 
growth cannot be underestimated because the rate of growth of technical progress itself 
and the rate of growth of labour may depend on the rate of capital accumulation. 
 
2.3 Capital controversy 
 
This section touches briefly on the extensive body of literature regarding capital 
controversy. Its main aim is to highlight the difficulties associated with constructing and 
measuring capital, hence large amount of information is omitted. Although it can be 
argued that this is an unsatisfactory procedure, it should also be noted that this chapter 
is not an exploration of the critique of the theory of capital. 
The pillar of the neoclassical growth model is the aggregate production function 
which maps aggregate inputs into aggregate output. Theoretically, aggregate or macro 
production function is built by adding micro production functions (Felipe & Fisher, 
2003). Nonetheless, aggregating micro production functions into a macro production 
function is problematic. Referring to the use of capital as a factor of production in 
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aggregate production function, Robinson (1953-1954) asked the question that triggered 
the controversy: in what unit is capital to be measured? (Robinson, 1953-1954) argued 
that since capital goods are a series of heterogeneous goods which each having specific 
technical characteristics, it is impossible to express the stock of capital goods as a 
homogenous physical entity. 
Similarly, Hunt and Lautzenheiser (2011, p. 436) noted: 
 
While it is perfectly clear what we mean when we aggregate the amount of labor employed 
(in order to ascertain its marginal productivity), it is by no means clear what we mean when 
we aggregate capital. If we say 100 laborers worked for one week, the meaning is 
unambiguous. But what does it mean to say 100 capitals worked for one week? One 
hundred factories? Of various sizes? One hundred shovels? Fifty factories and 25 shovels 
and 25 oil refining plants? This is obviously nonsensical. One piece of capital can be 
anything ranging from a screwdriver to a gigantic plant that employs tens of thousands of 
workers. 
 
 According to Harcourt (1969) one key issue in the differing opinions is related 
to marginal productivities of factor inputs and its role in the distribution of income 
between profit-earners and wage-earners. In a more comprehensive review of the 
literature on capital controversy, however, Harcourt (1972, p. 118) also noted that “the 
sharpest arrows in the quivers of the neo-Keynesian critics are the results of the double-
switching debate.” (Robinson, 1953-1954) pointed out that since aggregate capital stock 
is a heterogeneous group of capital goods, hence it differs depending on the length of 
time labour and other types of capital utilised to produce them. The longer it takes to 
construct each types of new capital, the higher are the interest costs relative to total 
production costs. In order to minimise production costs, profit-maximising firms will 
resort to different techniques with different combinations of capital goods when the 
relative wage-rental cost of capital changes over time. Thus, there is the possibility of 
reswitching which occurs when the same technique – a particular capital/labour ratio – 
is preferred at two or more rates of interest while other techniques are preferred at 
intermediate rates (Cohen & Harcourt, 2003; R. J. Taylor, 2007). 
Another source of debate is the neoclassical approach to capital which commonly 
uses comparative statics exercises to examine capital accumulation, thus ignoring time 
in its accounting framework. Robinson (1980, p. 228) noted that such comparison 
revealed nothing about processes of accumulation and growth and argued that “In a 
theoretical model, time can be frozen but it is a common error to confuse a comparison 
of static positions with a movement between them.” 
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This view was shared by Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962, p. 188) who argued that 
there does not exist a „production function‟ in the sense of a single-valued relationship 
between some measure of capital stock, Kt, labour, Lt, and output, Yt, (all at time t) 
because everything depends on past history, on how the collection of equipment goods 
which comprises Kt has been built up. Similarly, Carvalho (1983, p. 265) noted that 
“‟Time‟ is a concept that is usually neglected even in methodological discussions. 
Neoclassical economics, particularly, has treated this problem in a rather light way, 
approaching time as just another „space dimension‟." 
Against these critics, the neoclassicals did not remain silent. Solow (1955-1956) 
argued that the problems in measuring aggregate capital due to the reswitching issue can 
be overcome only in very special cases and commented that the real difficulty of capital 
comes not from the physical diversity of capital goods but it comes from the 
intertwining of past, present and future. Further, Solow (1955-1956, p. 101) defended 
his choice saying that “…if God had meant there to be more than two factors of 
production, He would have made it easier for us to draw three-dimensional diagrams.” 
 Solow (1963) provided further theoretical response from the neoclassicals‟ 
viewpoint. Attempting to avoid problems of capital by focusing on the rate of return on 
investment, Solow (1963) proposed capital theory without any mention of either 
„capital‟ or „its‟ marginal product. The model addressed the question „what is the 
expected marginal return to a little more saving/investment in a fully employed 
economy?‟ and served as the basis for empirical estimates of rates of return in actual 
economies. 
 Another neoclassical response came from Samuelson (1962) who attempted to 
extend the one-commodity results to more general heterogeneous commodity models. 
The „surrogate production function‟ proposed by Samuelson (1962) attempted to 
include what appeared to be a variety of capital goods which are physically distinct and 
assumed factor proportions which are equal in all industries, thus making relative prices 
independent of changes in distribution between wages and profits.  
 The capital controversy featured the limitations of capital stock construction 
within the neoclassical growth framework. It is apparent that with the volume of work 
using the neoclassical growth framework since the 1980s a large proportion of 
mainstream economists has neglected this issue (Felipe & Fisher, 2003; R. J. Taylor, 
2007). Further, Felipe and Fisher (2003) provided three arguments for this continuing 
use of the neoclassical growth framework. The first argument is the fact that aggregate 
production functions sometimes seem to work empirically. The second argument given 
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to justify the use of aggregate production functions is that, following the work of 
Samuelson (1962), the aggregate production function is to be thought of as a parable. 
The third argument is that there is no other option if one needs to answer the questions 
for which the aggregate production function is to be used, for example to study 
productivity differences across nations. Regarding this debate, Solow (2000, p. xiii) 
eventually argued that the “…whole episode now seems to have been a waste of time, a 
playing-out of ideological games in the language of analytical economics.”  
 
2.4 Total factor productivity 
 
The level of technological progress (proxied by total factor productivity) 
indicates the efficiency with which all factors of production are utilised to produce the 
final output. The higher the level of total factor productivity (TFP) of an economic 
entity, the higher would be its efficiency and also the higher its productivity (Solow, 
1956, 1957; Swan, 1956; Taylor, 2007). 
TFP can be defined as the portion of output that cannot be explained by the 
amounts of capital and labour inputs used in production. In other words, TFP is a broad, 
all-inclusive definition of technology that depends on many things, including (but not 
limited to) education, infrastructure, research and development, political stability, 
property rights acknowledgement, the efficiency of economic, political and social 
institutions in encouraging productive activities and efforts as well as the management 
skills of producers and entrepreneurs (Krugman & Wells, 2006; Van den Berg, 2012). 
Because these factors are actually much more than what can be suggested by the word 
„productivity‟, according to Baier et al. (2006), TFP should more fairly be called the 
„residual‟ or „Solow residual‟. 
Solow (1957) conducted a case study using the USA‟s economic data for the 
period of 1909-1949. Table 2.1 exhibits TFP growth estimates (   ⁄ ) for the USA 
compiled by Solow (1957).  
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
Table 2.1  TFP estimation for the USA, 1909-1949 
Year 
% labour 
force 
employed 
Capital 
stock 
($mil) 
Col.1 x 
Col.2 
Share of 
property 
in income 
Priv. 
Nonfarm 
GNP per 
man-hour 
Employed 
capital per 
man-hour 
ΔA/A A(t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1909 91.1 146,142 133,135 0.335 0.623 2.06 -0.017 1.000 
1910 92.8 150,038 139,235 0.330 0.616 2.10 0.039 0.983 
1911 90.6 156,355 141,640 0.335 0.647 2.17 0.002 1.021 
1912 93.0 159,971 148,773 0.330 0.652 2.21 0.040 1.023 
1913 91.8 164,504 151,015 0.334 0.680 2.23 0.007 1.064 
1914 83.6 171,513 143,385 0.325 0.682 2.20 -0.028 1.071 
1915 84.5 175,317 148,188 0.344 0.669 2.23 0.034 1.041 
1916 93.7 178,351 167,115 0.358 0.700 2.34 -0.010 1.076 
1917 94.0 182,263 171,327 0.370 0.679 2.21 0.072 1.065 
1918 94.5 186,679 176,412 0.342 0.729 2.22 0.032 1.142 
1919 93.1 189,977 176,869 0.354 0.767 2.47 0.011 1.157 
1920 92.8 194,802 180,776 0.319 0.721 2.58 0.016 1.069 
1921 76.9 201,491 154,947 0.369 0.770 2.55 0.032 1.146 
1922 81.7 204,324 166,933 0.339 0.788 2.49 0.011 1.183 
1923 92.1 209,964 193,377 0.337 0.809 2.61 0.016 1.196 
1924 88.0 222,113 195,460 0.330 0.836 2.74 0.032 1.215 
1925 91.1 231,772 211,198 0.336 0.872 2.81 -0.010 1.254 
1926 90.0 244,611 226,266 0.327 0.869 2.87 -0.005 1.241 
1927 92.5 259,142 233,228 0.323 0.871 2.93 -0.007 1.235 
1928 90.0 271,089 243,980 0.338 0.874 3.02 0.020 1.226 
1929 92.5 279,691 258,714 0.332 0.895 3.06 -0.043 1.251 
1930 88.1 289,291 254,865 0.347 0.880 3.30 0.024 1.197 
1931 78.2 289,056 226,042 0.325 0.904 3.33 0.023 1.226 
1932 67.9 282,731 191,974 0.397 0.879 3.28 0.011 1.198 
1933 66.5 270,676 180,000 0.362 0.869 3.10 0.072 1.211 
1934 70.9 262,370 186,020 0.355 0.921 3.00 0.039 1.298 
1935 73.0 257,810 188,201 0.351 0.943 2.87 0.059 1.349 
1936 77.3 254,875 197,018 0.357 0.982 2.72 -0.010 1.429 
1937 81.0 257,076 208,232 0.340 0.971 2.71 0.021 1.415 
1938 74.7 259,789 194,062 0.331 1.000 2.78 0.048 1.445 
1939 77.2 257,314 198,646 0.347 1.034 2.66 0.050 1.514 
1940 80.6 258,048 207,987 0.357 1.082 2.63 0.044 1.590 
1941 86.8 262,940 228,232 0.377 1.122 2.58 0.003 1.660 
1942 93.6 270,063 252,779 0.356 1.136 2.64 0.016 1.665 
1943 97.4 269,761 262,747 0.342 1.180 2.62 0.071 1.692 
1944 98.4 265,483 261,235 0.332 1.265 2.63 0.021 1.812 
1945 96.5 261,472 252,320 0.314 1.296 2.33 -0.044 1.850 
1946 94.8 258,051 244,632 0.312 1.215 2.50 -0.017 1.769 
1947 95.4 268,845 256,478 0.327 1.194 2.50 0.016 1.739 
1948 95.7 276,476 264,588 0.332 1.221 2.55 0.024 1.767 
1949 93.0 269,105 269,105 0.326 1.275 2.70 ... 1.809 
Source: Solow (1957, p. 315) 
 
As shown in Table 2.1, over the 40-year period under study output per man-hour 
had approximately doubled, from 0.623 in 1909 to 1.275 in 1949. Further, data in the 
table also show that 87.5 per cent of this increase in output per man-hour can be 
attributed to TFP whereas the remaining 12.5 per cent can be attributed to capital 
accumulation (Solow, 1957). 
Some studies have pointed to TFP being a factor that is responsible for 
differences in economic growth between countries. For example, Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) offered some evidence in the debate regarding the cause of 
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differences in economic growth between rich countries and poor countries, that is, 
whether it was caused by differences in productivity or due to the physical and human 
capital differences. Their study found that the variations in the rates of growth between 
rich and poor countries were mostly attributable to the differences in TFP and had little 
to do with differences in physical and human capital. Similar results were provided by 
Hall and Jones (1999). Their study confirmed that differences in physical capital and 
educational attainment could only partially explain the variations in output per worker 
across the countries studied, whereas differences in the Solow residual were able to 
explain the largest part of these variations. More recently, Sawyer (2010) found that the 
slow economic growth of Latin American countries can be attributed to the slow growth 
of their TFP. Further investigation revealed that this slow growth in TFP was the result 
of the generally poor quality of institutions in the region. Although there are problems 
regarding the choice of the measure of institutional quality, Sawyer (2010) showed that 
three common measures of institutional quality (business regulations and their 
enforcement, rule of law and regulatory quality) have statistically significant 
relationship with TFP growth. 
Hsieh and Klenow (2010) proposed that the debate regarding the proximate roles 
of physical capital, human capital and TFP in explaining income differences across 
countries over the past 25 years is as follows: the portion of human capital that explains 
income differences across countries is 10-30 per cent, the physical capital portion is 
around 20 per cent and the largest part (50-70 per cent) of income differences across 
countries can be explained by differences in TFP.  
It is worth highlighting the debate regarding TFP and economic growth in the 
context of the growth of East Asian countries, specifically before the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997/1998. During the period of 1950-1973 Japan‟s per capita income was 
consistently rising by over 8 per cent per year. Compared to other East Asian countries 
at that time, which on average only grew at 2.6 per cent per year, it can be said that 
during this time period Japan experienced „super-growth‟. However, while Japan in 
1973-1999 only had a growth rate of around 2 per cent annually, the resurgent East 
Asian countries (such as Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and South 
Korea) as a whole was growing twice as fast as Japan – in the 1990s alone it was four 
times as fast (Maddison, 2007, p. 143). There are two contrasting arguments regarding 
the sources of the remarkable economic growth of these countries: accumulation theory 
and assimilation theory (R. J. Taylor, 2007). 
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 The accumulationists (such as Kim & Lau, 1994; Tsao, 1982; Young, 1994, 
1995) argue that the most important source of the high growth experienced by the East 
Asian countries was capital accumulation. Furthermore, Krugman (1994) argued that 
because the source of growth for these countries was mainly the accumulation of 
capital, eventually diminishing returns would occur and the steady state would stop 
shifting out, hence economic growth would be limited since these economies would not 
be able to continue to increase their savings rates, labour force participation or 
educational levels forever. In other words, according to this school of thought the 
exponentially high growth of many East Asian countries was basically not sustainable. 
 Table 2.2 shows the ranks in the growth rate of TFP for several countries 
compiled by Young (1994). 
Table 2.2  Annual growth of TFP, 1970-1985 
1 Egypt 0.035 23 Guinea 0.014 45 Turkey 0.008
2 Pakistan 0.030 24 South Korea 0.014 46 Netherlands 0.008
3 Botswana 0.029 25 Iran 0.014 47 Ethiopia 0.007
4 Congo 0.028 26 Burma 0.014 48 Austria 0.007
5 Malta 0.026 27 Mauritius 0.013 49 Australia 0.007
6 Hong Kong 0.025 28 China 0.013 50 Spain 0.006
7 Syria 0.025 29 Denmark 0.013 51 Kenya 0.006
8 Zimbabwe 0.024 30 Israel 0.012 52 France 0.005
9 Gabon 0.024 31 Greece 0.012 53 Liberia 0.004
10 Tunisia 0.024 32 Japan 0.012 54 Paraguay 0.004
11 Cameroon 0.024 33 Luxembourg 0.012 55 Honduras 0.004
12 Lesotho 0.022 34 Yugoslavia 0.011 56 Portugal 0.004
13 Uganda 0.021 35 Tanzania 0.011 57 U.S.A. 0.004
14 Cyprus 0.021 36 Colombia 0.011 58 Belgium 0.004
15 Thailand 0.019 37 Sweden 0.010 59 Canada 0.003
16 Bangladesh 0.019 38 Malaysia 0.010 60 Algeria 0.003
17 Iceland 0.018 39 Malawi 0.010 61 CAR 0.002
18 Italy 0.018 40 Brazil 0.010 62 India 0.001
19 Norway 0.017 41 Panama 0.009 63 Singapore 0.001
20 Finland 0.015 42 U.K. 0.009 64 Sri Lanka 0.001
21 Taiwan 0.015 43 W. Germany 0.009 65 Fiji 0.001
22 Ecuador 0.014 44 Mali 0.008 66 Switzerland 0.000
 
Source: Young (1994, p. 970) 
 
 Data in Table 2.2 show that the TFP growth rates of Zimbabwe, Cameroon and 
Uganda were higher than Taiwan and South Korea. Thus, Young (1994) concluded that, 
except for Hong Kong, aggregate productivity growth in the East Asian NICs (i.e. 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) was not extraordinarily high. Further, Young 
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(1994) argued that the high economic growth experienced by these East Asian NICs 
was mostly the result of rapid factor accumulation of both capital and labour. 
 On the other hand, according to the assimilation theorists, economic growth is 
basically the result of the exploitation of new technologies that are embedded in the 
capital inputs and this results in a more efficient production processes, thus creating 
more output per unit of inputs (R. J. Taylor, 2007). Hence, technological progress is 
inseparable from the investment in capital inputs, that is, without efforts to accumulate 
capital, technological progress would simply not exist. According to this school of 
thought, the introduction of new, technologically advanced machines through increases 
in capital inputs would induce technological progress.  
Based on this premise, diminishing returns would be unlikely to occur because 
the higher the rate of investment, the higher would be the turnover of the production 
machines and this would result in a higher productivity. Based on the study of Young 
(1994), R. J. Taylor (2007) argued that if the primary cause of growth – as proposed by 
accumulation theorists – was only TFP, then Egypt, Pakistan, Botswana, the Congo and 
Malta, which were the top five of TFP-performing countries according to the study, 
should experience high economic growth rates and significant structural transformation 
such as what happened in the East Asian countries. However, the fact was that these 
countries still lagged behind the economic levels of many East Asian countries like 
Singapore, Taiwan and Hong-Kong. Further, there are many empirical studies that 
suggest a positive correlation between physical capital accumulation and the rate of 
growth, for example in King and Levine (1993); Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992); 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and more recently in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005); 
Manova (2013); Quinn and Toyoda (2008), among others. 
Through extensive literature research, Isaksson (2007) reviewed the many 
determinants of TFP growth and grouped them under four headings. First: creation, 
transmission, and absorption of knowledge. Here, knowledge can be drawn from 
domestic investment in research and development and/ or education. It can also be 
absorbed through international trade, for example through the importation of relatively 
advanced goods which embody technological know-how or through foreign direct 
investment (FDI), with the hope that there would be technological spill-over effects (D. 
H. C. Chen & Dahlman, 2004; Guellec & de la Potterie, 2001; Joutz & Abdih, 2005). 
 Second: factor supply and efficient allocation. Included here is human capital in 
the form of health, training and education which could affect TFP through innovation 
creation as well as technology adoption and absorption (Isaksson, 2007). Public capital 
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in the form of infrastructure may also have a significant effect on productivity 
(Aschauer, 1989; Hulten, 1996). Structural change towards distortion-reducing policies 
may also play a dominant role in affecting TFP by facilitating efficient resource 
allocation (Chanda & Dalgaard, 2006). Also in this category is financial development, 
which could affect TFP through promoting capital accumulation and incentives in the 
economy (Fisman & Love, 2003; Roubini & Sala-i-Martin, 1992). 
 Third: institutions, integration and invariants (Isaksson, 2007). In the case of 
integration, increased exposure to international trade is believed to be able to increase 
competition and thus forces economic agents to use their available inputs more 
efficiently (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Maddison, 1997). Further, the quality of 
institutions may have a strong positive correlation to TFP (Sachs, 1999). Lastly, 
geographical conditions may also affect the process of technology transfer and this may 
affect TFP growth (Diamond, 1997; Landes, 1999). For example, a country endowed 
with rich natural resources tends to be negatively associated with low productivity and a 
landlocked country may find it more difficult to promote trade and absorb advanced 
foreign technologies (Isaksson, 2007). 
Fourth: competition, social dimension and environment (Isaksson, 2007). It is 
generally believed that domestic competition enhances the efficient allocation of 
resources which in turn would improve TFP (Bastos & Nasir, 2004; Nickell, 1996). 
Related to this, privatisation – if done gradually through a carefully monitored process – 
may serve as a good policy to improve productivity (Barone, 2004). Literature on the 
relationship of social dimension and TFP is very limited and the results are 
inconclusive. For example, there is no clear relation between income inequality and 
productivity (Forbes, 2000; Persson & Tabellini, 1994), whereas other indicators of 
social dimension, e.g. high youth dependency ratios (the population below working age 
divided by the population of working age), are confirmed to possess a negative 
correlation with TFP growth (Kögel, 2005). The same mixed results also apply to the 
correlation between environment and TFP. Nevertheless, the main debate in this aspect 
lies with the proper valuation method to quantify the relationship between TFP growth 
and environment. For example, whether output should or should not account for the 
reduction of undesirable outputs and whether productivity measures should or should 
not require price information (Isaksson, 2007). 
However, all of these determinants reviewed by Isaksson (2007) were mainly 
concerned with how they affect the production process, or in other words, they were 
mainly related to the supply side of the economy. Cornwall and Cornwall (2002) argued 
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that a producer‟s decision to adopt technological change may be a result of pressures 
from the demand side. They provided a model as well as empirical evidence and 
concluded that the existence of strong aggregate demand was actually able to „pressure‟ 
producers to make new investment (in new and more efficient machinery, for instance) 
and thus stimulate rapid technological progress. 
 
2.5 Resources depletion, growth and technological progress 
 
The purpose of this section is not to engage in the debate regarding the 
truthfulness of the prophecy of „peak oil‟, but rather to show how technological 
progress has enabled humans to continue their standards of living even when faced with 
the seemingly inevitable depletion of natural resources which they rely on. Modern 
living standards may not be able to be separated from hydrocarbons which are mostly 
derived from oil, gas and coal. The majority of the world‟s hydrocarbons is used as 
fuels for electrical power generation, heating and propulsion. Hydrocarbons are also 
serve as raw materials for chemical, petrochemical, plastics and rubber industries (Olah, 
Goeppert, & Prakash, 2006).   
Early studies regarding the impact of resources depletion on economic growth, 
from the essay of Malthus (Malthus, 1798) to the so called Club of Rome report 
(Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens III, 1972), typically came up with 
pessimistic views of the long-run potential of natural resources to support continued 
economic growth, even in the near term (Managi et al., 2004). They have called the urge 
for the reorientation of socio-economic policies towards the development of a 
„spaceship economy‟ (Boulding, 1966; Daly, 1974), that is an economy “…in which 
virtually all intermediate materials (including fuels) are either eliminated or recycled, 
while durable goods are renovated, remodelled and remanufactured indefinitely” (Ayres 
& Frankl, 1998, p. 1).  
Within the context of these pessimistic views, the „Hubbert‟s peak‟ theory 
suggests that the global production of the world‟s most important commodity, oil, had 
reached its peak and has been followed by its inevitable decline (Banks, 2006; Deffeyes, 
2008; Hubbert, 1962). However, these studies have been criticised for failing to 
examine the potential of technological change in outweighing resource depletion. For 
example, Watkins (2006) criticised the Hubbert‟s peak theory (Hubbert, 1962) for its 
assumption regarding the „ultimate‟ reserves where the oil stock was assumed to be 
fixed. Whereas the world‟s oil reserves numbers in Watkins‟ study were showing an 
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increasing, rather than decreasing, pattern over time. Watkins suggested that this 
increase in reserves was due to the increase in knowledge. Cole, et al (1975, as cited in 
Managi et al., 2004) proposed that principally humans‟ exponential growth in 
knowledge would be able to support continuous growth in the form of technological 
innovation which, in the end, would offset the depletion of natural resources. Stiglitz 
(1974) and Barbier (1999) argued that when faced with the threats of exhaustible 
resources, technological change could be resource-augmenting in such a way that it 
would be sufficient enough to sustain continuous growth for an indefinite period. 
Adelman (1990, p. 3) precisely referred to this phenomenon as “…the endless tug-of-
war between diminishing returns and increasing knowledge‟‟. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates diagrammatically how sustaining the effective supply of 
resources requires technological change. 
 
Figure 2.3  Sustaining effective resources requires technological change 
 
Source: Van den Berg (2012, p. 247) 
 
 
 As shown in Figure 2.3, the declining physical inputs (H) of exhaustible 
resources from H1 to H2 to H3 requires technological progresses which are able to shift 
the production function, f(H) upward from f1(H) to f2(H) to f3(H) in order to sustain 
growth in output, Y, from Y1 to Y2 to Y3. It suggests that for the growth to be 
sustainable it requires changes in technology that are able to increase the output 
produced per unit of input of exhaustible resources faster than their depletion rate. 
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The oil and gas industry has striking examples of how technological progress 
has enabled the industry to maintain output overtime in the face of depleting resources. 
Significant technological innovations, such as horizontal drilling and deepwater drilling 
technologies as well as three-dimensional (3D) seismology have enabled oil and gas 
companies to reduce the costs of finding and developing oil and gas resources, increase 
their economic reserves and maintain productivity in mature petroleum basins (Bohi, 
1998). 3D technology results in higher-quality images from seismographic tests than 2D 
technology. The ability to locate new hydrocarbon deposits and determine the reservoir 
characteristics for their optimal development have been greatly improved by these high 
quality images. Horizontal drilling technology enables drillers to guide a drillstring that 
can be deviated at any angle from vertical wells, thus increasing access to distant and 
difficult-to-reach reserves while lowering the drilling costs. Deepwater drilling 
technology allows for the finding and development of hydrocarbon reserves in hard-to-
reach basins in offshore areas where the depth of the seabed and high waves are 
particularly troublesome for the drilling operations. 
More recently, aside from the controversies on its environmental impacts, 
technological breakthrough in the exploitation of shale oil and gas through the fracking 
methods has driven up and rescued the seemingly inevitable declining U.S. oil and gas 
production (Kerr, 2010; The Economist, 2014). Due to fracking technology, by 2020 the 
U.S. is projected to overtake Saudi Arabia as the world‟s largest producer of oil (The 
Economist, 2014). The technology has also twisted the forecast which said that the U.S. 
would become a big gas importer; instead, the U.S. now “produces more gas than it 
knows what to do with” (The Economist, 2012b).  
From a study about the impact of technological progress on the exploration of 
oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico from 1947 to 1998, Managi, Opaluch, Jin, and 
Grigalunas (2005) found that over the past 50 years, technological change played a very 
significant role in increasing the amount of reserves as well as lowering the costs of 
exploration and discovery in the region‟s offshore industry. The study found that 
although the effect of resource depletion was dominant in the first two decades out of 
the five-decade period under study, over the entire period the effects of technological 
change was found to be able to offset the effects of resources depletion.  
Figure 2.4 on the following page shows the trends in the world‟s oil and gas 
proven reserves from 1980 to 2010.   
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Figure 2.4  World oil and gas proven reserves 
 
 
Source: The Titi Tudorancea Bulletin (2014). 
  
 
From Figure 2.4, it is rather hard to claim that the world‟s proven oil reserves 
have declined over time, and the same for natural gas reserves. It might be appropriate 
to suggest that these increasing reserves for oil and gas are due to the development in 
technology as Watkins (2006) suggests. However, it might not be fair to only present 
data on the world‟s oil and gas reserves without comparing them with the increasing 
global demand for oil and gas, either due to population growth or due to the increase in 
the standards of living. 
Perhaps there is truth in what Tertzakian (2007) said when he suggested that oil 
may never run out completely, but it would be more and more difficult and expensive to 
deliver, ready to be consumed. Even with the full back-up from the technological 
progress available, drillers might still, and in fact they do now, have to go to the far 
flung corners of the earth such as the Arctic or to regions devastated by wars and unrest 
to explore and exploit oil and gas to satisfy global demand. 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
This chapter focussed on the neoclassical model of economic growth as proposed 
by Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956). The key concept in the model is that long-
term output growth depends on the rate of technological progress. Technological 
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progress also holds a central role in the continuing supply of limited natural resources to 
support humans‟ current standards of living.  The petroleum industry might hold a 
prominent example of how technological progress has enabled output to be maintained 
overtime even when faced with depleting resources.  
As Indonesia today is facing a steady decline in oil and gas output, an 
investigation into the state of technological progress in the country‟s oil and gas 
industry is crucial. However, the historical context of the industry itself should first be 
understood in order to get a clear and thorough picture about the role of the industry in 
Indonesia‟s economic development over time. This will be the central theme of the next 
chapter. 
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  Chapter 3
Development of the Petroleum Industry and the Economy of Indonesia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the historical developments of 
Indonesia‟s petroleum industry as well as the general impacts of the industry on the 
economy. The primary reason for conducting a historical analysis is not only to give a 
deeper and richer analysis, but more importantly it is because output or economic 
growth is largely a result of the conditions that arose – and the consequent economic 
policies that were taken – in the past (Boediono, 2005). According to the path 
dependency theorem, the behaviour of the system today is profoundly influenced by 
what happened to the system during the previous period (Setterfield, 1998). Thus, this 
concept of path dependency could be closely linked to matters pertaining to 
development and national economic growth patterns (Woolcock, Szreter, & Rao, 2011).  
In recent years, empirical literature studying the relationship between history 
and current economic development has developed considerably. Several papers have 
documented how long-term economic development was profoundly affected by certain 
historic events. Examples of these including the study by Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) which showed that colonisation policies affected the subsequent 
development of domestic institutions and economic development; the study by Banerjee 
and Iyer (2005) which showed that differences in colonial land revenue systems set up 
by the British in India lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes; and the 
study by Nunn (2008) which showed the negative effects of Africa‟s slave trade to the 
subsequent economic development of the region. Nunn (2009, p. 88) argued that the 
recent development of literature on this subject reinforces the argument that “history 
matters”. 
 
3.2 Pre-independence: A historical sketch 
 
Indonesia is one of the oldest oil producing regions in the world (Hunter, 1966). 
In 1883, during the Dutch colonial period, Aeilko Jans Zijlker – a Dutchman – 
accidentally discovered the first commercially exploitable oil reservoir near Langkat, 
North Sumatra. When sheltering from heavy rain he observed that a local man lit a 
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bamboo torch that had been dipped in a nearby pond and upon inspecting the pond he 
recognised the smell of lamp oil emanating from the surface. Having concession from 
the local ruler, becoming the first oil concession in Indonesia, Zijlker established a 
company and raised funds from the Netherlands. A successful commercial production in 
Telaga Tunggal in the region of North Sumatra began in 1885 (Bartlett III, Barton, 
Bartlett, Fowler, & Hays, 1972). 
With this firm discovery as a basis, Zijlker set up several other oil companies, 
including Royal Dutch Petroleum, and started a wide search for oil in the Netherlands 
East Indies (N.E.I) – now Indonesia – with Surabaya, Jambi, Perlak, Palembang and 
eastern Borneo showed promising oil seepages that led to exploratory drillings. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum soon controlled the activities of production, refining and marketing for 
the group in Java and Sumatra (Pertamina, 1979). 
Other early player in Indonesia‟s petroleum industry was the Shell Transport and 
Trading Company which was founded by an Englishman named Marcus Samuel. It 
found oil in eastern Borneo and set up an oil refinery in Balikpapan in 1894. In 1907, 
both companies – Royal Dutch Petroleum and the Shell Transport and Trading 
Company – merged to form Royal Dutch/Shell and was soon known worldwide simply 
as „Shell‟, which nowadays is one of the major international oil companies. Due to its 
exploration efforts and financial strengths, Shell was able to monopolise virtually all of 
the petroleum industry‟s upstream and downstream activities which include production, 
refining, transport and marketing in the N.E.I and the neighbouring countries for several 
years (Bartlett III et al., 1972; Hunter, 1966; Pertamina, 1979). 
Table 3.1 presents the crude oil production during the years around the Second 
World War. 
 
Table 3.1 Crude oil production, 1938-1949 
1938 7,398
1939 7,949
1940 7,939
1941 N.A.
1942 3,250
1943 6,500
1944 3,750
1945 850
1946 302
1947 1,113
1948 4,326
1949 5,930
Year
Crude oil production 
(thousand metric tons)
 
Source: Hunter (1966) 
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As Table 3.1 indicates, between 1938 and 1940 annual crude oil production 
could be maintained at around seven million metric tonnes. In this period, over 75 per 
cent of crude oil produced in the Far East came from Indonesian wells, thus practically 
the entire oil industry in the region at that time was dominated by Indonesia (Hunter, 
1966). However, the capacity of the industry to generate growth in other sectors of the 
economy during this time period was very limited (Lindblad, 1989).  
With the status of the N.E.I as the largest oil exporter in the Far East, it is not 
particularly surprising that when World War II broke out in the Pacific, the N.E.I would 
be Japan‟s next target for invasion after the attack on Pearl Harbour and Malaya. During 
the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) oil production significantly dropped. As seen in 
Table 3.1, during this period annual crude oil production never reached the same level 
as before the war years. According to Barnes (1995), this drop in production was firstly 
due to the scorched earth tactics on oil production facilities used by the Dutch, where 
many oil facilities were destroyed to deny their usage by the Japanese. Secondly, it was 
due to the incompetence on the part of the Japanese in the oil industry at the time. Many 
of the men assigned to exploit the N.I.E‟s oil facilities for the war efforts were drafted 
directly from schools and had minimal practical experience. Further, the problems in 
production increased when the Allied forces started to bomb the remaining oil facilities 
(Bartlett III et al., 1972). Table 3.1 shows that nearing the end of the Second World 
War, oil production was declining drastically, with approximately only 850,000 metric 
tonnes produced in 1945. 
Table 3.1 shows that by the end of the war, production started to increase, from 
a very low output of only 302,000 metric tonnes in 1946 to more than one million 
metric tonnes in 1947. In 1948 and 1949, the quantity of oil output still could not reach 
the pre-war levels due to, among others, the political instability following the Dutch‟s 
re-colonisation efforts and the revolutionary war for Indonesia‟s independence (Hunter, 
1966). 
 
3.3 Early years of independence and the Soekarno era 
 
During the vacuum of power following the end of World War II, Indonesia 
declared its independence on August 17, 1945, with Soekarno as its first president and 
hence ended more than three hundred years of Dutch colonialism. However, due to the 
damages suffered during the war years and political instability of the new country, the 
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oil and gas industry was slow to reach its full potential to the same level as before the 
war. As Table 3.1 showed, production of crude oil during the early years of 
independence moved up slowly from 302,000 metric tonnes in 1946 to 1,113,000 in 
1947 and only reached 5,930,000 metric tonnes in 1949. These were well below the 
production output in 1940. 
 After failed attempts by the Netherlands to retake Indonesia as its colony in 
1947 and 1949, the Netherlands finally recognised Indonesian independence. This was 
followed by a wave of nationalisation of foreign companies that eventually destabilised 
the economy. The „anti-foreign exploitation‟ sparked intense debates in the government 
for years to come and it was only in 1960 – fifteen years after independence – that 
President Soekarno, using his emergency powers, signed the Oil and Mining Law No. 
44 (Carlson, 1977, as cited in Widiyanto, 2004). This law clearly stated that oil and gas 
operations were to be undertaken only by the state and exclusively carried out by state 
enterprises (Fabrikant, 1975b). The base for this government monopoly in oil and gas 
operations is Article 33 Section (3) of the Constitution of Indonesia which stated that 
„the land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the powers of the 
State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people‟ (Constitution of Indonesia, 
2002). 
This was a major milestone in the policy for the petroleum industry in Indonesia, 
within which from now on, non-state owned companies, either foreign or domestic, 
could only operate as contractors to state companies. This subsequently gave birth to the 
contractual systems (production sharing contract/PSC and service contract) in Indonesia 
which replaced the concessionary system that was inherited from the era of the 
Netherlands East Indies. Regarding the PSC, Indonesia was a pioneer, with the first 
contract signed in the early 1960s (Nakhle, 2008). 
It is worth highlighting the basic difference between concessionary and 
contractual systems. Under the concessionary system, the titles of oil and gas are 
transferred from the government to oil companies when they are „produced‟ (that is, 
when the oil or gas is lifted from beneath the earth), and then the producing company 
pays royalties and taxes. Whereas in contractual systems, titles of oil and gas still reside 
with the government even after they are produced. The company only receives a share 
of production (in the case of PSC) or revenue (in the case of a service contract) (Mazeel, 
2010). 
The era of President Soekarno from the 1950s until the 1960s was an era of 
turmoil. The exodus of foreign capital and many skilled workers, the growth of regional 
 30 
 
unrest that turned into rebellions, confrontation with Malaysia, instability of the 
government (from 1950 to 1957 alone Indonesians had seen eight cabinets rise and fall) 
and the substantial growth of the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) (Bartlett III et al., 
1972; Lev, 1966) all negatively affected the business environment in the country. 
However, as shown in Figure 3.1, the Indonesian oil industry was able to maintain a 
steady increase in crude oil production even though the industry was also not immune to 
the generally adverse conditions in the country at that time. 
 
Figure 3.1  Crude oil production, 1950-1964 
 
Source: Hunter (1966) 
 
 
Data plotted in Figure 3.1 show that by 1951 crude production in that year alone 
reached over 8 million tonnes, and for the first time oil extraction had surpassed the 
average annual production before independence. Furthermore, crude oil production after 
the signing of the Oil and Mining Law No. 44 in 1960 steadily increased, from around 
21 million metric tonnes in 1961 to around 23 million metric tonnes in 1964.  
This steadily increasing production during 1950-1964 could also be partly 
attributed to the tight financial discipline in the management of the state-owned oil 
companies at that time. During the early years after the formal recognition of 
independence from the Netherlands, the main aim of the state-owned oil companies‟ 
management teams was to rehabilitate the damaged oil facilities using money provided 
from the selling of the available crude oil. These efforts grew strongly after the central 
government, through the Indonesian army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan 
Darat), took over oil facilities from the bickering local controlling groups in 1957 
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(Barnes, 1995; Bartlett III et al., 1972). For example, in May 1958 a batch of crude 
production from the North Sumatra oil fields of 1,700 metric tonnes was shipped to 
Japan and the US$30,000 from the sale was entirely spent on new equipment used to 
further restore and build the business (Pertamina, 1979).  
However, even though the growth in oil production had been able to help the 
ailing industry through its difficult years, the proportion of oil exported still represented 
only 30 per cent of Indonesia‟s total exports and the share of Indonesian oil in the Far 
East region had fallen to 50 per cent, compared to 75 per cent of the market share during 
the Netherlands East Indies era (Barnes, 1995). Furthermore, during this period the 
industry only contributed around 5 per cent to total central government revenue 
(Johnson, 1977). In this period, the Indonesian petroleum industry could not be 
expected to be the backbone for the government to support its economic development 
programs.  
 
3.4 Soeharto era: Free from oil? 
3.4.1 Consolidation of national oil companies 
 
In 1965, a failed coup d’etat by the Indonesian communists eventually led to the 
downfall of the Soekarno administration in 1966 and the establishment of Soeharto as 
president in 1968. Up until this time, the activities of the oil and gas industry in 
Indonesia were conducted by two different state enterprises which were Permina and 
Pertamin. The need to eliminate their overlapping responsibilities and divergent 
directions led the new administration to merge the two state enterprises in 1968 to form 
„Pertamina‟ (Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara) - one 
integrated national oil company (NOC) to represent the nation in all facets of petroleum 
exploitation in the country (Barnes, 1995; Pertamina, 1979). 
Later, to further bolster the position of Pertamina in the petroleum industry in 
Indonesia, the Pertamina Law No. 8 was passed in 1971 and became effective on 
January 1, 1972. The law specified that Pertamina operated the oil and natural gas 
activities covering exploration, exploitation, refining and processing, transportation and 
marketing. The law also stated that operational expansions of the oil and gas fields 
could only be undertaken with the approval of the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia. Hence, these rules in Law No. 8/ 1971 strengthened the central role of the 
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state in the development of Indonesia‟s petroleum industry (Barnes, 1995; Fabrikant, 
1975a). 
 
3.4.2 Oil boom 
 
In the 1970s the Indonesian oil and gas sector had grown into a mature and 
established industry, as seen in Figure 3.2. This period also saw the first production of 
offshore oil facilities and in early 1972, daily oil production had reached one million 
barrels per day (Indonesian Government, 1974).  
 
Figure 3.2  Oil production and oil export, 1970 – 1984 
 
 
Sources: British Petroleum (2015); Pinto (1987). 
 
 
As seen in Figure 3.2, oil production as a percentage share of GDP reached its 
peak in 1980 at 25.7 per cent. On the other hand, oil exports as a percentage of total 
exports reached its peak in 1975 (74.8 per cent) – this was more than a 200 per cent 
increase compared to the 1950s and 1960s. Oil production spiked in 1974 and 1980 
following steep price increases due to the world‟s oil crises during these years. 
Oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 brought a significant change in Indonesia‟s 
petroleum industry and the economy. During this period, the government became 
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increasingly dependent on the petroleum industry for its revenue and as the source of 
foreign exchange earnings (Barnes, 1995). The proportion of oil and gas revenue in total 
government revenue increased significantly during these two oil shocks, from around 26 
per cent in 1969 to 55 per cent in 1974 and reached its peak in 1981 with a share of 71 
per cent of total government revenue, as seen in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3  Oil revenue as a share of total government revenue and the world’s oil 
prices, 1969-1999 
 
 
Source: Widiyanto (2004) 
Notes: 1. SORFIR is the Share of Oil Revenue in Fiscal Revenue (per cent, left vertical axis) 
            2. WOP is the World‟s Oil Price (US$/Barrel, right vertical axis) 
 
 
It can also be seen in Figure 3.3 that income from oil fluctuates, closely 
following the fluctuations in oil prices. When the world‟s oil price is high, the share of 
oil revenue increases and vice versa. Therefore, when the Indonesian government relied 
heavily on oil revenue such as in the 1970s and 1980s, the country‟s economy was also 
largely exposed to the risks of oil price volatility. 
During the oil crisis of 1973-1974 the world‟s oil price quadrupled from 
US$2.80 per barrel in 1972 to US$11.22 per barrel by 1974. This unprecedented 
increase in the oil price was supposed to enable Pertamina, as a monopolist in the 
industry, to invest a huge amount of money in new technologies, more sophisticated 
equipment and explorations of new fields in order to increase the productive capacity in 
its core businesses, which are oil and gas. However, a bad financial strategy combined 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999
U
S$
/B
ar
re
l 
P
er
 c
en
t 
SORFIR WOP
 34 
 
with a business diversification strategy that was widely outside its business core
5
 and 
beyond its span of control, as well as the mismanagement of their operations brought 
down Pertamina (Barnes, 1995). In February 1975, the New York Herald-Tribune 
reported that Pertamina had failed to meet the payment schedule on a US$40 million 
loan to a foreign bank. When an audit team from the Indonesian government dug deeper 
into the issue, it found that the amount of Pertamina‟s indebtedness was estimated to 
reach US$10.5 billion (Glassburner, 1976); that was more than the amount of foreign 
aid raised by the Soekarno and Soeharto regimes combined (which only amounted to 
US$8 billion) (Goldstone, 1977). In this episode which is termed the „Pertamina crisis‟, 
the government eventually had to rescue Pertamina by taking over all of the company‟s 
debts. It caused the Indonesian economy to experience a setback as funds that should 
have been used to finance development programs had to be diverted to repay 
Pertamina‟s debts (Barnes, 1995; Glassburner, 1976). 
The 1970s was also marked by major developments in the gas industry in 
Indonesia. Following the finding of two large gas fields in Aceh (Northern Sumatra) 
and East Kalimantan in 1971 and 1972, Indonesia began its quest for natural gas 
reserves in other regions. These moves were supported by the construction of several 
gas processing plants for the sake of the development of the gas industry itself and not 
merely as a side project of some oil fields developments. The main aim of these efforts 
was that Indonesian gas industry would be able to serve as an independent producer of 
government revenue and as a source of foreign exchange earnings (Wijarso, 1985). The 
efforts to expand the gas industry seemed to have produced encouraging results. By 
2008 Indonesia‟s proven natural gas reserves were the largest in the Asia-Pacific region 
and ranked as the tenth largest in the world (OECD/IEA, 2008). 
 The huge windfall profits from the two oil shocks in 1970s and 1980s 
successfully removed the acute balance of payments constraint which for three decades 
since the country‟s independence had limited the ability of the government to 
implement its economic development programs (Arndt, 1983). As such, Indonesia‟s 
economic growth showed significant increases compared to the previous period. Figure 
3.4 shows the trend in Indonesia‟s economic growth before and after the oil shocks.  
 
                                                 
5
 At the time, beside its core business in oil and gas, Pertamina also owned and operated an airline, a hotel 
chain, a steel mill, petrochemical factories, property businesses and rice plantations (Glassburner, 1976). 
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Figure 3.4  Average annual GDP growth rates, 1960-1988 
 
 
Source: Booth (1992) 
 
 
 Figure 3.4 shows that during 1960-1967 the economy grew at an average rate of 
only 1.7 per cent annually. Following the windfall profit from oil revenue, economic 
growth increased significantly and reached an annual average of 7.9 per cent during 
1967-1973 and 7.5 per cent during 1973-1981. As the oil boom period ended, economic 
growth declined to an annual average of 4.3 per cent during 1981-1988. 
Overall, the years from 1968 to 1981 had witnessed some remarkable economic 
achievements in Indonesia where the average annual GDP growth rate accelerated to 
over 7 per cent per year. Compared to the economic achievements during the first two 
decades after independence, this was indeed an impressive record. According to Booth 
(1992), this rapid growth can be closely associated with the sustained improvement in 
the country‟s terms of trade that mostly accrued from oil revenue. 
 
3.4.3 Oil bust, deregulation and the crisis of 1997/1998 
 
The periods of oil boom for Indonesia eventually ended after 1981. The share of 
oil and gas in the government‟s total fiscal revenue declined after 1982. From 1980 until 
1984 oil and gas revenue accounted for over 65 per cent of the total revenue. However, 
by 1992 the oil and gas industry contributed no more than 30 per cent of total 
government revenue (Figure 3.3). This long-term decline might closely be associated 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1960-67 1967-73 1973-81 1981-88
G
D
P
 g
ro
w
th
 r
at
e
s 
(p
e
r 
ce
n
t)
 
 36 
 
with, first, the decline in the world‟s oil prices at that time and, second, the depletion of 
Indonesia‟s proven oil reserves. 
 After the steep increase in oil prices due to the two oil shocks in the 1970s the 
price of oil reach its peak in 1980 at US$35.48 per barrel and since then, at least until 
1999, oil prices declined (Figure 3.3). The oil shocks in the 1970s boosted global efforts 
to reduce the dependence of nations‟ economies to oil in case the same happened again 
in the future. Since then, considerable scientific and engineering work has been done to 
expand the possibilities of energy efficiency and conservation as well as the substitution 
of oil as a primary source of energy (Gately, 1984). The main effect of these efforts is 
the lower global demand for oil than before the crises (Lahardt & Dougherty, 2008) and, 
consequently, this lower demand drove the price of oil lower. 
 Further, Indonesia‟s proven oil reserves looked bleak. Figure 3.5 illustrates the 
conditions of the proven oil reserves in Indonesia from 1980 to 2010.  
 
Figure 3.5  Indonesia’s proven oil reserves, 1980-2010 
 
 
Source: The Titi Tudorancea Bulletin (2014) 
 
 
 As shown in Figure 3.5, Indonesia‟s proven oil reserves have shown a steadily 
declining trend since 1980. Even though it peaked briefly in 1991 with 11 billion barrels 
of proven reserves, it has been consistently falling and stayed at approximately 4 billion 
barrels from 2004 to 2010. This depletion in oil reserves was consequently followed by 
the reduction in the production of crude oil and eventually caused the oil revenue to also 
decline.  
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After the end of the oil boom era, Indonesia‟s GDP growth during the early part 
of 1980s declined significantly, as shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6  Annual GDP growth, 1981-2012 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
 
It can be seen in Figure 3.6 that during 1980-1982 Indonesia‟s economic growth 
rate steadily declined from 8.7 per cent in 1980 to 8.1 per cent in 1981 and declined 
steeply in 1982 with an economic growth rate of only 1.1 per cent. Although there was a 
brief increase in 1983 with a growth of 8.4 per cent, economic growth declined 
significantly in 1985 with a rate of only 3.5 per cent. 
During this time period, Indonesia seemed to be the perfect candidate for a 
country that had contracted the „Dutch disease‟. The name reflects the difficult 
economic conditions of Indonesia‟s former colonialist, the Netherlands, in the 1970s. 
On the surface, during this period the Dutch economy seemed strong and healthy due to 
the boom of natural gas exports from the Groningen fields. However, internally, the 
boom had negatively affected other sectors of the economy. The appreciation of the 
Dutch Guilder due to booming gas output had made the country‟s other tradeable 
sectors shrink, causing economic stagnation and a high level of unemployment (Davis, 
1995; Kremers, 1986). 
Anticipating the end of the oil boom era, the Indonesian government applied an 
„exit strategy‟ of diversifying the economy away from its heavy dependence on oil 
resources. This strategy had, more or less, successfully prevented Indonesia from 
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catching the Dutch disease (Usui, 1997). Although it should also be noted that avoiding 
the Dutch disease was not the primary reason for the implementation of this exit 
strategy. The Indonesian economic team – dubbed the „Berkeley Mafia‟6 – recognised 
the limitations of the government as the only single engine of prosperity and thus 
promoted market-based production structures as new engines of economic growth 
(Arndt, 1983; Prawiro, 1998). The consequence of this policy was the deregulation of 
many sectors of the economy to enable private investment to thrive. This deregulation 
affected, among others, the financial, manufacturing and trade sectors (Booth, 1992). 
All measures taken under the exit strategy appeared to work. The growth rates of 
GDP from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s were similar to, and at times were slightly 
above, the oil boom era (Figure 3.6). This was achieved even though oil and gas only 
contributed an average of 44 per cent to total government revenue during 1985-1990 
and only an average of 27 per cent during 1991-1996. So confident was the government 
of the successes of its exit strategy that in 1994, President Soeharto addressed the OPEC 
delegation in Bali stating that oil “no longer plays an important role” in the Indonesian 
economy (Barnes, 1995, p. 19). 
 However, deregulation, especially the deregulation of the financial sector
7
, was 
believed to be one of the factors that led the economy into the 1997/1998 financial crisis 
(Bennett, 1999; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999). An overly liberalised banking system 
coupled with a weak financial structure had led to a procreation of precariously 
undercapitalised and poorly supervised banks. These conditions, in turn, prompted large 
private external debts (most of which was unhedged and short-term) and a rapid build-
up of volatile private capital inflows (Djiwandono, 2000, p. 49; Hill, 2000; Thee, 2003). 
All of these worsened the burden of the crisis for the country. Indonesia was the worst 
affected by the Asian financial crisis compared with other East Asian countries such as 
Malaysia, Thailand or South Korea (Hill, 2000). So severe was the crisis in Indonesia 
that its economic growth rate fell by a dramatic amount in just one year, from an 
average of over 7 per cent annually during 1990 to 1997 to almost -14 per cent in 1998 
alone (Figure 3.6). 
The crisis also had devastating social and political effects on the country that 
eventually forced Soeharto, who had ruled for 32 years, to resign following massive and 
                                                 
6
 Named because a large number of the team were economic graduates from the University of California, 
Berkeley. 
7
 In October 1988 the central bank of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia) launched a deregulation package known 
as PAKTO 88 that relaxed significantly the establishment of private and foreign-owned banks in 
Indonesia (see Bennett, 1995; Prawiro, 1998). 
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deadly riots in the country
8
. It was estimated that around 500 people died in the riots 
with more than 3,000 buildings attacked and nearly 1,500 vehicles destroyed (Chinoy, 
1998). Such were the impacts of the petroleum industry on the rise and fall of a nation. 
Through a long and painful adjustment process Indonesia was eventually able to 
manage itself out of the crisis, even though its post-crisis output levels were still below 
the pre-crisis years. Indonesia‟s economic recovery resembled the „V‟ shape rebound 
experienced by other East Asian countries rather than the „L‟ shape growth patterns of 
much of the Eastern European (mostly the former Soviet Union) countries following the 
collapse of communism in the late 1980s (Aswicahyono, Bird, & Hill, 2009, p. 354).  
 
3.5 Reformation era: Net oil importer and unfavourable investment climate 
 
After the fall of Soeharto (dubbed „era reformasi‟9 or the reformation era), the 
petroleum industry struggled to regain its production capabilities back to the same level 
as before. During this time period domestic oil production steadily decreased whereas 
domestic consumption of petroleum products was increasing. This can be clearly seen in 
Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7 Oil production and consumption, 1980-2009 
 
 
Source:  The Titi Tudorancea Bulletin (2014) 
                                                 
8
 Detailed discussions on the fall of Soeharto can be studied in, among others, Eklöf (1999). 
9
 This is the name Indonesians give for the time period since the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The name 
signifies the effort to reform the country‟s social, political and economic structures from the legacy of 
Soeharto administration which was generally characterised by corruption, collusion and nepotism 
(Anwar, 2004). 
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This mismatch between the supply of oil and demand for oil, as shown in Figure 
3.7, impacted on the position of Indonesia in the international trade of oil. In 2004, for 
the first time since oil was found in the Netherlands East Indies era, Indonesia became a 
net oil importer. Eventually, in September 2008, OPEC announced that Indonesia – 
which had been a member since 1962 – had formally suspended its membership in the 
organisation (Pallone, 2009). 
In 2010, Indonesia‟s proven oil reserves amounted to 3.99 billion barrels. With 
the 2010 level of exploitation of around 300 million barrels a year and without 
significant new investment in exploration and advanced exploitation technologies the 
available reserves may be completely dry by the mid-2020s (OECD/IEA, 2008).  
 The era reformasi was also marked by two dramatic events relating to the oil 
and gas industry. The first event was the enactment of Law No.22/2001 which had the 
main aim of attracting new investment to Indonesia‟s ailing petroleum industry and the 
second event was the annulling of some of the significant provisions of this law in 2012. 
Recognising the continuing decline in oil production, the Indonesian 
government with the approval of the parliament passed the Oil and Gas Law No. 
22/2001 which had the main purpose of attracting new investment, either from domestic 
sources or foreign sources, in the upstream oil and gas industry, with the hope of 
increasing the industry‟s level of production. Under the new law, the regulatory 
functions in upstream and downstream activities were transferred from the state oil 
company, Pertamina, to new institutions called BPMIGAS (Executive Agency for 
Upstream Oil and Gas Activity) and BPHMIGAS (Executive Agency for Downstream 
Oil and Gas Activity) (OECD/IEA, 2008).  
The new law replaced the Pertamina Law No.8/1971 and thus practically ended 
the monopoly power of Pertamina, as the company had to surrender its position as  
licensor, supervisor and regulator in the Indonesian petroleum industry, rendering it 
only like a common oil and gas company (M. Karim, 2013). The pro free-market nature 
of the new law was formulated with the hope of increasing competition and the 
economic efficiency of the petroleum industry and eventually be able to boost the 
country‟s oil and gas output. 
In 2012 a petition was submitted by a number of prominent figures and 
organisations against the Law No.22/2001, as they saw this law as too liberal, violating 
the state sovereignty in the energy sector since the law allowed foreign companies to 
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drill for oil and gas in Indonesia. The Constitutional Court, having considered Article 33 
Section 3 of the Constitution, which states: „The land and the waters and the natural 
riches contained therein shall be controlled by the State and shall be used for the 
greatest benefit of the people‟, hinged its decision on its interpretation of „shall be 
controlled by the State‟ and ruled that BPMIGAS was unconstitutional and thus must 
cease to exist (Cornwell & Anas, 2013; M. Karim, 2013).  
To avoid turmoil and legal uncertainty in the Indonesian oil and gas industry 
following the liquidation of BPMIGAS, the President issued decree No. 95/2012 which 
transferred the duties, functions, and organisations of BPMIGAS to SKKMIGAS 
(Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Activities) – which is a unit under the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Furthermore, the government announced 
that all contracts including PSC or Contract of Work that were signed between all 
parties and BPMIGAS before the annulment would remain valid (Azwar, 2012; 
Wardany, 2012). According to the presidential decree, SKKMIGAS was not intended to 
be a permanent body (M. Karim, 2013), however, at the time of this study (two years 
later) the government has not yet worked out its replacement. 
This event made foreign investors nervous (The Economist, 2012a). Even 
though the government gave assurances that all current contracts would be honoured, 
international oil giants who have operations in Indonesia, such as ExxonMobil, Chevron 
and CNOOC, are now wondering what will happen when they come up for contract 
renewals. Indeed a study by Boyd, Devero, Frias, Meyer, and Ross (2010) which was 
conducted in 2009, three years before the BPMIGAS debacle, concluded from several 
interviews with oil and gas company executives in Indonesia that impetuous legislative 
decisions and frequent regulatory changes have deteriorated the legal certainty climate 
for investors and thus have adversely impacted their business sentiment. According to 
some interviewees in the study, ambiguous legislation and abrupt changes in laws and 
regulations as well as the nonexistence of reliable channels to settle business disputes 
have damaged investor confidence and subsequently deterred them from funding new 
exploration projects. It is not hard to see that these conditions may have thwarted the 
petroleum industry‟s expansion and thus negatively affected output production. 
The petition against Oil and Gas Law No. 22/2001 reflected the rise of resource 
nationalism in Indonesia, particularly since the era reformasi began (Habir, 2013; 
Soesastro, 2007). Some studies suggested that resource nationalism is a cyclical 
phenomenon where many factors might become involved in its rise and fall (Bremmer 
& Johnston, 2009; Vivoda, 2009). The high price of oil since the 2000s was considered 
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to be the main reason for the resurgence of resource nationalism in many resource rich 
countries (Vivoda, 2009). Related to this, in Indonesia this sentiment became stronger 
when the government began to reduce its fuel subsidy due to budgetary pressures 
following oil price increases. In fact, some legislators demanded more economic benefit 
from the country‟s energy resources following the spike in oil prices in 2008 (Davies, 
2009, as cited in Boyd et al., 2010). A study by Click and Weiner (2010), which treated 
resource nationalism as a political risk in 37 countries, concluded that such a sentiment 
destroys the market value of a country‟s petroleum reserves.  
 
3.6 Policy development in Indonesia’s petroleum industry 
 
Having overviewed the development of Indonesia‟s petroleum industry and its 
impacts on the economy, it is important to discuss the development of the policy related 
to the industry. Discussion in this section will cover the period from Indonesia‟s 
independence through to the reformation era in order to provide a better picture of the 
policy background that impacted the industry‟s highs and lows. 
The evolution of the national strategy for the Indonesia‟s petroleum industry is 
summarised in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2  Development of the national strategy for the petroleum industry 
Soekarno 
Era 
1950 - 1965  Economic programs emphasised the availability of 
foodstuffs, textiles and transportation. 
 No formal plan regarding the development of the oil 
and gas industry. 
 Revenue from the petroleum industry was 
insignificant. 
Soeharto 
Era 
First Five-Year 
Development Plan 
1969/70  – 1973/74 
 Main emphasis was on the agricultural sector.  
 The role of the petroleum sector was to support and 
boost the agricultural sector, e.g. provide feedstock 
for the fertiliser industry.  
 Development strategy for the petroleum industry 
relied on the search for new hydrocarbon reserves. 
Second Development 
Plan 
1974/75 – 1978/79 
 Import substitution policy to reduce unemployment 
and relieve pressures on foreign exchange reserves.  
 Oil exports as the main source of government income 
and foreign exchange (oil boom periods).  
 The development strategy for the petroleum industry 
was focused on the geological mapping of 
hydrocarbon potential and the training of local 
petroleum workers. 
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Table 3.2  (Cont.) 
 Third, Fourth and 
Fifth Development 
Plans 
1979/80 – 1993/94 
 Exit strategy. Government tried to reduce reliance on 
oil and gas revenue.  
 Massive deregulation of many sectors of the 
economy. 
 Strategy for the petroleum industry emphasised the 
finding of new reserves and maintaining the 
production capacity of existing wells.  
 Started the development of the gas industry. 
Sixth Development 
Plan 
1994/95 – 1998/99 
 Human capital development strategy with strong 
emphasis on efficiency and productivity of human 
resources.  
 The role of the petroleum industry was mainly to 
provide feedstock for other domestic industries.  
 The strategic plan was to compensate resource 
depletion with increasing productivity through 
science, technology and managerial skills. 
Reformation 
Era 
National 
Development 
Program 
(PROPENAS) and 
Mid-Term 
Development Plan 
(RPJM) 
2000 - 2009 
 Emphasis on economic recovery and national unity as 
well as dealing with social unrest and separatism.  
 No specific guidance on the medium-to-long-term 
development of the petroleum industry even though 
its depletion status has been formally recognised. 
Sources: Indonesian Government (1958, 1968, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000, 2005). 
 
3.6.1 Soekarno era 
 
In the Soekarno era, continuous political strife hampered the recovery of the 
petroleum industry from the devastating effects of World War II and the subsequent war 
for independence. During this time period, the only regulation that guided the five-year 
development plan, Law No. 85/1958, stated that the production sectors which most 
needed to be developed were foodstuffs, textiles and transportation (Indonesian 
Government, 1958). Therefore, at the national level, there was no formal plan or policy 
regarding the development of the oil and gas industry. The ability of the industry to 
maintain its production levels during those years was primarily due to the initiatives of 
the management of either state or privately owned oil and gas companies. The most 
notable example of this lack of strategy for the oil and gas industry during this time 
period was the absence of systematic geological explorations which had ended at the 
start of World War II. Limited geological research was conducted only in specific areas 
for the purpose of determining the appropriate location to drill new wells for the local 
site expansion of the fields that were already operating (Indonesian Government, 1968). 
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This era saw the end of the concession system in oil and gas mining in Indonesia, 
which was inherited from the colonial era, with the enactment of Law No. 44/1960. This 
law ruled that the state holds a sovereign right to the country‟s oil and gas resources and 
their exploitation must only be performed by the state or state-owned companies. Thus, 
foreign or domestic oil companies operating in Indonesia were relegated as contractors 
to the state or state-owned companies. This, in turn, paved the way for the contract of 
work (CoW) or service contracts for oil companies which had already secured a 
concession during the Dutch colonial era such as the Standard Oil of New Jersey 
(STANVAC) and the Standard Oil of California (CALTEX). The law also paved the 
way for the application of PSC systems in Indonesia (Arndt, 1983; Lubiantara, 2012).  
 
3.6.2 Soeharto era 
 
A policy that was directed more towards the medium-to-long-term development 
of the petroleum industry was formulated during  Soeharto‟s New Order era, although it 
was more or less due to the impacts of the windfall profit the government earned during 
the oil boom era of the 1970s. In REPELITA I (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun I or 
the First Five-Year Development Plan, for budget years of 1969/1970 to 1973/1974)
10
, 
the main focus of economic development was in the agricultural sector. This was 
unsurprising given that in 1966, which was the end of Soekarno administration, the 
inflation rate reached 650 per cent due to the lack of, particularly, foodstuffs in the 
market (Indonesian Government, 1968). Consequently, the main role of the petroleum 
industry was to support and boost agricultural production by providing feedstock to the 
fertiliser industry. Concurrent with the planned development of the fertiliser industry, 
gas distribution systems (gas pipes, processing facilities, etc.) started to be developed 
(Indonesian Government, 1968).  
The strategy to develop the petroleum industry during this period largely relied on 
the search for new hydrocarbon fields. A new foreign investment law was introduced in 
early 1967, partly to revive exploration efforts which stalled after the break out of 
World War II (Arndt, 1983; Indonesian Government, 1968), along with the building of 
a new research and development centre for oil and gas technology (Lembaga Minyak 
dan Gas or LEMIGAS). This facility served to complement the research facilities that 
                                                 
10
At the time the state budget was started on April 1
st
 and ended on March 31
st
 of the following year. 
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were owned and already operated by private oil and gas companies operating in 
Indonesia  (Indonesian Government, 1968). 
Under the Second Five-Year Development Plan or REPELITA II (1974/1975 - 
1978/1979), the high rate of unemployment prompted the government to focus on 
policies that could reduce the unemployment rate by promoting the establishment of 
import substitution industries. Aside from absorbing the workforce, it was hoped that 
these industries would also be able to relieve the pressures on the country‟s foreign 
exchange reserves. The oil shocks in the 1970s had greatly helped the government in 
achieving these objectives due to the windfall profit provided. The development 
strategy for the petroleum industry in this period was to concentrate on the integrated 
and systematic geological mapping of the archipelago in order to establish a complete 
geological map that portrayed the hydrocarbon potentials of the country for the sake of 
future exploitations (Indonesian Government, 1974). 
Furthermore, related to the development of human resources for the oil and gas 
industry, the government‟s policy was to provide training for the newly recruited 
petroleum workers, in order for them to be ready to fill the positions in this expanding 
industry. Oil companies were obliged to train local workers in order for these locals to 
be able to replace foreign workers. Research efforts were focused on the refining 
methods that were suitable for the types of oil found in Indonesia (Indonesian 
Government, 1974).  
It was during the Third Five-Year Development Plan or REPELITA III 
(1979/1980 - 1983/1984), following the falling in the world‟s oil prices, that the 
government started to realise that the windfall profits gained from oil shocks would not 
be available indefinitely. This forced the adoption of an export diversification policy in 
order to reduce the dependency on oil exports as the only source of foreign exchange, 
while at the same time still continuing to promote the import substitution policies. One 
of the significant policy changes during this time period was national tax reform, which 
aimed to simplify the once overly complicated tax codes in the hope of diversifying 
government sources of revenue by optimising tax collections from the non-oil and gas 
sectors of the economy. It was during this third five-year plan that the depletion stage of 
the available mature wells became a matter of concern for stakeholders. It had prompted 
the government to formulate some fiscal incentives for the application of secondary 
recovery methods in mature wells (Indonesian Government, 1979). 
During the Fourth (1984/1985 - 1988/1989) and Fifth Five-Year Development 
Plans (1989/1990 - 1993/1994), the main emphasis of the development policy was on 
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the exit strategy, which was the plan to not just reduce, but to shift the economy from 
reliance on the petroleum industry, towards the non-petroleum industries as the new 
engine of growth. This strategy called for deregulation in many sectors of the economy 
in order to boost private sector investment. One of the most notable policy changes was 
the deregulation of the financial sector. In this period, the petroleum industry still 
played an important role in providing revenue for the government but its trend in 
proportion was steadily decreasing (as shown earlier in Figure 3.3). 
The strategy adopted to develop the petroleum industry during the fourth and fifth 
plans was basically the same, which was to emphasise the need to find new hydrocarbon 
reserves, while maintaining the production capacity of the existing mature wells through 
enhanced oil recovery efforts as well as the transfer of petroleum exploration and 
exploitation technologies to locals. This period was also marked by the policy to 
significantly expand the exploitation and utilisation of the gas industry, for example, by 
building two large-scale gas processing plants, which are Bontang and Arun 
(Indonesian Government, 1984, 1989).  
The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1994/1995 - 1998/1999) highlighted the role of human 
capital in the development process. The policy was to give strong emphasis on human 
resources‟ efficiency and productivity to support economic growth. During this period, 
the main role of the petroleum industry was no longer as a source of foreign exchange 
reserves through its oil and gas exports, but rather to provide feedstock for other 
domestic industries in accelerating the process of industrialisation. The strategic plan 
was to compensate the resources depletion with increasing productivity through science 
and technological, as well as improved managerial skills (Indonesian Government, 
1994). 
It was realised during the sixth plan that the future of oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation was in remote and hard-to-reach areas, particularly in the eastern parts of 
Indonesia. Therefore, the government proposed that in order to overcome these 
challenges there was a need to accelerate the development of advanced science and 
technology. The focus on the expansion of production capacity rested offshore since the 
majority of potential onshore fields had already been exploited (Indonesian 
Government, 1994). 
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3.6.3 Reformation era 
 
Following the economic crisis of 1998, Indonesia was engulfed by social unrest 
and separatism. Hence, the policy emphasis during PROPENAS (Program 
Pembangunan Nasional or the National Development Program, 2000-2004) was on 
economic recovery and national unity. Even though the threat of unrest and separatism 
was significantly declining (though not completely gone) the subsequent five-year plan, 
which is RPJM (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah or the Mid-Term 
Development Plan, 2004-2009), more or less again put the same emphasis on dealing 
with social unrest and separatism (Indonesian Government, 2000, 2005).  
The five-year plans under the Soeharto Era discussed in detail their approaches in 
achieving the strategic objectives on the development of the petroleum industry, such as 
how many exploratory wells were targeted to be drilled, the exact capacity of the 
refinery facility that was planned to be built, and so on. On the other hand, PROPENAS 
and RPJM lacked such details. There was no specific guidance for the medium-to-long-
term development of the industry, even though it was formally recognised that the 
existing mature wells had arrived at their depletion stages. For example, in 
PROPENAS, under the headings of „Development of Natural Resources and 
Environment‟ (Indonesian Government, 2000, Chapter X), there was not even a single 
sentence that contained the word minyak (oil), or gas, or migas (which is the 
abbreviation of „oil and gas‟) to be found in the plan. However, when it came to the 
projections of the contributions of oil and gas sector in government revenue, more 
detailed information can be found, such as the medium-term projection of tax revenue 
from the oil and gas sector and the projections for other forms of non-tax revenue from 
the exploitation of oil and gas reserves. 
 
3.7 Development of the Indonesian production sharing contract11 
 
The production sharing contract (PSC) system emerged from the demands that the 
government should not be passive in the exploitation activity of its oil and gas 
resources. The main characteristic of PSC is that an oil company is chosen by the 
government as a contractor for a specific working area. The contractor has to bear all 
the costs and the related risks of exploration, development and production for that 
                                                 
11
 This section draws from Lubiantara (2012). 
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working area. If the exploration succeeded in striking oil, the costs expended by the 
contractor will be recovered – called the „cost recovery‟ – and they will be paid from the 
appropriation of the oil produced. Further, the contractor also owns the right for „profit 
oil‟ which is part of the production available to the contractor after cost recovery 
deductions. The contractor has to pay taxes just like other firms and at the end of 
contract period all of its installations and equipment in that specific working area will 
become the state‟s property. 
Indonesian PSC rose as a result of government disappointment in the contract of 
work (CoW) system implemented earlier. In PSC, the government and the oil 
companies share the proceeds from production, and not the proceeds from sales, as had 
been the case in the CoW system. Furthermore, unlike the CoW system, with PSC the 
government also possesses managerial control over the oil companies. 
In Indonesia‟s first generation PSC (1966 – 1975), oil and gas companies served 
as contractors to Pertamina and the managerial functions were fully in the hands of 
Pertamina. The maximum cost that could be recovered by oil companies (cost recovery) 
was 40 per cent of yearly total income. The proceeds available from the difference 
between gross income and cost recovery were split between Pertamina and contractors 
with a ratio of 65 per cent:35 per cent respectively, with government take increasing 
progressively depending on the production rate. Further, 25 per cent of a contractor‟s 
take had to be sold domestically under the scheme of domestic market obligation 
(DMO) at a price of US$0.20 per barrel. 
Due to the oil crisis of the 1970s and the consequent steep price increases, the 
government decided to renegotiate the previous contracts and the result was the second 
generation PSC (1976 – 1988). In this second generation contract there was no ceiling 
on the amount of cost recovery and the proceeds (before tax) from gross income after 
deductions for cost recovery were split between Pertamina and the contractor at 65.91 
per cent:34.09 per cent for oil and 31.82 per cent:68.18 per cent for gas.  
This second generation of PSC was also formulated to solve the problem of tax 
creditability for the U.S. oil and gas firms operating in Indonesia. In the first generation, 
taxes paid by contractors were included in the amount of government take. However, 
the U.S. tax authority does not acknowledge these payments as tax credit. Since many 
major U.S. oil and gas companies had operations in Indonesia at this time, in this 
second generation, contractor‟s taxes payments were not included in the government 
take, but treated as separate payments. 
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The end of the oil boom period in the 1980s meant trouble for government 
revenue. For mature wells with declining production, the oil output available to be split 
was dwindling. If there were no ceiling on cost recovery then there would be no more 
oil to be split since the cost recovery had to be paid with oil. When oil prices are low 
then the amount of oil needed to be delivered to contractors for cost recovery would 
rise. The lower the price of oil, the more oil that should be given to contractors as cost 
recovery. In a worst case scenario, there would be no oil left for the government since 
all of the oil produced might have to be delivered to contractors as cost recovery 
payments. 
This posed a problem for the Indonesian government since at that time many 
contractors were applying for contract renewal and they needed certainty on their 
investments in exploration efforts as well as in secondary recovery efforts. Hence the 
government issued the third generation PSC (1998 – today). To solve the problem 
caused by the non-existence of a cost recovery ceiling, the third generation PSC 
introduced what is called the first tranche petroleum (FTP) at 20 per cent. Thus, 20 per 
cent of gross production (before cost recovery deduction) is to be split between the 
government and the contractor. After this FTP, the rate for production split between the 
government and contractors is the same as the second generation PSC. 
The next section briefly examines the role of the state in the economic 
development of Indonesia. This is appropriate and helpful in understanding the 
evolution of Indonesia‟s production structure, particularly when the petroleum industry 
forms a large part the social, political and economic fabric of the nation. 
 
3.8 Indonesian economic development policy, 1990-2010 
 
This section discusses the evolution of government policies which have shaped 
Indonesian economic development over the period under study. After recovering from a 
serious economic crisis in the early to mid-1960s, the Indonesian economy grew rapidly 
for three decades. The regime change in 1968 was followed by a massive 
industrialisation process which had transformed the country from an economy that was 
highly dependent on the agricultural sector to an economy where manufacturing was the 
dominant sector in the early 1990s. This rapid growth completely changed the country 
from a poor, developing economy into a newly-industrialising economy, with the World 
Bank (1993) report categorising Indonesia as one of the „high-performing Asian 
economies‟ (Basri & Hill, 2011b; Thee, 2003; World Bank, 1993). 
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 Indonesia‟s economic development policy during 1990-2010 is summarised in 
Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3  Indonesian economic development policy, 1990-2010 
Fifth Five-Year 
Development Plan 
1989/1990 to 1993/1994 
 The policy emphasis was to provide adequate job opportunities for 
the increasing workforce. 
 Labour force policies were directed towards improving labour 
qualifications and productivity.  
 The private sector was encouraged to play a bigger role in 
economic development with the government aiming to maintain 
macroeconomic stability.  
 There was no planned economic reformation and deregulation 
policy other than to oversee the implementations of deregulation 
packages carried out in the previous period (e.g. Pakto ‟88). 
Sixth Five-Year 
Development Plan 
1994/1995 to 1998/1999 
 Emphasised enhancement in human resource quality, economic 
growth and structural change of the economy, enhancement of 
equity and poverty alleviation and economic stability.  
 Industrialisation still served as the main engine of economic 
growth and labour force employment with policies directed 
towards developing industries that depend on high-skills with high 
value-added products. 
 The services sector began to emerge as employment generator. 
There was no major economic reform and deregulation planned for 
this period. 
National Development 
Program (PROPENAS) 
2000 – 2004 
 
 National policies were focused on addressing economic, social and 
political crises in the country, with particular attention given to 
maintaining national unity.  
 Economic policies were mainly directed at accelerating economic 
recovery with development programs aimed at reducing the impact 
of the crisis on the poor, enhance economic participation, stabilise 
the economy, improve competitiveness, increase investment, 
provide adequate infrastructure and promote the responsible 
exploitation of available natural resources. 
Mid-Term Development 
Plan (RPJM) 
2004 – 2009 
 Main priorities were reducing the rates of unemployment and 
poverty.  
 Macroeconomic policies were focused towards increasing the rate 
of economic growth by encouraging the role of the private sector 
and increasing government participation.  
 The government reverted back to relying on labour-intensive 
industries rather than on a technologically-intensive, high-skills 
industrial base. 
Sources: Indonesian Government (1989, 1994, 2000, 2005) 
 
3.8.1 1991-1997: Soeharto era 
 
Fifth Five-Year Development Plan 
  
During the early 1990s, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) placed particular 
emphasis on securing employment opportunities for the growing labour force. Hence, in 
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REPELITA V (or the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan) for budget years 1989/1990 to 
1993/1994, the most prominent economic policy was to provide adequate job 
opportunities (Indonesian Government, 1989). Although the Family Planning Program 
which was launched in the period before had succeeded in reducing the birth rate, its 
absolute number was still high due to the country‟s high population level. It was 
estimated that during this time period, the total labour force would increase by 2.4 
million people each year. Hence, the rate of economic growth during this period was 
mainly targeted by the GoI to be able to cope with the growth in the workforce.  
 REPELITA V set an annual average economic growth rate target of 5 per cent 
with much of this growth expected to come from the non-oil and gas sectors of the 
economy. In line with the policy to provide adequate job opportunities, the contribution 
of the industrial sector (especially the labour-intensive industries) in national output was 
expected to increase, whereas the role of agriculture sector was expected to decrease. 
The industrial sector was expected to boost its contribution from 14.4 per cent of total 
national output in REPELITA IV to 16.9 per cent by the end of REPELITA V. On the 
other hand, during the same time frame the share of agriculture sector was hoped to 
shrink from 23.2 per cent to 21.6 per cent. 
Thus, with the aim of securing employment opportunities for the increasing size 
of the workforce, policies for industrial sector development were set along the following 
directions: development of export-oriented industries as the prime mover in accelerating 
industrial growth; increase industrial value-added by creating linkages between 
industries and between industry and other economic sectors; encourage the development 
of small industries including traditional and/or home industries; development of agro-
industries which use local inputs; research and development which aimed to improve 
production processes, create new products, increase efficiency as well as to accelerate 
technological and engineering capability in the manufacturing of industrial machinery 
and factory equipment; and increasing the quality and quantity of industrial 
entrepreneurs and professionals.  
 With the declining ability of the government to function as the sole engine of 
economic growth due to declining revenue from the petroleum industry, the private 
sector was expected to play a larger role in keeping the economy moving. In order to 
encourage the role of the private sector in capital accumulation, the REPELITA V 
emphasised macroeconomic stability through the policy of maintaining a balanced state 
budget which meant equalising government revenue and expenditure while at the same 
time enabling them to increase over time to be able to stimulate economic growth. On 
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the expenditure side, the GoI planned to make savings and to optimise its audit 
functions. On the revenue side, the government stressed its efforts in widening the 
country‟s tax base since oil and gas revenue could not be expected to be significant in 
the future. In this respect, one prominent step was the major revision of the tax laws in 
1994. This revision was mainly aimed at broadening the tax base by accommodating the 
taxation (through income tax and/ or value added tax) of new business models or 
practices which grew increasingly diverse and complex due to the country‟s successes 
in economic development during the previous periods. 
 Since policy in the financial sector also plays an important role in economic 
development, the GoI‟s plan in REPELITA V was for the financial sector to be able to 
effectively mobilise domestic public funds. The strategy was to broaden the reach of 
financial services to new customers and intensify the fundraising efforts to existing 
customers. Moreover, there were policies which were designed to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of financial institutions (bank and non-bank) in collecting 
funds. Other monetary policies involved the more traditional roles of central bank such 
as stabilisation of domestic prices (inflation control) and the balance of payments 
through the management of the money supply, interest rates and exchange rates.  
 Policies related to labour force participation in this period revolved around how 
to prepare new job seekers with adequate qualifications so as to be able to be absorbed 
productively in industries. This objective was to be achieved through improving the 
quality of teachers and giving greater autonomy to tertiary education institutions. 
Further, since there was gap between the required skills in the job market and the 
university education curricula, the government‟s vocational training centres were 
prepared to be able to provide short courses for university graduates to bridge this gap. 
The government also encouraged businesses to provide internship programs for new 
entrants in job market. Other policies involved improvements in the productivity and 
income of the underemployed and underpaid workers, including those who worked in 
informal sectors as well as the self-employed. In relation to these latter policies the 
strategy was to provide legal certainty for the informal sectors as well as consultations 
on ways to improve the quality of their products and services. 
 
Sixth Five-Year Development Plan 
  
The subsequent development plan during this period was the Sixth Five-Year 
Development Plan or REPELITA VI (1994/1995 to 1998/1999). The general objectives 
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of this plan were the following: increasing the quality of the country‟s human resources, 
maintaining economic growth and managing structural change of the economy, 
alleviating poverty and promoting a more equitable distribution of wealth and keeping 
the economy stable (Indonesian Government, 1994).   
 With the efforts to increase the quality of human resources, it was hoped that the 
country‟s productivity would also improve. Hence, REPELITA VI targeted a significant 
annual increase of 3.3 per cent in labour productivity. Policies to improve the quality of 
human resources included reforming the national curricula at all levels of education and 
introducing a nine-year obligatory education time for all students (from level 1 up to 
level 9).  
 The GoI targeted an average annual economic growth rate of 6.2 per cent with 6 
per cent growth in the first year and 6.6 per cent in the fifth year of the plan. 
Interestingly, it is in REPELITA VI that the sources of Indonesian economic growth 
first started to be addressed with 52 per cent of growth targeted to come from capital 
accumulation, 26 per cent from labour input, and 22 per cent from increases in TFP. 
REPELITA VI stated an objective of structural change in the economy where industry 
and services would increase their roles in output and employment generation while the 
role of agriculture would continue to decline. Policies were directed towards developing 
industries that depended on high-skills and which produced high value-added outputs. 
Nevertheless, this planned industrial transformation was actually a continuation of the 
previous industrialisation strategy which had been adopted in REPELITA V – with the 
exception of the service sector which started to get the government‟s attention during 
REPELITA VI. 
 The GoI realised that the fruit of economic development since the mid-1960s 
had not been able to be enjoyed equitably by all people, hence a more balanced 
prosperity between regions and between social classes was stressed in this five-year 
plan. This policy was a big step considering the authoritarian nature of the Soeharto 
administration. In this respect, the GoI set a target to reduce the total number of people 
living in absolute poverty to about 12 million, or just 6 per cent of the country‟s 
population. The policy for poverty alleviation was called IDT (Inpres Desa Tertinggal 
or the presidential instruction on under-developed villages). Here, the GoI sought to 
identify villages which were deemed „under-developed‟ based on certain criteria and 
then government funds would be provided to these villages by using the concept of 
revolving funds. Considerable leeway was given to regional (village) governments and 
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local civic groups in determining how the funds would be spent, hence it was a 
prototype of fiscal decentralisation in Indonesia (Akita & Szeto, 2000). 
 Policy for economic stability in REPELITA VI was somewhat stricter than the 
previous five-year plan. The targeted inflation rate was not to exceed 5 per cent, the 
current account deficit was to be no more than 2 per cent of GDP, and the availability of 
foreign exchange reserves was to be equal to five months of imports.  
 Nevertheless, REPELITA V and VI shared the same problem: both of them 
lacked policy on economic deregulation. In REPELITA V there was no planned 
economic reform and deregulation policy other than to oversee the implementation of 
deregulation packages which had been launched in the previous period (e.g. Pakto ‟88). 
The same held true for REPELITA VI. To make things worse, by 1993 the role of 
technocrats in the cabinet was severely degraded by President Soeharto and he turned to 
promote his technology minister, B.J. Habibie, and the minister‟s high-tech projects. 
Hence, many technocrats were unable to complete many of the major reforms which 
were initiated in late 1980s, particularly in the area of the financial sector. To 
summarise, there were no major policy reforms during the period of 1991-1997 – a time 
some economists refer to as a period of „deregulation fatigue‟ in Indonesia 
(Aswicahyono & Kartika, 2010; Hill & Cham, 2012).  
 
3.8.2 1998-2003: Transition and adjustment period 
 
With the economic, social and political crises which engulfed Indonesia 
following the Asian financial crisis and the fall of Soeharto regime in 1998, 
PROPENAS (or the National Development Program, 2000 – 2004) had to deal with five 
crucial problems faced by the country at the time: widespread social conflicts and the 
emergence of national disintegration symptoms, weak law enforcement and protection 
of human rights, slow economic recovery, a low level of prosperity, increasing social 
diseases and the limited capacity of regional governments for local economic 
development (Indonesian Government, 2000). 
 Hence, the national policies were mainly directed toward addressing the 
aforementioned problems through the following programs: the creation of a more 
democratic political system to maintain national unity and integrity, upholding the rule 
of law and good governance, accelerating economic recovery, improving the quality of 
living and cultural resilience and encouraging regional development through the 
decentralisation policy. 
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 Specifically, economic development policies in PROPENAS can be classified 
into seven programs which were designed with rapid economic rebound in mind. First, 
to reduce poverty and ensure the availability of basic needs. Here, one prominent 
program for poverty alleviation was the start of the establishment of a more systematic 
social safety net, whose function was not merely as a short term action against sudden 
economic shocks, but rather was a national system which could provide continuous 
insurance for people against adverse economic conditions. To ensure the availability 
and affordability of basic commodities – especially for rice as it is the basic staple of the 
majority of Indonesians – the GoI through BULOG (the Indonesian Bureau of 
Logistics) tried to control the price of rice by managing its supply with open market 
purchasing operations. 
Second, to develop small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as the backbone of a 
more democratic economic system and to broaden public participation in the economy. 
This policy was formulated because during the Soeharto era economic activities were 
concentrated in the hands of a few people who possessed close connections to the 
regime. Here, the government programs for SMEs were aimed at simplifying permit 
procedures and regulations as well as providing fiscal incentives. Moreover, there were 
also programs which aimed to broaden SMEs‟ access to productive resources such as 
capital, human resources, technology and markets. 
Third, to stabilise the economy and the financial sector. There were three 
policies: the formation of LPS (Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan or Indonesia Deposit 
Insurance Corporation), restructuring the banking system and reducing the fiscal deficit 
and managing government debts. In 1998, 16 banks deemed unhealthy were liquidated 
as the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia. The unintended consequence of this was a 
significant decline in public confidence in the country‟s banking systems. To restore 
confidence and prevent bank runs, the GoI established a „blanket guarantee scheme‟ 
where the government would take over any bank‟s payment responsibilities in the case 
of liquidation (LPS, 2014). Since this blanket guarantee scheme was an ad hoc policy at 
that time, PROPENAS launched a policy to formalise and systematise this arrangement 
by establishing the LPS.  
Further, since the crisis of 1998 severely hit the ability of large debtors to meet 
their debt obligations to banks (thus severely jeopardising banks‟ financial health), the 
GoI had to bail out these banks through a recapitalisation program. This step was 
followed by the restructuring of many of the banks in the form of mergers and 
acquisitions. However, this restructuring process significantly increased the fiscal 
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deficit which eventually had to be filled with debts, with the majority from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). To deal with this matter, PROPENAS planned a 
debt management program which is summarised as follows: reducing government 
expenditure (slashing subsidies, projects, expenditure on public servants, etc.) while at 
the same time increasing government revenue (e.g. broadening the tax base and selling 
government assets or more commonly known as „privatisation‟). 
Fourth, to improve competitiveness particularly in non-oil and gas exports. Here, 
the short-term objective was to encourage the private sector to exploit their available 
under-utilised capacity left by the crisis through exports, whereas the medium-term 
objective was to strengthen the domestic economy to be more globally oriented and 
competitive. To encourage exports the GoI promoted the programs of providing export 
facilities, simplifying export procedures and opening up new trading houses in major 
trading partner countries.  
Fifth, to encourage private investment. The GoI realised that at the start of 
PROPENAS the outflow of funds was higher than their inflows. One of the causes for 
this phenomenon was the country‟s deteriorating political and security conditions. 
Hence, improving the conditions of public security, social obedience to laws and 
regulations and the stability of domestic politics were integral in the efforts to entice 
capital back to the country. Moreover, other policies were aimed at encouraging the 
transparency and consistency of fiscal incentives which were given to new ventures, 
simplifying the procedures for new investment permits and, more importantly, the GoI 
planned changes to the existing legislation on the stock market with the aim of 
strengthening the independence of the stock market oversight body. 
Sixth, to improve the availability of physical infrastructure which is essential for 
economic growth. The crisis of 1998 had significantly reduced the GoI‟s financial 
ability to carry out new infrastructure projects. Thus, the short term policy was to, at 
least, maintain the level of services from the already available infrastructure by ensuring 
the availability of funds for their maintenance. On the other hand, the medium-term 
policy was to encourage the role of private investment in infrastructure development. To 
introduce competition in infrastructure provision, the role of owner, policy maker, 
regulator and operator, which at this time were still centred in the hands of the 
government, were to be released gradually. PROPENAS proposed that in the future the 
role of the government would only serve as policy maker, regulator and facilitator. 
Seventh, to optimise the exploitation of the country‟s natural resource 
endowment. It was a great concern that the country‟s natural environment conditions 
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were deteriorating during the Soeharto era due to the careless and irresponsible 
exploitation of resources. Thus, the policy focus for natural resources in PROPENAS 
lay with responsible and sustainable exploitations of these natural resources
12
.  
 
3.8.3 2004-2010: Stabilisation period 
 
In line with a better political environment, the threats of unrest, separatism and 
terrorism had been significantly declining – though not completely gone – during the 
Mid-Term Development Plan or RPJM in 2004 – 2009. Even so, RPJM still placed 
much emphasis on the issues of national unity, public security and counter terrorism. In 
the area of economic development, RPJM regarded that the moderate economic growth 
of the past five years had not been able to improve the general prosperity of the people, 
which was evidenced by the vast number of people who lived below the poverty line 
and the high rate of unemployment (although one cannot dismiss the fact that the ruling 
party at this time was – and still is – the political rival of the party which composed 
PROPENAS). By the end of PROPENAS in 2003, the total number of people living in 
poverty reached 16.6 per cent of the total population – it constituted an absolute number 
of 36.1 million people. In the same year official unemployment reached 9.5 per cent 
(Indonesian Government, 2005).  
Therefore, the main economic development policies in this period were aimed at 
reducing the rate of poverty and unemployment by setting the target for economic 
growth at an annual average of 6.6 per cent per year. This target was a significant 
increase from an actual growth of only 4.3 per cent during PROPENAS (according to 
RPJM‟s calculations). Policies to achieve this growth target were aimed at increasing 
the role of private investment from 16 per cent of gross national product (GNP) in 2004 
to 24.4 per cent of GNP by the end of 2009, as well as increasing the role of 
government investment from 3.4 per cent of GNP in 2004 to 4.1 per cent in 2009. 
Policies to reduce the poverty rate were particularly directed toward meeting the 
basic economic rights of citizens for food, employment, land and natural resources. To 
ensure the availability and affordability of food for the poor, the policy directions taken 
in RPJM were as follows: developing the institutional capacity of regional governments 
and communities in supporting local food resiliency; spreading knowledge on the 
importance of food diversification; efficiency in food production; improving food 
                                                 
12
 The natural resources exploitation policy in Propenas only dealt with mineral, water, forestry and 
marine resources. 
 58 
 
procurement, distribution and pricing systems; increasing the income of farmers and 
protecting domestic food products from competition from imported food; establishing 
an early warning system for nutrition and food deficiencies in vulnerable areas; ensuring 
the adequacy of food for poor communities and groups that were vulnerable to 
economic and social uncertainties and to natural disasters. 
Policies to reduce the rate of unemployment were as follows: promoting a more 
humane and harmonious system of industrial relations; global partnership for 
employment opportunities expansion and enhancing work protection; increasing the 
knowledge and skills of the poor and developing their ability to work and carry out 
business undertakings; protection of migrant workers who worked either inside the 
country or abroad; ensure job continuity, safety and security; promoting micro and 
small enterprises and cooperatives and encouraging poor communities to form 
institutions in order to enhance their bargaining position and to increase the efficiency 
of their undertakings. It should also be noted that it was in RPJM that the government 
formally planned to revert back to a reliance on labour-intensive industries rather than 
on a technologically-intensive, high-skills industrial base. 
Policies to ensure the rights of the poor to land were as follows: encouraging the 
participation of poor communities and traditional institutions in the planning and 
implementation of spatial allotment; enhancing the knowledge of poor communities on 
the legal aspects of land and of custom/traditional land; enhancing legal certainty of 
rights on land of the poor communities; developing the mechanism for protecting rights 
on land for socially vulnerable groups and developing the mechanism for the selective 
redistribution of land.  
Policies to ensure the rights of the poor to natural resources were as follows: 
disseminating information on schemes for managing natural resources that were 
concerned with poor communities; enhancing communities‟ knowledge and capacity in 
the sustainable utilisation of natural resources; establishing an effective legal system 
that can avert or resolve natural resources and environmental pollution; establishing 
managerial systems which allow the sustainable utilisation of natural resources and 
actively engaging in international cooperation against illegal and destructive 
exploitations of natural resources. 
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3.9 Summary  
 
This chapter discussed the historical background of the petroleum industry in 
Indonesia as well as its impacts on the country‟s economic development. It reveals how 
closely related the history of Indonesia is to its oil and gas industry, thus the progress 
and regress of the country can actually be traced to the ebb and flow of this relationship. 
The windfall profits from the oil boom era of the 1970s and early 1980s enabled 
Indonesia to alleviate the chronic economic problems which had plagued the country for 
decades. Following the end of the oil boom periods in the 1980s the government tried to 
break the country‟s dependence on the sluggish oil industry and its associated volatility 
in oil prices with an economic program commonly known as the „exit strategy‟.  
However, this decoupling cost the country dearly when the Asian financial crisis 
struck in 1997/1998. The exit strategy required deregulation in many sectors of the 
economy and in one particular sector, the banking/financial sector, deregulation proved 
to be out of control and thus added to the severity of the crisis. Social, political and, 
more importantly, economic turmoil engulfed Indonesia and culminated with the fall of 
the autocratic regime which had ruled for over thirty years. 
The post-crisis era witnessed a mismatch between domestic oil supply and 
demand. On the one hand, domestic oil supply is decreasing because new investment is 
hampered by unfavourable investment climate such as the increasing sentiment of 
resource nationalism. On the other hand, domestic demand for oil products is rising. 
Hence, with all this background, it is important to find out the productivity growth in 
the Indonesian economy as well as in the petroleum sector and non-petroleum sectors. 
These are the main topics in the chapters that follow. 
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  Chapter 4
The Variables for Growth Accounting 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
There are three key variables in the neoclassical growth model of Solow-Swan: 
output, capital stock and labour – as discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter attempts to 
provide a brief overview on these three key variables required to estimate TFP growth 
in the following chapters. In doing so, a richer and deeper understanding on the 
development of the petroleum sector, the non-petroleum sectors and the aggregate 
economy of Indonesia is provided. 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section discusses the 
output of the petroleum and non-petroleum sectors of the economy. The second section 
provides discussion on the capital stock accumulations in the petroleum and non-
petroleum sectors. The third section discusses labour employment in both the petroleum 
and non-petroleum sectors. The last section provides a brief overview of the Indonesian 
labour market. 
 
4.2 Output 
4.2.1 Output in the petroleum sector 
 
Data on the output of the petroleum sector are taken from the Statistical 
Yearbook of Indonesia published annually by BPS. These data are derived from the 
production output, i.e. crude oil (in barrels) and natural gas (in standard cubic feet), of 
all of the oil and gas mining companies operating in Indonesia and were valued at their 
current prices. In this study, the current values are deflated by the price level (2005 = 
100). A detailed and comprehensive discussion on the construction of the petroleum 
sector‟s output variable is presented in Chapter 6. 
Figure 4.1 shows the trend in the output of the oil and gas sector from 1991 to 
2010.  At least three sub-periods are discernible upon further inspection of Figure 4.1. 
First, there were the last few years of Suharto-era from 1991 to 1997. Second are the 
years from 1998 to 2003 when the Asian financial crisis struck, followed by a period of 
transition and adjustments in political and social situations. Lastly is the period from 
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2004 to 2010 where political stability was achieved albeit with an increasing spirit of 
resource nationalism among Indonesians. This last period was marked by the GFC of 
2007/2008 and the subsequent recessions in many countries which affected the global 
demand for energy, particularly the demand for oil and gas.  
 
Figure 4.1  Trend in output of the petroleum sector, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011b, 2012) 
 
 
Since Indonesian gas is produced and sold based on long-term contracts at 
predetermined prices (Indonesian Government, 2005), fluctuations in the petroleum 
sector‟s output as seen in Figure 4.1 could largely be determined by fluctuations in oil 
output, which in turn depend on the fluctuations in the world‟s oil prices. Market price 
for oil is an important factor that affects oil production. Since upstream oil investment 
requires a large amount of capital, the decision to develop a proven oil field depends on 
careful examination of its reserve conditions, its selling price and the costs of 
production (Pudyantoro, 2012). A reserve with difficult conditions such as being too 
small in volume or located in hard-to-reach areas with minimum supporting 
infrastructure, such as in Alaska or in deepwater offshore fields, may require higher 
production costs than if a reserve does not possess such difficulties. If the cost to 
produce an oil field is higher than the amount of money projected to be received, then 
the field may be deemed unfeasible to be developed further. 
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On the other hand, if the price of oil is sufficiently high to cover the high costs 
of production, then oil lifting in these difficult fields may become economically 
feasible. In a situation of high oil prices, marginal oil fields that were previously 
abandoned because of their economic infeasibility might start operating again since the 
expected cash inflow could be higher than the production cost. 
 As seen in Figure 4.1, oil and gas output during the last years of the Suharto era 
from 1991 to 1997 shows a declining trend. It is possible that this phenomenon may be 
the result of at least two factors. First, this negative growth trend could be explained by 
the generally low world oil prices in the 1990s. The average oil price during 1990-1999 
was only US$5.07 per barrel, which is very low when compared to an average price of 
US$10.51 per barrel during the 1980s (real 1970 prices; OECD, 2010). One of the 
possible consequences of these low prices is the deliberate action by oil companies to 
reduce their production and even to shut down, at least temporarily, the operation of 
some of their well sites. Second, this is also the period in which the Indonesian 
government had been implementing its exit strategy, reducing the country‟s over-
reliance on the oil and gas industry which had begun after the end of the oil boom 
period in the mid-1980s and was formalised in the government‟s Fourth Five-Year Plan 
(Indonesian Government, 1984; Prawiro, 1998).  
The implementation of the exit strategy eventually shifted the government‟s 
focus away from the petroleum sector and more towards the financial, trade and 
manufacturing sectors (Prawiro, 1998). This shift in focus might negatively impact the 
growth of new investment in – and eventually the output of – the oil and gas industry. In 
this period, even though the oil and gas industry still played an important role in 
providing a revenue stream for the government, its proportion was steadily decreasing 
(Widiyanto, 2004). 
 The declining trend in oil and gas output continued during the period of 1998-
2003. When the Asian financial crisis struck in 1997/1998, the output value of oil and 
gas fell dramatically from approximately US$36 billion in 1997 to just around US$14 
billion in 1998 – a drop of almost 60 per cent. It appears that this steep fall is attributed, 
first, to the sharp drop in world‟s oil prices due to the lack of demand following the 
crisis. At this time, world‟s oil prices fell sharply from US$18.56 per barrel in 1996 to 
just US$12.16 per barrel in 1998 (OECD, 2010). Second, in 1997 and 1998 Indonesia 
was, more or less, in a state of chaos. During and after the fall of the authoritarian 
regime of Suharto, mass street protests, inter-ethnic unrest and increasing separatism 
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occurred simultaneously. The combination of the fall in oil prices and political turmoil 
might have severely hit the output of petroleum industry. 
It did not take long for the industry to gain traction again. OPEC‟s decision to 
reduce its production targets resulted in the tightening of world‟s oil supply and the 
price began to rise again in 1999, peaking in 2000; from US$12.16 per barrel in 1998 to 
US$17.30 in 1999 and to US$26.24 in 2000 – an increase of almost 152 per cent 
(OECD, 2010). Following these hikes in prices, the Indonesian petroleum sector output 
growth rate changed significantly, from negative 59.63 per cent in 1998 to positive 1.53 
per cent in 1999, and eventually reached its highest level in 2000 with a growth rate of 
61.73 per cent. Output dropped again in 2001 and 2002 following a dip in prices. 
Further, concerns regarding the disruption of the oil supply due to the Iraq invasion led 
to a hike in prices in 2003 and resulted in positive growth in the output from the 
Indonesian petroleum sector in the same year. Nevertheless, output during 1998-2003 
generally declined. 
This declining trend in production output during 1998-2003 amid high oil prices 
might not be surprising since at this time there was no coherent grand plan or strategy at 
the national level for the development of the country‟s oil and gas industry (see 
Indonesian Government, 2000). Reading through the government economic 
development plans in PROPENAS and RPJM, one might not be able to avoid getting 
the impression that during this period, the oil and gas industry merely served as a cash 
source for the central and local governments and less attention was given to its medium-
to-long-term development. Even when the world‟s oil prices increased steeply in 1999-
2000, the industry simply did not have enough capacity and capability to capitalise on 
the high oil prices. 
 During the period of 2004-2010 political normalisation took root in Indonesia 
and the threats of unrest and separatism declined significantly. These conditions also 
coincided with the generally high prices of oil. The oil price increased significantly in 
2005 following Hurricane Katrina that hit one of the world‟s most important oil 
producing regions in the Gulf of Mexico, pushing Indonesian petroleum output 
upwards. Prices remained high in 2006 through to 2007 with an average price of around 
US$65 per barrel due to the high demand for oil in emerging economies, particularly 
China (OECD, 2010).  
In early 2008, the oil price crossed the symbolic threshold of US$100 per barrel 
and stayed at an average of US$97.26 per barrel throughout the year. Prices fell to US$ 
61.67 per barrel in 2009 following the impact of the near-global economic recession of 
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2008. The „Arab Spring‟, which is the waves of protests, demonstrations, riots and civil 
wars in the Arab world, which started at the end of 2010 affected some oil producing 
countries in the region such as Libya, Algeria and Kuwait and drove up oil prices. These 
price increases were followed by increases in the growth of output in the Indonesian 
petroleum industry.  
Domestically, the period of 2004-2010 was marked by an increase in the spirit 
of resource nationalism in Indonesia. The annulment of some of the key provisions in 
the Oil and Gas Law Number 22/2001 in 2012 was the result of this sentiment which 
had started to grow strong during this time period (Habir, 2013; Soesastro, 2007). 
Several studies (see, for example, in Joffé, Stevens, George, Lux, & Searle, 2009; 
Maniruzzaman, 2009; Vivoda, 2009) suggest that the sentiment of resource nationalism 
is a cyclical phenomenon which is often driven by supply scarcity and its consequent 
increase in prices such as when the world‟s oil price reached more than US$100 per 
barrel in 2008. The period of 2004-2010 was also marked by the change of status of 
Indonesia from a net oil exporter to a net oil importer due to more than a decade of 
steadily decreasing domestic oil output on the one hand and the ever increasing demand 
for oil products on the other hand. 
Nevertheless, amid these two negative issues, oil and gas output during 2004-
2010 experienced an increasing trend. This was indeed a significant achievement 
compared to the other two sub-periods before. However, it could be argued that this 
positive growth was more or less due to the consistently high oil prices, as has been 
discussed before, rather than from some orchestrated effort to strengthen and develop 
the country‟s petroleum sector in the medium term as well as in the long term. 
 Today, the major concern for the upstream petroleum sector is the ageing of the 
existing oil and gas fields (BPMIGAS, 2011). Still, advanced extraction technology, 
such as the enhanced oil recovery (EOR) technology, would enable the continual 
exploitation of mature wells. Furthermore, since many potential reserves in the 
Indonesian deepwaters and the eastern regions (e.g. Maluku, Papua) have not been fully 
exploited, there are significant opportunities for the industry to reverse its declining 
trend in output (KESDM, 2007). According to a report by the Indonesian Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources or Kementerian ESDM, as of 2007 there are 22 oil and 
gas basins that have not been explored yet, mostly in deepwater and in the eastern 
regions of Indonesia (KESDM, 2007, 2011). 
Even though some old fields have applied various EOR technologies, there are 
still large numbers of old wells which have not applied these technologies (BPMIGAS, 
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2011). The potential to increase production through the implementation of EOR is 
significant. According to BPMIGAS, there remains 49.5 billion barrels of original oil in 
place (OOIP) that can be extracted using various EOR technologies (BPMIGAS, 2011).  
Furthermore, fracking technology (aside from the controversy regarding its 
environmental impacts) is able to extract vast amount of oil and gas from geological 
formations previously deemed unrecoverable. For example, due to this technology the 
U.S. is predicted to overtake Saudi Arabia as the world‟s largest oil producer by 2020 
(The Economist, 2014). However, at the time of this study, there is not one single 
fracking project that is planned to be implemented in the near future in Indonesia. 
Applying EOR technologies and opening up new oil and gas fields especially in 
deepwater areas as well as applying fracking technology are capital intensive activities 
that require a large amount of investment (Pudyantoro, 2012). Hence, investment 
growth in Indonesia‟s upstream oil and gas sector will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
4.2.2 Output in the non-petroleum sectors 
 
Data on the output of the non-petroleum sectors are taken from the GDP values 
reported in the Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia published annually by BPS and 
deducting the values of the petroleum sector‟s output. Thus, these data consist of the 
values of finished goods and services produced by all economic sectors (activities) 
except the petroleum sector. A detailed and comprehensive discussion on the 
construction of the non-petroleum sector‟s output variable is presented in Chapter 7.  
Figure 4.2 shows the trend in production output of the non-oil and gas sectors of 
the Indonesian economy from 1991 to 2010.  
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Figure 4.2  Trend in the output of the non-petroleum sectors, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011b, 2012).  
 
 
Two sub-periods are discernible upon a closer examination of Figure 4.2. The 
first sub-period is the years before the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997/1998 
and the second one is the period when the crisis struck and the years after. As shown in 
Figure 4.2, from 1991 to 1995 non-petroleum output grew steadily and only declined 
slightly during 1996 and 1997 following the start of the Asian financial crisis. To make 
sense of the dynamics of output growth during the pre-crisis years, it is necessary to 
make a quick trip back in time in order to understand thoroughly the historical context 
of the development of the non-oil and gas sectors in Indonesia. That is because 
economic growth is largely a result of the conditions that arose – and the consequence 
economic policies that were taken – in the past (Boediono, 2005). 
During the years of 1950s to the mid-1960s, political instability had denied 
Indonesia firm solutions to its basic macroeconomic problems, i.e. the problems 
inherent in its balance of payments and its fiscal budget deficits (Boediono, 2005; 
Booth, 1992). No single administration in this period of rapid government turnover was 
able to tackle these two chronic economic problems which had been plaguing the 
country since its independence. During this period of guided democracy under 
Soekarno, politics was everything. Hence, economic problems were to be solved 
politically. The role of the government was overly praised and private sectors were 
distrusted (Boediono, 2005, p. 313). Regulations were strongly preferred rather than 
incentives. As a result, the problems of macroeconomic imbalances became worse. 
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Extremely high inflation set in due to an acute problem of supply scarcity. The situation 
became so untenable that many actually believed that the only way out was a regime 
change. Indeed, it happened through a vicious process with an immense cost in human 
lives (Boediono, 2005; Hossain, 2006; Prawiro, 1998). 
Since the late 1960s under Soeharto‟s New Order regime, Indonesia successfully 
implemented stabilisation and rehabilitation programs and embarked on a period of 
rapid and sustained economic growth (Thee, 2012). During the early years of the 1990s, 
non-oil and gas output showed strong growth with an annual average growth rate of 
3.41 per cent per year for 1991-1997 and an average real value of output of more than 
US$580 billion per year for the same period (Figure 4.2). 
Table 4.1 on the following page shows that between 1965 and 1996 there was a 
three-decade long rapid growth in three main sectors – agriculture, manufacturing and 
services. During these times, the manufacturing sector served as the main driver for the 
growth in the non-oil and gas sectors with its consistent double-digit growth rates. 
 
Table 4.1  Average annual growth rates, 1965-1996 (per cent) 
 
 1965-1980 1980-1990 1990-1996 
Agriculture 4.3 3.4 2.8 
Manufacturing 12.0 12.6 11.1 
Services 7.3 7.0 7.4 
Source: World Bank as cited in Thee (2012, p. 72) 
  
 
Following the end of windfall profits gained from the oil boom in the 1970s and 
1980s, Indonesia applied the exit strategy which aimed to diversify the economy, away 
from its heavy dependence on oil resources (Usui, 1997). This strategy required policy 
adjustments and the consequence of this policy was the deregulation of many sectors of 
the economy to give way to private investment, particularly in export-oriented 
industries (Prawiro, 1998; Thee, 2006). Data in Table 4.1 indicate that these 
deregulation measures, which had been adopted to develop more efficient and 
competitive non-oil and gas sectors, particularly the manufacturing sector, appeared to 
have been very successful in offsetting the decline of the oil and gas industry as the 
main engine of economic growth.  
 Figure 4.3 demonstrates that from the mid-1980s through to the mid-1990s, the 
manufacturing sector – with its consistently increasing trend – had seemingly been able 
to replace the ailing oil and gas sector as a major engine of growth.  
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Figure 4.3  Manufacturing value added and oil rents, 1984-1997 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
 
Due to the remarkable growth performance of its manufacturing sector as shown 
in Figure 4.3, Indonesia – together with Malaysia and Thailand – was labelled by the 
World Bank in one of its reports as one of the „newly-industrialising economies‟ (NIEs) 
(World Bank, 1993). Furthermore, due to its substantial economic and social 
achievements, Indonesia was also classified by the World Bank in the same report as 
one of the „high-performing Asian economies‟ together with Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
The persistently increasing trend in production output of the non-oil and gas 
sectors during 1991-1996 (Figure 4.2) was consistent with the structural adjustments 
made by the government during the decade before. In particular, adjustments due to the 
team of economic technocrats or the „Berkeley mafia‟ (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), made in response to the dramatic decline in export earnings as well as the 
decline in government revenue from oil and gas sector. The steep decline in oil prices in 
the early 1980s forced the government to undertake dramatic measures in fiscal, 
monetary and foreign exchange policies which seemed to be reasonably effective.  
 Fiscal austerity was introduced in the fiscal year 1986/1987 to tackle the 
deteriorating budgetary conditions due to the slump in oil prices. In line with a 16 per 
cent decline in domestic revenue, total expenditure was cut by 14 per cent and the 
shortfall was primarily funded by external borrowing. This fiscal austerity was soon 
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followed by monetary measures. In September 1986 the government drastically 
devaluated the Rupiah by 31 per cent against the US Dollar (Arndt & Hill, 1988).  
Aside from the harshness of these policies, they substantially improved the 
competitiveness of Indonesia‟s export and import-competing industries and boosted the 
necessary shift from an economy that depended on natural resources sectors to an 
economy that relied on tradeable sectors, especially the manufacturing industry. 
However, on the negative side, these policies had caused periodic runs on the Rupiah. 
After failed attempts to control capital flights by increasing the short-term interest rates, 
the government ordered several large state-owned companies to transfer their funds 
from term deposits in state-owned banks into the central bank‟s notes or Sertifikat Bank 
Indonesia (SBI). The result of this policy was a sharp reduction in banks‟ liquidity 
which drove up interest rates. This policy effectively stopped the flight of capital from 
Indonesia at that time (Arndt & Hill, 1988). 
 At the microeconomic level, the government introduced a series of deregulation 
measures and trade reforms which aimed to improve the private investment climate, 
especially for export-oriented industries. In May 1986 the government introduced a duty 
„exemption and drawback scheme‟ that enabled export-oriented companies to purchase 
imported intermediate goods at international prices, which significantly reduced the 
highly protectionist trade regime before. This scheme proved to be crucial in 
encouraging firms to start producing for export (Thee, 2006).  
Another significant policy was the deregulation of the financial sector in 
October 1988, called Pakto „88 or Paket Oktober 1988 (October 1988 package) 
(Prawiro, 1998). This policy package relaxed significantly previous regulations on the 
establishment of private bank in Indonesia, either locally or foreign-owned. The main 
aim of this policy was to mobilise domestic funds to “bolster the development of the 
non-oil sectors of the economy” (Bennett, 1995, p. 459). Other reform packages were 
mainly targeted at relaxing import restrictions, particularly for the textile, steel, 
electrical machinery and automotive industries. It is estimated that these reform 
packages removed or relaxed around 40 per cent of all import restrictions on the 
country‟s manufacturing sectors (Arndt & Hill, 1988). All these measures enabled the 
rapid and sustained output growth in non-oil and gas sectors during the early 1990s as 
can be seen in Figure 4.2. They raised the prospect that the economy would be able to 
follow the path of other NIEs in the East Asia region (Thee, 2003, p. 2).  
Nevertheless, these seemingly remarkable developments were not without flaws. 
Hossain (2006) argued that the economy at the time was plagued by structural and 
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institutional weaknesses such as weak legal systems, including the lack of effective 
means to enforce legal contracts, collect debts and to sue for bankruptcy. In one of its 
reports on Indonesia, the World Bank (1997, p. 1) euphemistically pointed that 
“common local practices” had increased the hidden cost of doing business in the 
country. Thee (2003) suggested that these „common local practices‟ included the 
prevalent corruption and collusion between businesses and government officials as well 
as outright nepotism in the bureaucratic ranks – all of which led to severe economic 
inequality and eroded the economic efficiency and resilience of the country. 
 According to Nasution (2000), the high economic growth rates and the 
substantial growth in non-oil and gas exports in pre-crisis years were actually artificial. 
The country‟s high economic growth was largely driven by the non-traded sectors of the 
economy (e.g. land-based industries, physical infrastructure and financial services). The 
growth in non-oil and gas exports during the same periods were mostly from foreign-
owned firms operating in sectors that relied very little on domestic inputs. On the other 
hand, the domestically owned firms which relied heavily on domestic inputs contributed 
poorly to the growth of the non-oil and gas sectors. 
 The deregulation of the financial sector with Pakto „88 was believed to be one of 
the factors that led the economy into the 1997/1998 crisis (Bennett, 1999; Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 1999). The deregulation created an overly liberalised banking system, which 
when coupled with a weak financial structure, led to a procreation of precariously 
undercapitalised and poorly supervised banks. These conditions, in turn, prompted large 
private external debts which were largely unhedged and short-term in nature and 
therefore drove a rapid built up of volatile private capital inflows (Djiwandono, 2000, p. 
49; Hill, 2000; Thee, 2003). All of these worsened the burden of the crisis faced by 
Indonesia. The country was the worst affected in the region (Hill, 2000). So severe was 
the crisis for Indonesia that its GDP experienced an almost 300 per cent contraction in 
just one year, from a growth rate of 7 per cent in 1997 to a negative growth of almost   -
14 per cent in 1998 (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.6). 
 Dhanani (2000) argued that the seeds of the serious problems with Indonesia‟s 
non-oil and gas sectors could be traced to the sluggish growth in manufactured exports 
during 1993-1997. During 1985-1988, the average growth of the manufacturing sector 
was at around 13 per cent per year, with manufactured exports growing at an average of 
27 per cent per year. This growth increased significantly between 1989-1992 with an 
average growth of 22 per cent annually for the manufacturing sector and 27 per cent 
annually for the manufactured exports industry. However, from 1993 until the 
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beginning of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the manufacturing sector grew only at an 
average of 12 per cent per year, and the manufactured exports grew at only 7 per cent 
per year. In fact, this declining growth in non-oil and gas exports was one of the 
concerns the World Bank highlighted in its 1997 report about the country (World Bank, 
1997). 
Even though Indonesian policy makers at the time were concerned that these 
downward trends may negatively affect the achievement of high economic growth in the 
future, increasing oil prices in the years just before the crisis of 1997/1998 had faltered 
the momentum to undertake further policy reforms that were needed for the non-oil and 
gas sectors of the economy (Aswicahyono & Kartika, 2010). A study by James and 
Fujita (2000) found that progress in trade reforms aimed at promoting export-oriented 
industries had slackened during 1990-1995. Some economists have dubbed this period 
as the era of “deregulation fatigue” (Aswicahyono & Kartika, 2010, p. 4; Thee, 2006). 
This deregulation fatigue was consistent with the slightly declining trend in output that 
started immediately after 1994, as seen in Figure 4.2. The figure also shows that even 
though prior to the crisis in 1997 output slightly increased, when the full impact of the 
crisis hit Indonesia in 1998 output shrunk significantly.  
During the period of 1999-2003, non-oil and gas production output finally 
rebounded and this positive trend continued during the political stabilisation period of 
2004-2010. Nevertheless, despite such positive trend in growth, real values have yet to 
fully recover its former strength – even after twelve years had passed since the crisis hit 
Indonesia. At constant 2005 prices, the highest real-value of output during post-crisis 
years was reached in 2010 with a value of just under US$450 billion. It was 30 per cent 
less than the highest output during pre-crisis period, which reached more than US$650 
billion in 1995 (Figure 4.2).  
Although the Asian financial crisis has been mentioned several times in this 
discussion, to better understand the factors behind Indonesia‟s slow recovery process 
after the crisis, it is necessary to dig deeper into the causes of the crisis and the 
responses taken by Indonesian decision makers at the time. This is because their 
responses shaped the development of non-oil and gas output in post-crisis periods 
including during the GFC of 2007/2008. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 was preceded by the booming economic 
environment in Southeast Asia. Low rate of return in capital exporting countries 
prompted investors to turn to the Southeast Asian region which offered more attractive 
returns and – according to the assessment of the World Bank, the IMF and credit rating 
 72 
 
agencies at the time – also offered minimum risks (Calvo, Leiderman, & Reinhart, 
1996; Hossain, 2006). 
After Thailand‟s foreign currency reserves dried up and the country was unable 
to back its fixed exchange rate regime, the government was forced to float the Thai Baht 
in July 1997
13
. The Baht eventually collapsed and due to the panic that followed, steep 
currency depreciation spread throughout the region as creditors and investors started to 
reduce their exposure. Its contagion effect affected, among others, the Malaysian 
Ringgit, the Filipino Peso and the Indonesian Rupiah (Thee, 2003). 
Even after the Indonesian government floated its currency and asked for the 
financial assistance from the IMF, these measures failed to stem the downward slide of 
the Rupiah. It has been argued that there was domestic and international 
mismanagement in the handling of the crisis (Hill, 2000). Internationally, the IMF – 
showing little political sensitivity at critical periods – was demanding excessive fiscal 
austerity and policy conditionality. Whereas domestically, President Soeharto – who 
had severely weakened the role of the gifted economic technocrats – had lost popular 
support due to flagrant corruption by his children. The inability of the government to 
deal effectively with the devastating impacts of the financial and economic crisis 
eventually led to a political crisis. In May 1998, following massive riots that erupted in 
the country, President Soeharto stepped down after 32 years in power (Basri & Hill, 
2011a).  
 The periods after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998 until 2003 were times of 
political and social instability. Communal conflicts, terrorism and separatism during this 
period clearly did not help the country‟s economic recovery process. In the aftermath of 
the crisis, Indonesia recovered more slowly than its East Asian neighbours (World 
Bank, 2000a). Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea actually had more or less identical 
problems with their financial sectors before the crisis of 1997/1998. However, Indonesia 
was trailing behind these two countries in regaining its economic strength. Hossain 
(2006) argued that one of the reasons for this slow recovery was the government‟s 
external debts and the short-term corporate external debts were larger than in Thailand 
and South Korea. Hossain (2006) further asserted that at the time, Indonesia was the 
most exposed among the East Asian countries in terms of the ratio of total debt to 
exports, of total short-term external debt to international reserves and of total debt to 
GDP. 
                                                 
13
 For detailed discussions on the origins of the crisis see, among others, Goldstein (1998). 
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 According to Pangestu and Goeltom (2001), increasing political uncertainty 
following the resignation of Soeharto and inconsistency in the implementation of 
economic policies deteriorated market confidence and thus adversely affected the 
recovery process. Mistrust and disagreement between key institutions such as the IMF 
and Indonesian policy makers had worsened due to a number of issues, including the 
problems of transparency and governance, the controversial plan to issue new 
government bonds, disagreements over the proposed amendments to the law governing 
the central bank authority and delays in the divestment of assets controlled by IBRA 
(Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency). 
 Further, according to Mackie (1999), the exodus of 30,000 to 40,000 wealthy 
ethnic Chinese from Indonesia following the mass riots in Jakarta in 1998 also 
adversely impacted the ability of the country to regain its former strength. Ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia were generally believed to have been responsible for providing the 
capital, enterprise, commercial connections, technological knowledge or innovations 
and the necessary managerial skills that had boosted output to the high level achieved 
during pre-crisis years. Since domestic savings held the key to the capital formation in 
Indonesian economy (Ramstetter, 2000), this exodus may also help explain the slow 
process of economic recovery experienced by Indonesia during the post-crisis period. 
After the general election in 2004, the country‟s social and political environment 
has generally been stable. Communal conflicts, terrorism and separatism have 
significantly declined, although have not completely gone. As seen earlier in Figure 4.2, 
during the period of 2004-2010, non-oil and gas production output was maintained at a 
continuously increasing trend. According to Basri and Hill (2011a, 2011b) at least four 
factors determined this outcome. First, the reestablishment of economic stability and the 
significant drop in debts level. Second, the economy was generally still open to trade 
and investment. Third, although there were still high levels of corruption and weak legal 
systems, the political system had stabilised and rules for businesses became more 
predictable. Fourth, there was the beneficial „neighbourhood effect‟ that kept the 
pressure to keep up with other productive, reforming economies in Southeast Asia 
region. 
 Basri and Hill (2011a, 2011b) further argued that on closer inspection of the 
output growth across sectors, as shown in Table 4.2, the growth drivers in the post-crisis 
period had actually changed.  
 
 74 
 
 Table 4.2.  Sectoral output growth and GDP growth, 1990-1996 and 2000-2008 
  1990-1996 2000-2008 
Average annual growth (per cent) 
    
 Agriculture 3.1 3.9 
 Mining and Utilities 5.3 1.5 
 Manufacturing 11.2 5.2 
 Construction 13.7 6.5 
 Wholesale Trade 8.9 5.8 
 Transport 8.2 10.1 
 Other Activities 6.4 5.8 
 GDP 7.9 5.3 
Source: Asian Development Bank Statistical Database System as cited in Basri and Hill (2011a). 
 
 
As seen in Table 4.2, when comparing the periods of 1990-1996 and 2000-2008, 
growth rates in mining and utilities, manufacturing and construction during the second 
period were less than half of those of the first period. Even amid the historically high 
commodity prices, the mining sector experienced slow growth as a result of poor 
exploration and a poor taxation environment. For construction sectors, the very high 
growth achieved during the pre-crisis years was at an unsustainable level and hence it 
was hit hard by the crisis. For the manufacturing sector, the steadily appreciating 
exchange rate, high infrastructure costs and a rigid labour market adversely affected its 
growth (Basri & Hill, 2011a).  
On the other hand, the agriculture and transport sectors grew faster in the second 
period. For the agriculture sector, its higher growth reflected the generally buoyant 
commodity prices during this period. Whereas technological changes and substantial 
deregulation were deemed responsible for the higher growth in the transport (including 
telecommunication) sector (Basri & Hill, 2011a). 
The GFC which had started at the end of 2007 in advanced economies began to 
affect Indonesia by mid-September 2008. It was marked by plunging stock market 
prices, the deeply depreciating Rupiah and significant increases in government bond 
yield (Djaja, 2009). Due to the crisis, non-oil and gas output growth slowed in 2008 and 
2009, however, it quickly bounced back in 2010 (Figure 4.2). 
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Largely, the GFC had a relatively small impact on the Indonesian economy 
compared to other countries in the region, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand 
and also compared to the severity of the Asian financial crisis. Appropriate policy 
responses from the Indonesian central bank and the government were considered to be 
some of the factors contributing to this relatively good performance during the crisis 
(Basri & Hill, 2011a; Basri & Rahardja, 2010).  
Based on the lessons learned during the Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian 
government (in this case the Ministry of Finance) and the central bank were aware that a 
severe crisis of confidence can arise due to instability and disruption in the financial 
sector. During the height of the Asian financial crisis, this loss of confidence caused 
Indonesia to suffer from massive bank runs (Bennett, 1999). One of the important 
lessons learned from this event is that the cost of preventing losses of confidence (such 
as providing guarantees in the banking sector, ensuring liquidity and using a fiscal 
expansion policy) is much lower than the cost of allowing such condition to arise (Basri 
& Rahardja, 2010; Hill, 2000). Therefore, when one private bank in Indonesia was 
nearly bankrupt due to the GFC, the government bailed out the bank at a cost around 
US$1.3 billion, succeeding in containing its negative impact on confidence and 
successfully avoiding the risk of bank runs (Basri & Rahardja, 2010). 
Figure 4.4 presents the trend in the share of exports in GDP during 2004-2010. 
The declining proportion of exports relative to GDP, as shown in Figure 4.4, was also 
suggested as a factor that partially shielded Indonesia from the GFC (Basri & Rahardja, 
2010; Djaja, 2009).  
 
Figure 4.4.  Exports as percentage of GDP, 2004-2010 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
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As indicated in Figure 4.4, the share of exports as a proportion of GDP reached 
its peak in 2005 at 35 per cent. Afterwards, it declined steadily, reaching only 24 per 
cent in 2009 – the lowest during 2004-2010.  
Djaja (2009) estimated that in 2005 around 85 per cent of goods and services 
produced in Indonesia were consumed domestically. However, it is argued that this 
condition was not a case of a deliberately planned economic strategy but rather a mere 
case of coincidence (Basri & Rahardja, 2010). The country recorded such a small share 
of exports to GDP due to, among other factors, poor international production networks. 
Moreover, lagging production networks were mainly caused by an unfavourable 
investment climate and bad logistics systems in Indonesia (Kimura, 2005; Kimura & 
Ando, 2005). Combined with the hurdles found in the supply side of the economy, they 
made Indonesia less competitive and consequently its export growth was relatively 
limited (Basri & Rahardja, 2010). In other words, at the time of the GFC, Indonesia was 
less integrated with the global economy. Hence, the relatively small share of exports as 
a proportion of GDP was a factor of good luck that minimised the effects of the GFC of 
2007/2008 on the Indonesian economy (Basri & Rahardja, 2010). 
It might be important to note that following the Asian financial crisis of 
1997/1998, Indonesia saw the introduction of an anti-monopoly policy which was 
designed to push the Indonesian economy towards a more competitive environment. 
This reform was mandated by the IMF in one of its reform packages in the aftermath of 
the Asian financial crisis and culminated with the enactment of Competition Law No. 
5/1999. The main objective of this new law was to create a healthy business 
environment that would encourage economic agents to improve their competitiveness 
by increasing their efficiency and productivity. On this premise, the law prohibited 
business practices such as monopoly, price fixing and cartels (Aswicahyono & Kartika, 
2010; Thee, 2002). 
Following the end of the oil boom period in the early 1980s, there were wide-
ranging deregulation packages that had been promoted by the ruling government with 
the intent to reduce the economy‟s highly restrictive anti-trade bias and anti-foreign 
investment regime at the time (Thee, 2002). Although these reforms were considered to 
have been successful in attracting foreign direct investment and prompted greater 
import competition, there were still extensive restrictive regulations on domestic 
competition and trade. These restrictions took many forms such as price controls, entry 
and exit controls, the sanctioning of cartels, monopoly in specific industry and ad hoc 
government interventions in favour of a specific firm or industry (World Bank, 1996).  
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One prominent example of market restrictions during this period was the 
monopoly in the flour market. Indonesia imported almost all of its wheat and while 
BULOG was its sole licensed importer, Bogasari was its major beneficiary. A company 
owned by a Soeharto crony, Bogasari held a special right to mill all of BULOG‟s wheat 
into flour. As a form of payment for this „service‟ Bogasari received all of the flour at 
22 per cent below international market price. Thus Bogasari practically held 
monopolistic control of the flour market in Indonesia because other companies were 
forbidden to import wheat and if they wanted to import flour they would have to buy 
them at international market prices (Mobarak & Purbasari, 2006). 
Hence, it was in the spirit of reducing these market imperfections that the 
Competition Law No. 5/1999 (or the anti-monopoly law) was introduced following the 
fall of Soeharto regime and the start of a more democratic era. Generally, there has been 
no major problem with a lack of competition in the Indonesian economy in post-crisis 
period (Aswicahyono & Kartika, 2010). It appeared that the law succeeded in creating a 
fairer, healthier, more competitive environment, which eventually helped push non-oil 
and gas output expansion after the crisis of 1998. 
A recent study by Aswicahyono and Kartika (2010) concluded that post-crisis 
Indonesia has a more competitive business environment than before. Although the 
economy still has quite a high level of industrial concentration, they argued that there is 
a relatively significant increase in foreign ownership in almost all industries. 
Furthermore, there is a tendency of a rising import penetration ratio in post-crisis years 
particularly in agriculture, mining and finance. Lastly, there is a change in the entry and 
exit rates, particularly in the manufacturing industry. They noticed that after 1998 exit 
rates were always higher than entry rates, whereas previously it was the other way 
around. Hence, they argued that these conditions signified a higher level of business 
competition after the introduction of the new anti-monopoly law. 
One of the aspects of macroeconomic management which may contribute to the 
rebound in the growth of the non-oil and gas sectors‟ output after the Asian financial 
crisis was the role of aggregate (domestic) demand. Figure 4.5 shows that domestic 
demand (calculated as differences between total GDP and total exports) reached its pre-
crisis level in 2003 and the trend remained relatively strong until 2010. Data on 
aggregate (domestic) demand in Figure 4.5 are presented as percentage of GDP (total 
GDP deducted by total exports, then the result is divided by total GDP times 100 per 
cent), thus it shows all goods and services which are consumed domestically. 
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Figure 4.5  Aggregate (domestic) demand, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators (2014); author‟s calculations. 
 
 
 Further, government fiscal policy may be partly responsible for these increases 
in aggregate demand. During the 2000s, there was a steady expansion in government 
spending, particularly after 2002, as shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6  Government spending, 2001-2010 (2005=100) 
 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia (2014) 
 
 
 Figure 4.6 indicates that although there was a brief contraction in 2009 
following the global financial crisis, overall government spending during 2002-2010 
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showed a steadily increasing trend. This fiscal expansion is apparently consistent with 
one of the new features in the more democratic, post-crisis Indonesia which is the 
beginning of social welfare and compensation schemes. Even though these programs are 
still at a very basic stage they are fairly broad-based, covering large portion of the 
country‟s population (Basri & Hill, 2011b). 
These schemes were first launched following the severe economic downturn due 
to the crisis of 1997/1998 and later expanded, particularly in response to external shocks 
such as the steep increase in international oil prices in 2005 and the global recession of 
2008. Based on their purposes, these schemes can be broadly categorised into three 
groups: against structural poverty, breaking the intergenerational poverty chain and 
dealing with economic shocks (Papanek, Basri, & Schydlowski, 2010). 
The rice subsidy program (or Raskin) was one of the first anti-poverty programs 
designed to reduce the severity of the Asian financial crisis. This program basically 
provided a price subsidy by distributing rice to the poor at one-fourth to one-third of the 
market prices. The National Community Empowerment Program (or PNPM) was 
another program which aimed to tackle structural poverty through infrastructure 
projects. Since the program was labour-intensive, it could provide poor peasants with 
off-season employment on a permanent basis. Further, since it required hard physical 
labour and the wages were set to be very low, the program was said to be self-targeting, 
where only the really poor would be willing to participate (Papanek et al., 2010). 
 There were several programs which aimed to break the intergenerational poverty 
chain. The School Operational Assistance (or BOS) provided financial assistance to 
cover school expenses with the purpose to cut out student fees without sacrificing 
educational quality. There were also several other programs which aimed to improve the 
health conditions of the poor such as the Community Health Guarantee (or Jamkesmas), 
Health Insurance for Poor Family (or Askeskin) and Program Keluarga Harapan (or 
PKH) (Papanek et al., 2010). 
 A program which was specifically designed to deal with economic shocks was 
the direct cash transfer program (or BLT). Following the change in Indonesia‟s status as 
a net oil importer since 2004 and the fact that the domestic fuel price is subsidised by 
the government, soaring international oil prices in 2005 severely burdened the 
government‟s budget due to the increasing amount of fuel subsidy. At the height of the 
oil price increases in early 2005, the fuel subsidy reached an unsustainable level at 
Rp200 trillions (it was 20 per cent of total government expenditure and equivalent to 4 
per cent of GDP), thus it threatened to destabilise overall macroeconomic conditions. 
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Hence, the government had no other choice than to reduce the subsidy by increasing the 
domestic fuel price even though there was public outcry over this decision. As increases 
in fuel prices would be channelled into increases in the prices of commodities, to 
minimise these negative effects for the poor, and partly to calm the public, the BLT 
scheme was introduced with families identified as poor receiving Rp100,000 (around 
AU$10) cash transfers each month for one year. This program was introduced again in 
2008 when the world‟s oil price increased to more than $100 per barrel (Basri & Hill, 
2011b). 
 Aside from the steady increase in government spending through its fiscal 
expansion policy, aggregate demand might also be boosted by steady increases in 
private spending as shown in Figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7  Consumer expenditure, 2001-2010 (2013 = 100) 
 
 
Source: Global Market Information Database (2014) 
 
 
 Data in Figure 4.7 show that the average annual growth in consumer spending 
during 2001-2010 was 6.0 per cent. Although this rate was lower than Malaysia (7.3 per 
cent) and Vietnam (9.8 per cent), it was much higher than most other East Asian 
countries like the Philippines (4.6 per cent), Singapore (4.1 per cent) and Thailand (4.3 
per cent). These expansions in government and private spending were consistent with 
generally good macroeconomic management, particularly in the area of inflation control 
and monetary policy. The combination of optimum levels of inflation and low levels of 
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real interest rates were able to push aggregate demand up continuously for over a 
decade. 
A controlled level of inflation may also help to boost aggregate demand. In this 
regard, by the early 2000s Indonesia was generally able to tame the very high inflation 
of 1999 following the economic crisis a year before, as can be observed in Figure 4.8. It 
is argued that the strong coordination between the Indonesian central bank (BI) and the 
Ministry of Finance were generally able to keep inflation at sustainable levels 
(Kenward, 2013). 
 
Figure 4.8  Annual rate of inflation, 1999-2010 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.8, probably one of the most notable achievements in 
post-crisis macroeconomic management was the fast decline in the level of inflation 
since 1997/1998. Although the BI had just adopted inflation targeting policy in 1999, 
within one year BI succeeded in bringing the rate of inflation down to 3.7 per cent in 
2000 (from 20.5 per cent in 1999), even though it was a time full of social and political 
upheavals (Kenward, 2013). 
With the enactment of the State Financial Law No. 17/2003, both the BI and the 
Ministry of Finance were responsible for setting and achieving inflation targets. Hence, 
inflation targeting became a joint monetary and fiscal exercise. Although the inflation 
rate rose to two digits in 2005 and 2006, the overall performance was generally good. 
This arrangement of the joint exercise between the BI and the Ministry of Finance has 
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been able to broaden the institutional responsibility in inflation targeting and thus move 
closer towards common international practice (Hammond, 2012).  
Towards the end of the 2000s, international best practices were now being 
applied in nearly all aspects of Indonesia‟s inflation-targeting framework which 
includes: the target, the target range, the time horizon, the authority for setting the 
target, the pursuit of flexible inflation-targeting, close monitoring of the target, frequent 
review periods and accountability – including its communication to the public 
(Kenward, 2013). Overall, the most important achievement in this inflation-targeting 
regime might have been the downward trend in inflation while still achieving relatively 
high levels of economic growth. 
Aggregate demand may also be boosted by the low levels of real interest rates 
since cheaper cost of borrowing usually stimulates spending. Figure 4.9 presents the 
trend of the real interest rates (i.e. the lending interest rates adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator) for the period of 1999-2010. 
 
Figure 4.9  Annual real interest rate, 1999-2010 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.9, from the early 2000s, real interest rates had a tendency 
to decline, aside from a brief hike in 2009 following the GFC of 2008. It is possible that 
one of the effects of these declining real interest rates is the increase in spending, either 
in consumption goods or in investment goods. However, since the data collected in this 
study show that post-crisis capital accumulation has not been able to reach the same 
levels of growth as the pre-crisis period, it is possible that these generally low real 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
P
er
 c
en
t 
 83 
 
interest rates have been channelled to increases in aggregate demand via consumption 
spending.  
After the Asian financial crisis, the transport (including telecommunication) 
sector experienced the highest growth compared to other sectors of the economy, as 
seen in Table 4.2. In this sector, the big three items are the consumptions of cars, 
motorcycles and other vehicles, personal transport equipment and telecommunication 
services. Further, the prominent evidence of the impact of the „easy money‟ policy on 
demand growth can be seen in the growth rates of these three particular goods and 
services, as can be seen in Figure 4.10.  
 
Figure 4.10  The growth in consumption of cars, motorcycles and other vehicles, 
personal transport equipment, telecommunication services and GDP, 2002-
2010 
 
 
Sources: Global Market Information Database (2014); World Development Indicators (2014) 
   
 
As shown in Figure 4.10, even after a steep decline in the consumption growth 
in 2006 (which was consistent with the soaring oil prices), average consumption growth 
in these three types of goods and services are generally higher than the growth rate of 
GDP. While the GDP growth rate for 2001-2010 on average was 5.4 per cent per year, 
consumption of telecommunication services grew far above this rate at 13.3 per cent per 
year. This consumption growth was followed by growing demand in personal transport 
equipment (10.7 per cent) and cars, motorcycles and other vehicles (8.7 per cent). 
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The ability to keep interest rates low while at the same time preventing the 
economy from becoming overheated appeared to have resulted from the efforts of the 
BI and the Ministry of Finance to keep the rates of inflation at an „optimum‟ level. 
While an inflation rate that is too high will render money worthless, an inflation rate 
that is too low will encourage people to hoard cash instead of spending on goods and 
services. Hence, in the effort to reach a balance between these two extremes, in July 
2005 the BI decided to change its operational target from the base money to interest 
rates. The mechanism is basically as follows: based on the performance of inflation 
relative to the targets, the central bank‟s interest rate (BI rate) is then set as a „signal‟ by 
the BI‟s board of governors. This „signal‟ is then reflected in other interest rates (such 
as bank lending rates) and ultimately affects inflation and the real sector (Kenward, 
2013). 
Therefore, it can be argued that Indonesia‟s macroeconomic management during 
the 2000s – at least the management of the inflation rate, fiscal policy and the interest 
rate – was generally a success story (Basri & Hill, 2011a, p. 102). The country had 
successfully kept the inflation rate and interest rate at sustainable levels, even in the face 
of continuing fiscal expansion. These efforts appeared to have resulted in a steady 
increase in aggregate (domestic) demand which, in turn, may have pulled up the growth 
of non-oil and gas production output. 
 
4.3 Capital stock 
4.3.1 Capital stock in the petroleum sector 
 
Indonesia‟s statistics agency (BPS) never publishes official estimates of capital 
stock, neither in the aggregate economy nor in any specific economic sector (Van der 
Eng, 2009). Thus, in this analysis the capital stock series is constructed from serially 
available data on investment expenditure in the oil and gas sector from various 
government publications. These include the Annual Report by BPMIGAS and the 
Petroleum Report Indonesia by the US Embassy, Jakarta (which compiled its reports 
based on data provided by the Directorate General of Oil and Gas, Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources). A detailed and comprehensive discussion on the construction 
of the petroleum sector‟s variable for capital stock is presented in Chapter 6. 
Figure 4.11 shows the trend in capital stock formation in the petroleum sector. 
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Figure 4.11  Trend in capital stock formation in the petroleum sector, 1991-2010 
 
Sources: BPMIGAS (2005, 2011); U.S. Embassy (1994, 1998, 2001, 2008) 
Note: net investment = gross investment – depreciation 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.11, capital accumulation during the last years of Suharto-
era, from 1991 to 1997, shows a declining trend. Capital stock would increase as a 
result of investment, and investment in the petroleum industry is closely related, among 
others, to the price of oil (Pudyantoro, 2012). The generally low oil prices in the 1990s 
which prompted oil companies to put restraint on their investment decisions, combined 
with the shift of government focus away from petroleum industry due to the 
implementation of the exit strategy, appeared to have contributed to the declining trend 
in investment and, consequently, in the formation of capital stock during the period of 
1991-1997.  
Regarding this shift of government focus, a proposal prepared for the 
Government of Indonesia (GoI) by the Indonesian Mining Association  (Reid, 1994 as 
cited in Bhasin & McKay, 2002) reported that there had been a considerable change in 
the attitude of the GoI that made investment in the mining sector uninviting.  
In its proposal, the association highlighted several factors that greatly 
contributed to the decline in investment during this period, which are: 
1. Rising country risk. Numerous major changes in economic, politics and legal 
structures such as local autonomy have increased the country‟s investment risk. 
2. Rising security risk. The failures of authorities to uphold the law to protect the 
interests and investment of foreign firms. 
3. Rising legislative risk. Since the end of the 1980‟s the GoI rarely invited foreign 
mining firms to discuss legislative changes in the mining sector, hence it has 
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undermined investment in the industry. For example, since the introduction of the 
7
th
 generation of the Contract of Work (CoW) more than half of the companies that 
have signed it had either cancelled or withdrawn from their projects in 1994. 
Furthermore, as of 1994, not one single company had signed the proposed 8
th
 CoW 
generation. 
4. Rising inconsistency in policy. Policy changes have occurred at a much faster pace 
than before, frightening away would-be investors. 
5. Rising cost of doing business. Actual cost of doing business in Indonesia has risen 
due to higher costs in labour, transportation, imports and other operations. 
6. Other factors, which include: 
6.1. Land tenure and compensation. The lack of a clear tenure system and the 
impotence of the legal system in solving compensation claims. 
6.2. Shifts in global exploration spending. It is estimated that more than 50 per 
cent of the world‟s exploration funding went to Australia, Canada and the 
USA which provide low levels of investment risk, well developed 
infrastructure and attractive fiscal regimes. Other countries, such as Chile, are 
also opening up their domestic mining industry to foreign investors. 
6.3. Lacklustre infrastructure development. Lack of adequate transportation and 
communication systems eventually increase the costs of doing business. 
6.4. Burdensome bureaucratic practices and rampant corruption. 
 
Capital stock formation declined steeply in 1998 following the Asian financial 
crisis and the subsequent drops in the world‟s oil prices. In fact, during the period of 
1998-2003, capital stock in the petroleum sector experienced its worst growth compared 
to the other two sub-periods (1991-1997 and 2004-2010). However, it might be 
necessary to note that this period was a time of political instability in Indonesia. There 
were three presidents and three cabinets during the span of only five years. Deadly 
social conflicts in several regions such as Ambon, Maluku and Poso, terrorist bombings 
and the ongoing separatist movements in Aceh and Papua were engulfing the nation 
during these years (Bhakti, 2004). These situations did not help the formation and 
growth of capital stock in the oil and gas sector. 
The period 2004-2010 was marked by improvements in social and political 
stability and was also followed by an increase in capital stock accumulation. However, 
further investigation into the nature of investment expenditure during this time period 
reveals a rather discouraging picture, as can be observed in Table 4.3 which shows the 
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investment expenditure in upstream oil and gas sector. Activities in the upstream oil and 
gas sector include the prospecting, exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural 
gas. Basically, the upstream oil and gas sector consists of activities needed to recover 
and bring the crude oil and /or raw natural gas to the surface. 
 
Table 4.3  Upstream oil and gas investment expenditure, 2000-2010  
(current US$ millions) 
 
Sources: BPMIGAS (2011); U.S. Embassy (2008). 
 
Data in Table 4.3 show that for the period of 2000 to 2010, on average, more 
than 60 per cent of investment expenditure went to the production process and only 
around 30 per cent went to the exploration and development of new oil and gas fields, 
while the remaining 10 per cent went to administrative purposes. From this, it could be 
interpreted that the bulk of investment has been used to maintain the flow of oil and gas 
from the existing mature and dwindling oil and gas fields rather than to explore and 
develop potential new ones. 
After the Asian financial crisis, capital formation in Indonesia‟s oil and gas 
industry has not been able to reach the same level as before the crisis. The post-crisis 
periods of 1998-2003 and 2004-2010 basically shared the same problems that have 
hampered investment in the industry. A joint OECD and IEA study identified these 
problems as follows (OECD/IEA, 2008): 
1. The problem of long-term certainty. The Indonesian investment environment was 
badly damaged by the confusion caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998, 
while the Constitutional Court‟s annulment of some parts of Oil and Gas Law No. 
22/2001 in 2004 has made investors nervous. 
Year
Exploration & 
Development
Production Administration Total
2000 758                     2,433              413                        3,604             
2001 1,158                 2,615              429                        4,202             
2002 1,076                 1,676              666                        3,418             
2003 1,409                 3,458              438                        5,305             
2004 1,744                 3,204              610                        5,558             
2005 2,582                 4,769              816                        8,167             
2006 2,519                 4,639              636                        7,794             
2007 2,562                 5,711              869                        9,142             
2008 3,064                 6,579              981                        10,624           
2009 3,304                 6,391              730                        10,425           
2010 3,165                 7,033              833                        11,031           
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2. Legal risk. Following the annulment of some provisions in Law No. 22/2001, the 
GoI promised to propose new laws as well as implement regulations with the hope 
to increase certainty and provide predictability to investors. However, these 
proposals lack transparent details and are extremely slow in progressing
14
.  
3. Subsidised pricing. Investors‟ decisions are distorted by the subsidy or non-cost-
reflective pricing practices in oil products because it raises concern about stability 
and return on investment in the petroleum sector. 
4. Tendering and approval process. Since the criteria, standards and tender formats are 
determined by the tendering participants themselves, it has caused confusion and 
concerns regarding the transparency of the tendering and approval processes 
because they are prone to unequal treatment due to corruption. 
5. The GoI‟s management on investment approval coordination and implementation. 
Even though the Indonesia‟s Investment Coordinating Board (or BKPM) has the 
responsibility to coordinate and implement a „one-stop‟ integrated service for 
investment, there are still problems regarding the slow implementation of 
government policies and regulations due to poor coordination across government 
agencies. 
6. Need for visible results. There is a lack of concrete response from the GoI on 
investors‟ concerns. 
7. Anti-corruption. While it should be appreciated that the GoI has been working hard 
to eradicate corruption, the drastic measures of the anti-bribery schemes have made 
public officials overly cautious for fear of their actions being misconstrued by law 
enforcers. It has resulted in the slowing down of officials‟ actions and the decision 
making processes.  
 
Further, a survey of 32 different companies operating in the Indonesian oil and 
gas industry that was conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012) reported that 
contract sanctity, uncertainty over cost recovery, interference from other government 
agencies, corruption and the latest confusion regarding the implementation of Law No. 
22/2001 has continued to stifle investment.  
The survey also reported that the general view of the participants is that capital 
expenditure would decline or at least stay the same over the next five years after the 
survey was conducted. This is a substantial change in business players‟ sentiment 
                                                 
14
 While the GoI was still struggling to keep its promise on the new laws and regulations, some more of 
the provisions in Law Number 22/2001 were annulled once again in 2012 by the same court. It has 
worsened the picture of the severity of legal risk in Indonesia. 
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compared to the same survey which was conducted in 2008 which stated that the 
majority of survey participants thought that capital spending would increase.  
In fact, one of the participant‟s comments in the survey more or less summarises 
the problems of investment in the Indonesian upstream petroleum sector: 
 
“History will record that the past decade has seen a big increase in political interference in 
the oil and gas industry and it is no surprise that oil and gas production has been adversely 
affected. Ours is an industry that requires long-term investment, longer than the 
government political cycles and only with contract sanctity and stability in the regulatory 
regime can that investment be sustained. Our industry provides the bulk of the GDP for 
Indonesia yet has been hijacked by the Ministry of Finance as a result of their incessant 
greed for a greater share of revenues. This has clearly stifled investment, particularly in the 
Exploration sector – comparative data shows that Indonesia can no longer compete with its 
regional neighbors” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012, p. 33). 
 
 
In line with this, the BPMIGAS (2011) reported that out of 112 contracts for 
working areas which had been signed between 2002 and 2008, 60 per cent of them had 
failed to meet their contract commitments. According to BPMIGAS, the main issue for 
these failures was problems related to overlapping land permits, business permits, social 
concerns and other issues related to field operations. For example, Sele Raya – an oil 
and gas company which operates Merangin II oil field in South Sumatra – had to 
temporarily halt its operations because the local government held the company‟s 
trucking permit due to the issue of road damage (BPMIGAS, 2011). 
 Related to Indonesian local governments‟ authority, an ADB (2005) survey 
confirmed in its study that business practitioners found increasing regulatory 
uncertainty following the implementation of decentralisation policy in 2001. With this 
decentralisation policy, the major parties responsible for local budgets are the local 
governments, not the central government. Since then, businesses (including oil and gas 
firms) have to bear the burden of the many regulations issued by each local government 
in its efforts to raise funds. This is being done even though these local regulations often 
contradict those set by the central government (World Bank, 2006).  
A lack of understanding regarding the economics of oil and gas among 
Indonesian legislators is viewed as another factor which has aggravated the capital 
formation problem in the country‟s petroleum sector (Boyd et al., 2010). There is a 
perspective among some Indonesian law-makers that the country nowadays is a very 
different place from Indonesia back in the early Soeharto-era of 1967, in that the 
country “now does not need to attract investment at any cost” (Boyd et al., 2010, p. 
241). They hold the view that since oil and gas resources will always stay where they lie 
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underground, it will be better to delay their exploitation until there are better bargaining 
positions available for Indonesians.  
The period of 2004-2010 was an interesting period in the development of the 
Indonesian oil and gas industry since two prominent events happened during this time. 
First, the rising sentiment of resource nationalism and second, Indonesia started to 
become a net oil importer in 2004.  
Rising resource nationalism could adversely affect the formation of private 
capital since at some point it might manifest itself in the form of asset expropriations or 
nationalisation – such as what happens in Venezuela‟s oil and gas industry. When 
expropriations or nationalisation does not happen, then resource nationalism might 
manifest itself in the form of tougher laws and regulations for foreign investors as well 
as a higher rate of government take from natural resources exploitation (Vivoda, 2009). 
Regardless of how resource nationalism may manifest itself, there is a risk that it might 
eventually hamper the expansion of private investment. 
A study by Kretzschmar, Kirchner, and Sharifzyanova (2010) found that foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in oil and gas is increasingly flowing towards low-risk 
developed countries due to the recent increase in resource nationalism in major oil 
exporting countries (the majority of which are developing countries). Therefore, 
although less virulent than in countries such as Russia, Bolivia or Venezuela, 
Indonesian resource nationalism might harm investor confidence unless it can be 
managed constructively (Boyd et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, one of the consequences of being a net oil importer is that the 
country‟s balance of payments would be put under pressure, especially when the 
world‟s oil prices increase steeply. It may drain the country‟s foreign exchange reserves 
since the common currencies for international oil trading are the U.S. Dollar and the 
Euro (Clark, 2005; Shipley, 2007). More importantly, since gasoline in Indonesia is 
subsidised by the government, an increasing oil price would also mean an increase in 
government spending since the government has to absorb any disparity between the 
international selling price and the domestic selling price. For example, at the height of 
the world‟s oil price in 2008, the government subsidy for gasoline alone reached over 4 
per cent of GDP and absorbed around 20 per cent of total government spending 
(Bulman, Fengler, & Ikhsan, 2008). There is the possibility that the pressures on the 
country‟s balance of payments and state budget would, in turn, limit the government‟s 
ability to take part in the formation of capital stock in the oil and gas industry. 
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4.3.2 Capital stock in the non-petroleum sectors 
 
Since there is no official estimate of capital stock (as discussed earlier), in this 
analysis the capital stock series is constructed from investment expenditure in the non-
petroleum sectors of the economy. Here, the values of the aggregate gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) published annually by BPS minus the values of investment in the 
petroleum sector are used as a proxy for the levels of investment in the non-petroleum 
sectors. A detailed and comprehensive discussion on the construction of the variable for 
the non-petroleum sector‟s capital stock is presented in Chapter 7. 
Figure 4.12 shows the trend in capital stock formation in the non-oil and gas 
sectors of the Indonesian economy from 1991 to 2010.  
 
Figure 4.12  Trend in capital stock formation in non-petroleum sectors, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011b, 2012); BPMIGAS (2005, 2011); U.S. Embassy (1994, 1998, 2001, 
2008). 
Note: net investment = gross investment – depreciation   
 
 
Figure 4.12 shows that in the pre-crisis period, from 1991-1997, capital stock 
accumulation in the non-petroleum sectors increased. It was then followed by a steep 
decrease in 1998 as the Asian financial crisis struck. Although immediately after 1998 
capital stock accumulation again began to increase, by 2010 it had still not been able to 
reach the same level as the pre-crisis period, even after more than a decade had passed 
since the crisis. 
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Looking at the increasing trend in the accumulation of capital stock during 
1991-1997 in Figure 4.12, it is possible that the deregulation measures in Pakto „88 had 
been able to mobilise funds to support the development of the country‟s non-oil and gas 
sectors. During this period, slowing economic activity and low rates of return in capital 
exporting countries induced capital inflows in Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia, as shown in Table 4.4 (Calvo et al., 1996; Corbo & Hernandez, 1996; 
Hossain, 2006). 
 
Table 4.4  Selected recipients of large capital inflows 
Country
Year in Which 
the Capital 
Inflows Began
Per Capita GDP (in 
1992 US$)
Balance on the Capital 
Account as a Percentage 
of GDP
Balance on the Current 
Account as a Percentage of 
GDP
Indonesia 1990 670 5.3 2.5
Malaysia 1989 2790 10.1 4.8
Philippines 1992 770 8.3 4.2
Thailand 1988 1840 9.4 6.0
Annual Average from First Year of Inflows to 1994
Source: Calvo et al. (1996, p. 125) 
 
 Thee (2003) suggested that these large capital inflows, as shown in Table 4.4, 
drove the rapid industrialisation process in Indonesia. The high capital formation during 
this time period transformed the country from an economy that was highly dependent on 
natural resource endowment to an economy in which the manufacturing industry was 
the dominant sector. 
Figure 4.13 shows the development of net inflows of FDI and domestic savings 
during 1991-2010.   
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Figure 4.13  FDI and gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP, 1991-2010 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
 
 Figure 4.13 shows that in the pre-crisis period, during 1991-1997, the net inflow 
of FDI reached its peak at 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1996. The figure also shows that 
domestic savings for this period was at its highest rate in 1991 and subsequently 
underwent a declining trend until the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 struck.  
 These inflows of FDI and the formation of domestic savings during 1991-1997 
were consistent with the deregulation measures which were launched in the 1980s as 
part of the exit strategy (Arndt, 1983; Prawiro, 1998; Usui, 1997). One of those 
deregulation measures was the introduction of the exemption and drawback scheme for 
duty and import tax in May 1986 which allowed exporters to purchase intermediate 
inputs at international prices. The government agency responsible for implementing the 
policy was Bapeksta (Hill, 1987, as cited in Thee, 1991). This agency – whose efficient 
operations impressed business people and observers alike – has largely been deemed 
responsible for the country‟s successful transition from an import-substituting economic 
strategy to an export-promoting one. As a result of this policy, which began in 1987, 
there were massive and growing inflows of capital from four of Asia‟s newly 
industrialised countries (NICs) – Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Nevertheless, it was argued that the majority of these flows of investment went to small-
scale, labour-intensive and low-technology manufacturing industries (Thee, 1991).  
Related to these inflows of capital, Ramstetter (2000) suggested that the 
importance of FDI in Indonesia‟s industrialisation process is often overestimated since 
the inflows of FDI, even at their peak in 1996, accounted for only around 9 per cent of 
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total fixed investment. Ramstetter (2000) further argued that it was domestic investors 
who hold the key to the formation of capital stock in Indonesia. This view is consistent 
with the data shown in Figure 4.13, where the yearly average share of FDI was only 
1.48 per cent of GDP during the period of 1991-1998. This might be a rather 
insignificant contribution compared to the share of domestic savings which reached a 
yearly average of 31.13 per cent of GDP for the same period. 
 Some studies (see, for example, in Faruqee & Husain, 1998; Wade, 1998) 
suggested that there were at least two crucial factors which were responsible for the 
relatively high rates of domestic savings in Indonesia. First, there were shifts in the 
demographic structure of the population with an increase in the population of working 
age. It is argued that the higher the ratio of young adults or working-age population to 
the total population of a country, the higher the rate of savings in that country. Second, a 
sustained increase in per capita income also has a significant positive impact on the 
savings rate. The majority of these savings came from households, and even though 
some were invested abroad, the majority was invested at home.  
 Although the share of FDI was much smaller than domestic savings, FDI plays 
an important role in the manufactured exports industry in Indonesia. Therefore, its 
presence cannot be ignored since the manufactured exports industry holds a significant 
role in economic growth and employment in many countries, including Indonesia (see, 
for instance, in Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1999; Borensztein, De Gregorio, 
& Lee, 1998; James & Fujita, 2000; Li & Liu, 2005).  
 Following the Asian financial crisis, the formation of capital stock decreased 
steeply (see Figure 4.12). The social and political instability that engulfed Indonesia 
following the crisis appeared to have resulted in rapid capital flight out of the country. 
Hill (2000) noted that in 1996-1997 there were net capital inflows of US$13.5 billion, 
but it was followed by net capital outflows of US$11.8 billion a year later and around 
US$10.8 billion two years later.  
 Further, Hill (2000, p. 24) argued that during the pre-crisis years there was an 
accumulation of “mobile capital” in the form of short-term external debt and portfolio 
investment. During the 1980s when Indonesia had successfully dealt with shrinking oil 
revenue through financial deregulation packages, the country‟s external debts started to 
accumulate. Also, Indonesia received large quantities of capital in the form of portfolio 
investment which when combined with the country‟s open capital account system, these 
funds can be regarded as internationally mobile. The flight of mobile capital during the 
Asian financial crisis worsened the severity of the crisis for Indonesia. The country was 
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regarded as the worst affected economy in East Asia. Its economic contraction in 1998 
was about twice as large as the next most affected economy, i.e. Thailand (Hill, 2000). 
 Capital flight often sparks deep concerns in developing countries, such as 
Indonesia, for three possible reasons. First, capital flight adds trouble to the existing 
problem of capital scarcity which further hampers growth and development. Second, 
during periods of crisis, instability and uncertainty, capital flight can lead to a negative 
feedback process. As resource constraints become binding there is the possibility that 
external sources of funds will be cut off, thus limiting further growth. As a result, more 
capital flight may ensue. The third reason concerns the negative distributive impacts of 
external indebtedness and capital flight. The rest of the society will suffer when external 
debts are being misused or improperly used to benefit only a few elite in the form of 
capital flight (Beja Jr, 2006). 
 From the year 2000, the accumulation of capital stock in the non-oil and gas 
sectors started to rebound and steadily increased in the years that followed (see Figure 
4.12). However, it has not been able to reach the same level as the pre-crisis period even 
after more than a decade had passed since the crisis. This phenomenon was consistent 
with the generally poor investment climate in Indonesia. There are many reports which 
highlight the investment impediments in Indonesia and therefore the country fares 
poorly in international comparisons. For example, A. T. Kearney, a management 
consulting firm, in its FDI Confidence Index, ranked Indonesia 21
st
 out of the 25 top 
FDI destinations in 2007, below Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia (Kearney, 2008). 
Further, the World Bank (2010), in its report on the rankings on the ease of doing 
business, put Indonesia at 122
nd
 place among 183 nations surveyed. 
A comprehensive survey of firm-level respondents conducted by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB, 2005) identified several key factors that hamper investment 
in Indonesia and affects both foreign and domestic investors. The most severe business 
obstacles identified by the study are macroeconomic instability, economic and 
regulatory policy uncertainty and corruption. For medium-sized firms, access to formal 
financing is a major problem. Labour regulations concerning the hiring and lay-off 
procedures as well as minimum wages policies are also serious concerns for businesses. 
Further, according to the ADB‟s report, inadequate physical infrastructure is 
regarded as another factor that negatively affects new investment. Stoppages in business 
operations increased as a result of declining investment in infrastructure after the crisis 
of 1998. Firms increasingly experienced power outages, transport failures, as well as 
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inadequate water and other supplies. The report estimated that around 4 per cent of total 
sales were lost due to the frequent power outages alone (ADB, 2005, p. 4). 
Decentralisation policy following the increase in regional autonomy which 
started in 2001 has also adversely impacted the business and investment environment in 
Indonesia. Since some regulatory and revenue-raising functions are commissioned to 
district-level governments (or kota/kabupaten), businesses eventually have to bear the 
burden of the many regulations issued by each local government in their efforts to raise 
funds. Indeed, the ADB (2005) survey confirmed that around 40 per cent of the 
respondents found increasing regulatory uncertainty following the implementation of 
decentralisation policy in Indonesia. 
A report by the World Bank (2006) stated that despite the fact that there is law 
which gives the central government the right to restrict which economic sectors are 
deemed liable for local taxation as well as law which states that local regulations cannot 
conflict with those issued by the central government, there are many local regulations 
which contravene those laws and have been established solely for the purpose of 
imposing new taxes and charges on businesses. These local regulations frequently 
hamper inter-regional trade within the country by imposing levies on the movement of 
goods passing through their territory. To avoid scrutiny by the central government, local 
governments usually disguise them as user charges or as other non-tax instruments. It is 
estimated that from 2000 until mid-2005, around six thousand new taxes and charges 
were established by various local governments (LPEM FEUI, 2005a, as cited in World 
Bank, 2006). 
More recent studies on Indonesia‟s investment climate have pinpointed more or 
less the same domestic problems which curb the formation of capital in the country, for 
example in Butt and Parsons (2012) and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2011). They express 
similar views regarding the deterioration of the investment climate in Indonesia which 
discourages foreign investment and makes domestic entrepreneurs unenthusiastic about 
opening up new businesses. 
Further, even after the fall of the autocratic Soeharto regime, the legal system in 
post-crisis Indonesia remains complex, opaque and costly. Corrupt practices are still 
widespread in the country‟s legal environment. In fact, in the pre-crisis period, 
businesses could be certain that their corrupt payments (bribes) would result in their 
demanded outcomes. However, the same cannot be said for the post-crisis period since 
corrupt payments by businesses do not guarantee that they would get what they want. 
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Parties in dispute have been able to thwart their opponents‟ claims by bribing the legal 
system to work in their favour (Aswicahyono et al., 2009; Lindsey, 2004). 
Aside from the poor investment climate, the changing of status of Indonesia to a 
net oil importer in 2004 might have also adversely impacted the formation of capital in 
the non-oil and gas sectors. As a net oil importer, the government‟s subsidy on the 
consumption of gasoline has reduced the fiscal capacity of the central government to 
take part in the national effort to boost capital stock formation (through infrastructure 
expenditure, for example) since any disparity between international and domestic oil 
prices will have to be absorbed by the government.  
Gasoline was subsidised by the government, starting in budget year of 
1977/1978, with the initial intention to push the still sluggish economic activities at the 
time (Indonesian Government, 1995). This subsidy did not cause significant problems 
when Indonesia was still a net oil exporter. For example, when the international oil 
price was at a very low level in 1986/1987, the government did not have to spend any 
money on this subsidy, and in fact it reaped profit from the domestic sale of gasoline 
because at that time domestic price was higher than international price (Indonesian 
Government, 1990). As discussed earlier, problems with the gasoline subsidy started to 
worsen when Indonesia became a net oil importer. For example, when the international 
oil price reached more than US$100 per barrel in 2008, the gasoline subsidy in that year 
swelled to approximately 3.1 per cent of GDP. As a comparison, non-energy subsidies 
(i.e. subsidy for rice, cooking oil, fertiliser, etc.) were only around 1.3 per cent of GDP 
for the same year (Indonesian Government, 2008). 
Pressures stemming from the GFC of 2007/2008 on the capital formation in 
Indonesian economy can be seen in several indicators. In late 2008, the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange was down by around 50 per cent and stock trading needed to be closed 
temporarily. Another indicator was the pressure on the value of Rupiah which 
experienced steep depreciation due to massive sell-off in the capital market. Further, 
growth in bank lending declined from around 32 per cent before the crisis to 10 per cent 
in early 2009 (Basri & Siregar, 2009).  
Amid these pressures, Indonesia in general was relatively immune to the GFC of 
2007/2008 as discussed earlier. Following this crisis, the non-oil and gas sectors‟ capital 
stock still grew steadily, which is consistent with the fiscal stimulus packages in late 
2008 and early 2009 as well as the lowering of the central bank‟s interest rate (Basri & 
Hill, 2011a; Basri & Rahardja, 2010). However, since the crisis forced households and 
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firms to delay and/or cancel investment (Bernanke, 2009), there is the possibility that 
Indonesia might have lost the momentum to increase its investment level further. 
 
4.4 Labour 
4.4.1 Labour in the petroleum sector 
 
The quantity of labour in the petroleum sector is constructed using serially 
available data on the number of workers employed in the Indonesian upstream oil and 
gas industry, published periodically by BPS in its Mining Statistics of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas. These data were compiled from the annual survey conducted by BPS on 
all companies which operate in the upstream oil and gas industry. A detailed and 
comprehensive discussion on the construction of the variable for labour in the 
petroleum sector is presented in Chapter 6. 
Figure 4.14 shows the trend in the number of workers employed in the 
petroleum industry for the period under study.  
 
Figure 4.14  Trend in the number of employees in the petroleum sector, 1991-2010 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1992, 1997b, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2009b, 2011c) 
 
 
Overall, from 1991 until 2010, on average, the upstream oil and gas industry 
made up only 0.03 per cent of total national employment. Mabro (1970) suggested that 
the generally low employment in the oil and gas industry could be interpreted in two 
ways. First, oil and gas output might not need to expand with labour due to 
technological advances. Second, shortages in labour supply might restrict the expansion 
of employment in the oil and gas industry. Nevertheless, Mabro (1970) argued that the 
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former interpretation is strongly believed to be the case. Furthermore, it was also argued 
that the industry‟s high reliance on sub-contractors for many of its operations (e.g. 
drilling, transports, catering, geological explorations) might account for this lack of 
employment absorption (Mabro, 1970). 
Following the country‟s windfall profit due to the oil shocks in the 1970s and 
the early 1980s, there was a growing interest in education in the field of oil and gas 
technology and petroleum engineering degrees began to be offered at several Indonesian 
academic institutions. During the period 1991-1997, the government realised that 
improving the quality of human resources by ensuring that Indonesians are able to 
utilise, develop and master science and technology are the decisive factors in improving 
the efficiency and productivity of the petroleum industry (Indonesian Government, 
1994).  
During this period, the government gave special attention to the science and 
technology necessary to support the development of the mining industry in general, 
increase value-added, the preservation of the environment and minimising losses due to 
accidents. These were enhanced through improved education, training and technological 
transfer efforts to meet the needs for professional and skilled workers in the oil and gas 
sector (Indonesian Government, 1994). 
Following the fall in the output and capital stock formation in the petroleum 
sector, the number of workers employed in this sector had a declining trend during the 
period of 1991-1997, as seen in Figure 4.14. During this period, many skilled and 
experienced local workers left the country to find jobs abroad (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2012). One of the problems derived from this exodus could lead to difficulties in the 
foreseeable future when the industry has to deal with the maturity of oil and gas fields 
and tries to expand by exploring and exploiting new fields.  
 Amid the issues of reserve depletions and the unfavourable investment climate, 
employment in the petroleum sector actually increased after the Asian financial crisis of 
1997/1998. As the oil price increased from just US$12.16 per barrel in 1998 to 
US$17.30 per barrel in 1999 and further to US$33.69 per barrel in 2004, post-crisis oil 
and gas employment also increased. During the period of transition and adjustment in 
Indonesia from 1998-2003, the average annual growth in oil and gas employment was 
3.95 per cent. This was much better than the average employment growth in the period 
of 1991-1997 which was -8.4 per cent.  
It is possible that with the continuing increases in global demand and prices for 
oil and gas after the 1997/1998 crisis, that this increase in employment might be due to 
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the refilling of positions which had been vacated during the period of low oil prices 
previously. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 4.14, even though the growth may look 
promising, on average, the level of employment in the oil and gas sector in the post-
crisis period was still below the pre-crisis level. Furthermore, amid these increases in 
the employment rate, the sector faced difficulties in recruiting sufficient and skilled 
local workers because many of the skilled locals sought employment abroad, mainly in 
the Middle-Eastern countries in the search for better salaries, while the importation of 
skilled workers from abroad was severely restricted by the government 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012).   
Even though oil prices increased further during the period of 2004-2010 and 
crossed the psychological barrier of US$100 per barrel in 2008, employment levels 
during this time period stayed more or less stagnant. This condition could be interpreted 
as the general inability of the Indonesian petroleum sector to reap the potential benefits 
provided by the hike in oil prices due to the many problems faced by the sector as 
discussed in other parts of this study. 
 
4.4.2 Labour in the non-petroleum sectors 
 
The variable for labour in the non-petroleum sectors is constructed using serially 
available data on the number of workers employed in all sectors of the economy. These 
data are published annually by BPS in its Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia and are 
grouped by BPS into nine economic sectors, as follows:  
1. Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery 
2. Mining and quarrying 
3. Manufacturing 
4. Electricity, gas15 and water supply 
5. Construction 
6. Trade, hotel and restaurant 
7. Transport and communication 
8. Financial, real estate, and business services 
9. Other services 
The number of workers employed in the petroleum sector is deducted from the 
aggregate data to arrive at the number of workers employed in the non-petroleum 
                                                 
15
 Gas in the downstream industry.  
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sectors. A detailed and comprehensive discussion on the construction of the labour 
variable for the non-petroleum sector is presented in Chapter 7. 
Figure 4.15 presents the trend in the number of workers employed in the non-oil 
and gas sectors during 1991-2010. Overall, it shows a steady increase trend in labour 
input even amidst the two crises: the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 and the GFC of 
2007/2008. 
 
Figure 4.15  Trend in the number of employees in the non-petroleum sectors, 1991-
2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011b, 2011c, 2012) 
 
 
The background for the policy changes on job creation during the pre-crisis 
period can, again, be found in the condition of the country‟s oil and gas industry. With 
the support from the windfall profit provided by the oil and gas industry in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, policies which aimed at job creation could finally be carried out. These 
policies were focused on recovering macroeconomic stability and developing sectors of 
the economy whose outputs were desperately needed domestically. However, with the 
shrinking of the government‟s oil revenue following the end of oil boom era, came the 
need for the private sector to be able to create as many employment opportunities as 
possible through a combination of trade, investment and labour market reforms (James 
& Fujita, 2000; Prawiro, 1998; Usui, 1997). 
With these policies, the Indonesian economy underwent significant structural 
adjustment and change. For example, the trade reforms were estimated to have cut the 
nominal rate of protection in manufacturing industry from 21 per cent in 1987 to 11 per 
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cent in 1999 and down further to 6 per cent in 1995. The effective rate of protection was 
down from 80 per cent in 1987 to 35 per cent in 1990 and dropped further to 25 per cent 
in 1995 (James & Fujita, 2000).  
Upon closer investigation, employment in the non-oil and gas sectors was 
mostly divided between four main industries - agriculture, manufacturing, public 
services and trade. Figure 4.16 shows the trend in employment in these industries from 
1991 to 2010.  
 
Figure 4.16  Number of workers employed in four main industries, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.16, employment in the agriculture and services 
industries were not significantly affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998, 
whereas employment in the trade and manufacturing industries felt the pressure of the 
crisis. Nevertheless, all of these four industries showed resilience as the destinations for 
Indonesian job seekers during the GFC of 2007/2008. 
The agriculture industry required further discussion because it served as the 
sector employing the largest part of the Indonesian workforce, even in the face of 
sustained and rapid population growth (Squires & Tabor, 1994). Further, as seen in 
Table 4.5, the agriculture industry has demonstrated a remarkable ability to maintain 
positive growth in employment when other industries and the aggregate economy 
experienced negative growth in employment. 
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Table 4.5  Employment growth in selected industries, 1990-1996 and 2000-2008 
 
1990-1996 2000-2008 Change
Agriculture -1.7 0.2 1.9
Mining & utilities 6.0 3.7 -2.3
Manufacturing 6.0 0.9 -5.0
Construction 10.8 5.7 -5.1
Wholesale trade 6.5 1.7 -4.8
Transport & communications 9.4 3.9 -5.5
Other 4.6 3.6 -1.0
Aggregate economy 2.3 1.7 -0.6
Annual average employment growth (per cent):
 
Source: ADB Statistical Database System as cited in Aswicahyono, Hill, and Narjoko (2011). 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.16 and Table 4.5, before the Asian financial crisis 
employment growth in the agriculture sector was declining. Nevertheless, a decline in 
agricultural sector employment is argued to be one of the dominant characteristics of a 
growing economy (Anderson, 1987; James & Fujita, 2000). This phenomenon is 
possibly driven by two factors. First, in a growing economy the increasing productivity 
per unit of arable land and per worker that are driven by rapid development of new farm 
technologies can result in lower employment in the agriculture sector. Second, in a 
growing economy the demand for agricultural products usually increases more slowly 
than the rise in demand for other non-farm goods and services, thus it might reduce 
employment growth in agriculture (Anderson, 1987). Further, a study by James and 
Fujita (2000) found that the negative growth in Indonesian agricultural employment 
during 1990-1995 was correlated with the positive growth of employment in the 
manufacturing and services industries during the same period. 
Hence, there is the possibility that the higher the rate of economic growth, the 
lower is the employment growth in the agricultural sector and vice versa. This is 
consistent with data in Figure 4.2 (see earlier) and Table 4.5. Similar findings are found 
in the study by R. J. Taylor (2007) which showed that declining employment in 
Malaysia‟s agriculture sector from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s was consistent with 
the increasing economic growth rate and increasing employment in the manufacturing 
sector during the same period. 
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It has been argued that the majority of the labour force employed in Indonesia‟s 
agriculture sector lacks the capacity and the means to migrate to other more productive 
sectors of the economy (Fatah, 2007). With the generally low wages in the country‟s 
agriculture sector, the easiest way for these workers to earn higher wages is to work in 
the labour-intensive, low-skills manufacturing jobs (Aswicahyono, Brooks, & Manning, 
2011; Priebe, Howell, & Sari, 2014). Thus, when the growth of Indonesia‟s labour-
intensive manufacturing industry slowed, even after more than a decade had passed 
since the crisis of 1997/1998, these workers may have little choice but to go back to, or 
have to stay in, the rural agricultural sector (Aswicahyono, Brooks, et al., 2011; Hugo, 
2000; Ranis & Stewart, 1999; Suharto, 2002). 
There is also the possibility that other factors contributed to the strong 
employment performance in agriculture industry, even when faced with two crises. 
High commodity prices and increased competitiveness due to the depreciation of the 
Rupiah would have helped the agriculture sector to record a positive growth in 
employment during the post-crisis period (Aswicahyono, Hill, et al., 2011). 
 The next sector requiring further examination is manufacturing, since the 
growth of this industry is likely to affect employment prospects in other sectors of the 
economy, either directly or indirectly through inter-industrial linkages. James and Fujita 
(2000) studied the employment induced by the manufactured exports industries in 
Indonesia (i.e. heavy industry, chemical industry, light industry and food processing 
industry) during two periods: 1985-1990 and 1990-1995. They found that total 
employment induced by the manufactured exports industries had slowed considerably, 
from 6.4 per cent of total national employment in the first period to just 3.7 per cent in 
the second period. One of the conclusions of their study was that progress in trade 
reforms aimed at promoting export-oriented industries had slackened during 1990-1995, 
the outcome of which was the declining employment in manufactured exports 
industries. 
As seen earlier in Table 4.5, after the Asian financial crisis, employment growth 
in the manufacturing sector dropped significantly from an annual average of 6 per cent 
pre-crisis to 0.9 per cent post-crisis – an 85 per cent decrease. Aswicahyono, Brooks, et 
al. (2011) put forward two factors which might be responsible for this poor employment 
performance: first, post-crisis manufacturing exports experienced slower output growth 
and second, the composition of exports had moved towards the more capital-intensive 
food processing industry, heavy industry and the chemical industry. 
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Further, Aswicahyono, Brooks, et al. (2011) argued that in the case of Indonesia, 
the development of the manufacturing sector towards a more capital-intensive industry 
was premature since the country still had a relatively elastic supply of unskilled labour. 
The high rates of unemployment and underemployment, relative stagnation of real 
wages as well as the large share of labour in low-productivity agriculture and the 
informal sectors, served as evidence for this argument.  
 It is also possible that the low employment in export-oriented industries reflects 
the generally poor employment performance in the Indonesian manufacturing sector 
during the post-crisis period. Uncertainty in regulation and policy, an overly regulated 
labour market, inadequate infrastructure and the appreciation of the exchange rate since 
the mid-2000s have been cited as some of the factors responsible for this low 
employment growth (Aswicahyono, Hill, et al., 2011). 
 For the trade industry, employment was dominated by the informal sector
16
. 
Even before the Asian financial crisis, informal employment comprised more than 80 
per cent of the total number of people working in the trade sector of the Indonesian 
economy (Evers & Mehmet, 1994, p. 3). Over time, employment in the informal sector 
expanded due to the decline in labour-intensive manufacturing industries and the 
continuing trend in urbanisation (Brata, 2010; Suharto, 2002). 
 The typical characteristics of workers in the informal sector are that they are 
vulnerable, have very limited capital, receive low economic returns and low living 
standards (Suharto, 2002). Sethuraman (1985) suggested that the majority of informal 
employees had very low levels of income and they usually negatively impacted the 
quality of the urban environment. Furthermore, they were usually powerless to protect 
their rights in getting even minimum standards of living as well as to fight against 
discrimination and victimisation (Gumber & Kulkarni, 2000). Hence, even though 
Indonesia‟s trade industry ranked second in employing the workforce in the non-oil and 
gas sectors, its quality of employment is likely to be generally poor since it is dominated 
by informal workers. 
 As shown previously in Figure 4.16, growth in public services employment was 
very modest at an average of 1.1 per cent annually between 1991 and 2000. However, 
after the decentralisation policy was implemented in 2001, employment growth in the 
                                                 
16
 Categorisation of formal and informal employment in Indonesia is based on work status. Wage 
employment (i.e. employers and paid employee) is regarded as the formal sector. Whereas self-
employment (i.e. self-employed, self-employed assisted by family workers, day labourers, and unpaid 
family workers) is categorised as the informal sector. However, these categorisations are still open to 
debate due to their broad nature (see Cuevas, Mina, Barcenas, & Rosario, 2009; Hugo, 2000; Suharto, 
2002)). 
 106 
 
public services sector swelled at an average growth of 5.47 per cent annually between 
2001 and 2010.  Even though one of the consequences of decentralisation policy was 
that local governments absorbed former central government‟s employees into their 
ranks, many local leaders were still hiring their own local staff and were reluctant to cut 
their already excessive number of personnel (Silver, 2003). A study by Usman (2002) 
found that more than 70 per cent of local governments reported increases in the number 
of their work units after the implementation of decentralisation policy. Furthermore, 
provincial governments continued to maintain large staff of their own despite significant 
reductions in their tasks and responsibilities due to the transfer of such tasks and 
responsibilities to district and municipal levels of governments. Over-employment in 
the public sector results in unnecessary pressures on local governments‟ budget and thus 
may adversely affect their ability to fund local development programs. 
 Table 4.6 shows the growth in output and employment in four major industries - 
agriculture, manufacturing, trade and services during 1991-1997 and 2000-2010. Since 
these four industries accounted for around 88 per cent of total employment in the non-
oil and gas sectors, they can reasonably be used to represent the conditions of the 
country‟s labour market and employment.  
 
Table 4.6  Output and employment growth in selected industries 
(annual average in per cent) 
 
1991-1997 2000-2010
Output Growth (per cent)
Agriculture 4.59 6.49
Manufacturing 13.76 8.81
Trade 8.09 7.25
Services 4.73 9.35
   Average 7.79 7.98
Employment Growth (per cent)
Agriculture -2.56 0.76
Manufacturing 6.56 1.76
Trade 7.74 2.42
Services 5.82 3.00
   Average 4.39 1.99
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011b, 2012). 
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One key feature that is evident when looking at Table 4.6 is the transition of the 
economy towards a more capital-intensive industrial composition. As can be seen, after 
the Asian financial crisis, output growth was maintained at more or less the same level 
as before the crisis. However, this ability to maintain output growth occurred with a 
significant reduction in the growth of employment.  
As shown in Table 4.6, by comparing output and employment during the two 
periods, i.e. 1991-1997 and 2000-2010, the same amount of output growth was able to 
be achieved with much less growth in labour employment. During the 1991-1997 period 
an output growth of 7.79 per cent required 4.39 per cent of employment growth, 
whereas during the 2000-2010 period an output growth of 7.98 per cent required only 
1.99 per cent of employment growth. Therefore it is possible that the available capital 
stock during 2000-2010 (which was scare due to the many problems in the investment 
climate as discussed in other parts of this study) may have been invested mainly 
towards new, labour-saving production tools.  
This proposition is consistent with the finding of some studies (see, for example, 
in Aswicahyono, Hill, et al., 2011; Manning & Roesad, 2007). These studies argued that 
after the 1997/1998 crisis, the Indonesian economy was more capital-intensive than 
before the crisis. Further, these studies also argued that this transition towards a more 
capital-intensive industrial composition and upgrading was a consequence of the 
increasingly rigid labour market conditions in Indonesia that was brought about by 
tighter labour regulation, i.e. enactment of the Manpower Law No. 13/2003. This 
proposition is also supported by the work of Brummund (2012) who, by using 
difference-in-differences statistics method to measure the impact of this new labour law, 
concluded that Indonesian firms reacted to the increases in labour costs imposed by the 
law by increasing their capital-labour ratio. 
During the autocratic Soeharto regime, the labour market was less rigid while 
industrial relations were generally harsh and labour disputes were frequently solved 
with the “security approach” (Caraway, 2004, p. 33). Under the regime, workers could 
only join a state-sponsored labour union and the government denied workers‟ rights to 
form or join independent labour unions. There were active interventions from the 
military and the police in labour dispute cases. Furthermore, the government established 
a series of institutions to detect and deter industrial disputes as well as to establish a 
series of legal obstacles to curb labour strikes (Ford, 1999; Hadiz, 1998). Hence, 
following the fall of Soeharto, structural adjustment in industrial labour relations was 
needed in order to improve labour conditions in the country and this structural 
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adjustment was achieved by constructing a new law, i.e. the Manpower Law No. 
13/2003. 
The following sections provide brief overviews of the Indonesian labour market. 
In doing so, they provide a more complete picture of the economic development of 
Indonesia, particularly as labour plays a pivotal role in driving technological progress. 
In fact, the last three decades have seen the rapid expansion of the „endogenous (new) 
growth theories‟ in the economic growth literature which emphasise the importance of 
human capital accumulation (Lucas, 1988; P. M. Romer, 1986, 1990). 
 
4.5 Indonesian labour market 
4.5.1 Brief overview of the Indonesian labour market 
 
With a gross national income (GNI) per capita of around US$2,000 in 2008-2009, 
the World Bank classifies Indonesia as a lower-middle-income economy (World 
Development Indicators, 2014). Indonesia‟s GNI per capita was well below the upper-
middle-income economies in Southeast Asia in countries such as Thailand (around 
US$3,800) and Malaysia (around US$7,500). After the Asian financial crisis of 
1997/1998, job creation emerged as a major problem whereas low productivity in the 
agriculture and services sectors played a significant role in the economy and, more 
importantly, for employment (Manning, 2004). 
Figure 4.17 on the following page presents the trends in total labour force and 
unemployment rates during the period 1991-2010. As shown in the figure, on average, 
around two million people enter the workforce each year. The data also show that by 
2010, Indonesia‟s total labour force amounted to around 114 million people. During the 
1980s, with the aim of securing employment opportunities for the workforce, the 
government promoted a labour-intensive import substitution industrialisation strategy. 
Nevertheless, from the early 1990s labour policy was diverted towards improving the 
qualifications and productivity of workers. This policy was to be achieved through, 
among others, promoting vocational education and internship programs as well as 
giving greater autonomy to tertiary education institutions. In this respect, REPELITA V 
and VI placed strong emphasis on the development of human capital to support a 
technologically-intensive, high-skills industrial base (Indonesian Government, 1989, 
1994). 
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Figure 4.17  Total labour force and unemployment rates, 1991-2010 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
  
As shown in Figure 4.17, the slow economic recovery following the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997/1998 caused unemployment rates to be persistently higher than 
before the crisis. This situation forced the government to formulate policies towards 
expanding job opportunities. To achieve this objective, the government reverted back to 
the 1980s‟ strategy of relying on labour-intensive industries rather than on a 
technologically-intensive, high-skills industrial base which had been the main policy of 
the previous administration during the early 1990s. Government-sponsored 
infrastructure projects were launched with the main aim to provide, at least, temporary 
employment for the workforce. Although these measures have not generally been able 
to reduce the unemployment rate to the same level as the pre-crisis era, rates show a 
steady decline since 2005.  
 Another prominent feature of Indonesia‟s labour force is the changing 
employment structure by age group, particularly after the crisis of 1997/1998 – as seen 
in Figure 4.18. Labour force participation rates shown in Figure 4.18 are the ratio 
between the population that are economically active and national population of the same 
age range. 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
P
er
 c
en
t 
M
ill
io
n
 P
er
so
n
s 
Labour force (left vertical axis) Unemployment rate (right vertical axis)
 110 
 
Figure 4.18  Labour force participation rates by age group, 1991-2010 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011b, 2012); World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
 
 As shown in Figure 4.18, since 1998 the gaps between workers aged 20-34 and 
35-49 have narrowed. Hence, the growth of older workers is faster than younger 
workers. This implies the possibility that it was getting harder for young Indonesians to 
get jobs.  
 In terms of labour participation by gender, apparently female participation has 
undergone little change since the early 1990s. Figure 4.19 shows the trend in labour 
force participation rates by gender for the period 1991-2010. 
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Figure 4.19  Labour force participation rates by gender, 1991-2010 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
 
 As shown in Figure 4.19, the participation rate of females (i.e. the percentage of 
female employees to total female population ages 15 and over) consistently stood at 
around 50 per cent, whereas for male the percentage consistently stood around 80 per 
cent. The 1997/1998 crisis and the regime change that followed apparently did little to 
change this composition.  
There are also some notable differences between rural and urban labour markets 
in Indonesia as shown in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7  Urban and rural labour markets 
2000 2003 2006 2009 2010
Urban
Labour force participation (%) 57.34 60.18 61.37 64.13 65.14
Unemployment (%) 6.99 10.01 10.86 5.04 4.03
Underemployment (%) 21.13 18.13 17.97 23.23 19.39
Rural
Labour force participation (%) 67.41 68.79 65.24 69.67 69.64
Unemployment (%) 2.55 4.38 6.12 2.30 2.30
Underemployment (%) 47.44 39.85 40.20 42.05 37.67
  
Source: Priebe et al. (2014). 
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Table 4.7 shows that labour force participation rates in rural areas were 
persistently higher than in urban areas. Consistently, the unemployment rates were also 
lower in rural than in urban areas. These data imply the significant role of the rural 
agricultural sector in providing jobs for the expanding labour force. The slowing 
employment growth in the manufacturing industry after the crisis of 1997/1998 
appeared to have made the rural agricultural sector one of the major destinations for 
Indonesian job seekers (Hugo, 2000; Ranis & Stewart, 1999; Suharto, 2002).  
Table 4.7 also shows, however, that the rates of underemployment (i.e. workers 
who are employed but not in the desired capacity – whether in terms of working hours, 
compensation, or level of skill and experience) in rural areas were persistently higher 
than in urban areas. Owners of traditional farmland are usually reluctant to refuse job 
applications submitted by their families or neighbours, even when these marginal 
employments may cause reductions in the landowners‟ income and in the wages of 
existing workers (Geertz, 1963 as cited in Squires & Tabor, 1994). Thus, 
underutilisation of workers is common in the rural agricultural sector with the larger 
percentage of these workers characterised by low income and low productivity (Fatah, 
2007). 
The country‟s stakeholders recognise the generally accepted view of the 
importance of human capital development for economic growth and this view is 
reflected in Indonesia‟s Constitution. The fourth amendment of Indonesia‟s constitution 
mandated that the government must provide a minimum of 20 per cent from the state‟s 
annual budget for education spending (Constitution of Indonesia, 2002). Following this 
requirement, government spending on education has steadily increased as shown in 
Figure 4.20. 
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Figure 4.20  Public spending on education as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
 
 
 As seen in Figure 4.20, during 1994-1997 the annual average government 
spending on education was only 1.05 per cent of GDP. This percentage rose steeply 
during 2001-2005 when government spending on education reached an annual average 
of 2.78 per cent of GDP – that was an increase of around 260 per cent compared to the 
period 1994-1997. Government spending on education continued to increase and 
reached an annual average of 3.10 per cent of GDP during 2007-2010. 
These increases in education spending are consistent with the increasing levels 
of workers‟ education in all sectors of the economy as shown in Figure 4.21. 
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Figure 4.21  Levels of education of employees, 1991-2010 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 
2006, 2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011b, 2012) 
 
 
As indicated in Figure 4.21, the percentage of workers with secondary and 
tertiary levels of education showed steadily increasing trends, while the percentage of 
workers with primary education and less (not finishing primary education and no 
schooling) showed a steadily declining trend. These phenomena may imply that the 
Indonesian economy is increasingly relying on workers who have secondary and tertiary 
levels of education. 
 
4.5.2 Development of labour market policies in Indonesia 
 
Compared to its neighbouring countries, labour market policies in Indonesia were 
theoretically more protective of workers‟ welfare (Manning, 2004). The old labour laws 
which were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s(Badan Pusat Statistik, 1991) were 
generally pro-worker in nature. This was because these laws were largely adopted from 
labour policies which were implemented in the Netherlands at the time. The national 
law prohibited discrimination and guaranteed freedom in union activities and the right 
to strike and bargain collectively. The Indonesian Constitution endorsed freedom of 
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employees, employers and the government had equal representation – oversaw 
industrial disputes. Further, all layoffs and firings had to be approved by these 
committees (Caraway, 2004). 
Nevertheless, during the autocratic Soeharto era, labour freedoms were tightly 
controlled (Hadiz, 1998). The implementation of labour laws was impaired by tight 
government control over the one and only official labour union (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh 
Indonesia/SPSI) – which was closely affiliated with the ruling party. The practice of 
using military and police in solving labour relations issues further diluted workers‟ 
protections and rights provided by the law (Manning, 2004). During these times, labour 
relations were particularly harsh with the military frequently intervening in strikes and 
quelling workers‟ dissents (Caraway, 2004). 
In a more open and democratic Indonesia following the downfall of President 
Soeharto in 1998, labour market policies moved towards protecting workers‟ rights and 
welfare. The government ratified some International Labour Organization (ILO) 
conventions, including freedom of association and rights to compete without 
discrimination. Key labour structural reforms were embodied in Trade Union Law No. 
21/2000 and Manpower Law No.13/2003. The former assures the basic rights of labour 
to set up workers‟ unions. The latter covers a particularly broad scope of labour policies 
such as wages and conditions of work, contract employment, collective bargaining, 
dismissals, settlement of grievances and terms of employment for children, women and 
foreign workers (Indonesian Government, 2003). 
While the Manpower Law No. 13/2003 has brought improvements in the 
industrial relations environment, there are, however, three key areas in this law that is 
argued to have adversely affected employment growth, particularly in the labour-
intensive manufacturing sector (Aswicahyono, Brooks, et al., 2011; Manning & Roesad, 
2007). There is the possibility that these three key areas are overly rigid and thus might 
harm the capability of the economy to create job opportunities for the unemployed. It is 
argued that a job market that is too rigid and inflexible might negatively affect the levels 
of employment (Nickell, 1997). These three key areas are: first, severance pay. There 
are significant increases in mandated severance rates which dramatically raise the cost 
of firing workers. Second, the hiring of fixed-term contracts and sub-contract workers. 
Embedded in the law is the encouragement towards permanent employment by severely 
limiting fixed-term contracts and sub-contract employment arrangements which, in turn, 
may deny employers the opportunity to hire new, temporary workers in response to 
sharp, short-term changes in market demand. Third, the minimum wage. The 
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determination of the minimum wage relies too heavily on the cost of „minimum living 
needs‟ rather than on labour productivity.  
The following sections provide more specific discussions on these three key 
areas in the Manpower Law No. 13/2003. 
 
4.5.3 Severance pay 
 
Several authors argued that overly generous mandatory severance pay increases 
the rate of unemployment and adversely affects the job creation capacity of an economy 
(Manning & Roesad, 2007; Pagés & Montenegro, 2007; Vodopivec, 2004, p. 11). Since 
severance pay usually increases with years of service or tenure and tenure tends to 
increase with age, it is possible that mandatory severance pay that is too high may act as 
a disincentive for firms to dismiss older workers and to take on new recruits, thus 
reducing the employment opportunities for younger workers. There is the possibility 
that the rates of employment might decrease and the labour market flows (not only from 
employment to unemployment but also from unemployment to employment) might 
slow if the severance pay is considered to be too generous. 
For employees in developing countries like Indonesia, severance pay is a crucial 
form of compensation when they lose their jobs. This is because these countries usually 
lack alternative forms of unemployment benefits (Vodopivec, 2004). Severance pay 
typically has to be paid in a lump sum by the employer when they dismiss employees or 
when employees have to leave their jobs for reasons beyond their control, such as in the 
case of bankruptcy. 
Although there were also increases in mandatory severance pay during the 
Soeharto era, their impact on firms‟ efficiency measures were small because at the time 
severance pay rates were relatively low and the levels of compliance to labour 
legislation were generally also low. As the levels of compliance to law and legislation 
increases in a more democratic and open society, just like in post-crisis Indonesia, any 
changes in labour legislation which affects the cost of labour would be immediately 
reflected in firms‟ balance sheets (Suryahadi, Widyanti, Perwira, & Sumarto, 2003). 
With the introduction of Law No. 13/2003 severance pay increased significantly, 
especially the severance rates for workers with 10 years or more service time (from 
2000 to 2003 the rate increased by around 80 per cent). These increases in severance 
pay also coincided with large increases in real minimum wages – on which the 
calculation of severance pay is based.  
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Manning and Roesad (2007) estimated that the combination of a 50 per cent 
increase in the average real minimum wage and the 80 per cent increase in severance 
pay from 2000 to 2003 resulted in a spectacular increase of 170 per cent in the costs of 
firing workers. The new law mandated that even a bankrupt firm still had to pay a 
severance rate which is equal to 18 month salary for workers with more than 10 years of 
service (Manning & Roesad, 2007). This significant increase occurred at a time when 
there were falling rates in severance payments in many countries in the world, thus 
making Indonesia‟s severance payment regulation one of the costliest regimes among 
developing countries (Aswicahyono et al., 2009).  
 
4.5.4 Fixed-term contract and sub-contracting 
 
It has been suggested that tight control over contract employment may limit 
production flexibility and firms‟ capacity to respond to fluctuations in product demand 
(Cox-Edwards, 1997 as cited in Manning & Roesad, 2007). Sicat (2004) argued that 
government pressures on firms to grant permanent employment to workers by issuing 
regulations which severely limits the ability of firms to hire temporary contract workers 
is problematic. This is because government involvement in the prerogatives and 
judgment of firms‟ management to dismiss workers or end their employment may 
interfere with efficient business decision-making. Further, Sicat (2004, p. 6) also 
pointed out that strict restrictions in hiring temporary contract workers may interfere 
with the workings of the labour market as well as prevent firms from responding 
immediately to the unexpected fluctuations in the global market, which in turn might 
negatively affect job creations in the economy. 
In the case of Indonesia, Law No. 13/2003 imposes stricter restrictions on how 
contract workers can be hired. This new law limits the duration of fixed-term contract 
employment to a maximum of three years, compared to a maximum of six years in the 
previous legislation. Further, sub-contracting (also called outsourcing) is permitted only 
for „non-core‟ activities of a firm and only in certain conditions: one-off activities, 
seasonal work not exceeding three months, a project that is expected to finish within 
three years and marketing jobs for new products on trial (Indonesian Government, 2003; 
Manning & Roesad, 2007). Basically the new law pressures employers to convert 
contract workers to permanent employees.  
For industries where demands are seasonal and fluctuate considerably (such as 
garments, toys and electronics) these regulations pose complicated problems since they 
 118 
 
limit the opportunity of firms to take full advantage of sudden and short-term increases 
in demand by hiring temporary workers (Aswicahyono et al., 2009). Hence, firms in 
post-crisis Indonesia are wedged in a difficult industrial relations system. On one side 
there is the high cost of dismissing regular workers (due to high severance payments) 
and on the other side there are tight restrictions on the hiring of temporary or contract 
workers (Manning & Roesad, 2007). 
 
4.5.5 Minimum wages 
 
A minimum wages policy that is too rigid is argued as one of the factors that 
may adversely affect the level of employment since it may increase labour costs and 
create inflexible labour markets (Felipe & Hasan, 2006, p. 75-76; Nickell, 1997). In a 
flexible labour market the quantity, quality and price of labour inputs are able to be 
changed in a short period of time, making production output more adjustable to rapid 
changes in market demand. Inflexible labour markets do not allow these types of 
changes to happen, at least not immediately.  
In the case of Indonesia, the minimum wages policy in the Manpower Law No. 
13/2003 is seen as too rigid (Manning & Roesad, 2007). This rigidity appeared to have 
been caused by the calculation of minimum wages that are based on a „decent‟ standard 
of living (kebutuhan hidup layak or KHL), which is a basket of commodities said to 
constitute that standard (Marks, 2004). There are at least two possible problems with 
this arrangement. First, the determination of the items included in the KHL basket is not 
clearly defined in the law but rather depends on interpretations and negotiations 
between employer and employee, with the government acting as an intermediary (even 
though it holds the final say). Workers would tend to focus their demand on increasing 
the number of items which, they argue, should be included in the KHL basket, and they 
often succeed in doing so, especially during periods leading up to an election. In 2004, 
the number of items in the KHL basket was only 44. By 2012 the number had swelled 
to 60, and at the time of this study (with a presidential election scheduled to be held in 
less than three months) workers or unions are persistently demanding that the KHL 
basket must include 84 items (Aditiasari, 2014).  
Second, the calculation of minimum wages relies too much on the estimated cost 
of living through the KHL while having only weak links to workers‟ productivity at 
enterprise, sector and economy levels (Manning & Roesad, 2007). Hence, minimum 
wages are tied to the levels of inflation rather than on the performance of workers. This 
 119 
 
is especially troublesome in the case of Indonesia where there are widespread formal 
and „informal‟ market restrictions on the supply side which create economic bottlenecks 
(such as briberies and extortions in trucking activities, see Barron and Olken (2007)). 
On the other hand, there are increases on the demand side which are caused by the 
increasing population and rising standards of living. This combination caused the rate of 
inflation to rise faster than the rate of productivity growth (Manning & Roesad, 2007).  
 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter provides an overview of three key variables in the Solow-Swan 
model (output, capital stock and labour) which are related to Indonesia‟s petroleum and 
non-petroleum sectors. From the early 1990s until the early 2000s, the output of the 
petroleum sector showed a declining trend. By the mid-2000s it started to show an 
increasing trend albeit still below the output levels of the 1990s. For the non-petroleum 
sectors, output after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 showed a consistently 
increasing trend. Nevertheless, despite such a positive trend in the growth of output, 
their real values have yet to fully recover their former strength even after more than a 
decade since the crisis hit Indonesia. 
Capital stock formation in Indonesia‟s petroleum sector showed a consistently 
declining trend from the early 1990s until the early 2000s. Afterwards, it was followed 
by a slightly increasing trend until the end of 2000s. On the other hand, capital stock in 
the non-petroleum sectors of the economy showed a consistently increasing trend after 
the crisis of 1997/1998. However, but 2010, it still had not been able to reach the same 
level as the pre-crisis period. 
The declining trend in the number of workers in the petroleum sector was 
reversed in the early 2000s. It seemed that the increasing trend in the oil and gas output 
during the 2000s was followed by the increasing growth of employment in the 
petroleum sector during the same period. On the other hand, the number of workers in 
the non-petroleum sectors showed a consistently increasing trend during the whole 
period under study. Further investigation revealed a low quality of employment in the 
economy where the majority of the workforce is employed in the low productivity 
agriculture sector and informal trade sector. 
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  Chapter 5
TFP Growth in the Aggregate Economy 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the TFP growth for the aggregate economy. 
For this study, the period 1991-2010 is examined. The chapter is structured as follows: 
the first section presents the model, data sources, model specifications and the 
estimation of capital‟s share of output (α). The second section discusses the estimations 
of the TFP growth in the aggregate economy. 
 
5.2 The model 
 
To estimate TFP, this study employs the following production relationship (R. J. 
Taylor, 2007, p. 189): 
         
    
1   (5.1) 
 
where Y, A, K and L denote the output, TFP, capital stock and labour respectively.   and 
    denotes capital‟s and labour‟s shares in the total value of output, respectively. 
 By taking logs and differentiating, (·), with respect to time, t, Equation (5.1) can 
be rewritten as: 
  ̇       ̇         ̇ (5.2) 
 
 Once an estimate of  ,  ̂, is provided, then TFP,  ̂ , can be estimated using the 
following equation: 
  ̂   ̇   ̂ ̇      ̂   ̇ (5.3) 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Data sources 
 
Data for these estimations are mainly gathered from the publications of Badan 
Pusat Statistik (BPS) or the Central Board of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, 1991, 
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1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, 
2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011b, 2012) and the World Development Indicators (World 
Development Indicators) of the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2014). All 
data, unless otherwise noted, cover the period of 1991-2010 and the nominal values are 
adjusted at constant 2005 prices (2005=100).  
 
5.2.2 Model specifications: Discussions of variables 
Output 
 
Data for the output in the aggregate economy are constructed using serially 
available data on gross domestic product (GDP) from BPS publications of the system of 
national accounts (SNA). These publications cover the output of all economic activities 
and are classified into nine industries: 
1. Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery 
2. Mining and quarrying 
3. Manufacturing 
4. Electricity, gas, and water supply 
5. Construction 
6. Trade, hotel and restaurant 
7. Transport and communication 
8. Financial, real estate, and business services 
9. Other services 
The current market prices data for the above industries are adjusted to real 2005 
prices (2005=100) using the consumer price index (CPI) from WDI databank by 
employing the following formula: 
 
 
           
             
   
   ⁄
 
(5.4) 
 
 
Capital stock 
 
The Indonesian statistics agency (BPS) never publishes official estimates of the 
country‟s capital stock, even though it has published statistics on national accounts 
annually since the 1960s (Van der Eng, 2009). Hence, the capital stock series in this 
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study is constructed by summing capital stock from all existing asset vintages using the 
following formula (R. J. Taylor, 2007, p. 189): 
 
 
∑    
 
  1
    ⁄  
(5.5) 
 
Here, I represents gross investment, t denotes the age of the oldest vintage of capital 
stock, i=1 denotes the current capital stock, δ is the depreciation17, and P is the price 
level. 
The value of aggregate gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is used as a proxy 
for the level of gross investment in the aggregate economy. Capital goods in GFCF data 
are classified into building or construction (factories, offices); machines (prime movers, 
generators); transportation (vehicles, ships, trains); livestock; equipment (electrical, 
communication, leather, fabrics) and others (optic devices, household appliances, 
measuring devices) (Van der Eng, 2009; Yudanto, Wicaksono, Ariantoro, & Sari, 
2005). These data are adjusted to constant 2005 prices using Equation (5.4). 
 
Labour 
 
Labour input in the aggregate economy is constructed using serially available 
data on total employment that are published periodically by the BPS. Thus, these data 
comprise all workers who are employed in all sectors of the economy and cover all 
levels of education of workers, i.e. from non-schooling to university post-graduates. 
Ideally, the number of hours worked would be a better proxy for labour input (R. J. 
Taylor, 2007). However, the unavailability of such data for Indonesia renders this 
exercise difficult. 
 
5.2.3 Estimation of α (capital’s share) in the aggregate economy 
 
Prior to the estimations of TFP growth, it is important that an appropriate α 
value is derived. This is because the α value can bias the estimations of TFP growth 
upwards or downwards. In a detailed analysis, R. J. Taylor (2007) reported the 
                                                 
17
 The rate of depreciation used in this study is the same as the implicit rate of depreciation used by BPS 
in its System of National Accounts, which is 5 per cent. 
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sensitivity of TFP estimates to the value of α. In his case study of Malaysia (1963-
1998), R. J. Taylor (2007, p. 200) concluded that the lower the value of α, the higher is 
the estimate of TFP growth. 
In this study, constant returns to scale is assumed. Once we have the α value, by 
subtracting 1, this will give labour‟s share. The main data source that is used to estimate 
the value of α for the aggregate economy is the BPS‟ Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi 
(social accounting matrix or SAM) (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2011a). However, BPS does 
not publish SAM yearly and during the period of 1991-2010 SAM was published in 
only particular years (Table 5.1). Hence, these data will be used as the base to estimate 
capital‟s share of output for the whole period under study. The calculations are shown in 
Table 5.1 and α is found to be 0.56. 
 
Table 5.1  Capital’s share of output (2005=100) 
Output Capital Income
(million US$) (million US$)
1993 588,959.63                   321,322.62                   0.55
1995 697,587.30                   396,693.56                   0.57
1998 179,595.76                   136,548.25                   0.76
1999 219,184.28                   102,482.79                   0.47
2000 224,260.44                   142,343.53                   0.63
2003 264,926.46                   117,308.56                   0.44
2005 270,627.21                   138,741.92                   0.51
2008 367,686.30                   192,859.20                   0.52
0.56
SAM Year
AVERAGE
                        
  
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (2011a); author‟s calculations. 
 
 
 Past studies on TFP growth reveal that the value of α applied to Indonesia 
ranged from 0.36 to 0.69, with an average value of 0.50. Further, the value of α used for 
different countries in East Asia ranged from 0.49 to 0.75, with an average value of 0.63. 
These estimates are presented in Table 5.2. Thus, it appears that the α value of 0.56 for 
Indonesia in Table 5.1 is consistent with prior estimations. 
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Table 5.2  Different α values for Indonesia and selected countries 
 Period α value 
Indonesia 1881-2008 0.36 
 1971-2007 0.45 
 1970-1994 0.69 
 Average: 0.50 
Selected East Asian countries: 
Hong Kong 1966-1995 0.49 
South Korea 1960-1995 0.63 
Singapore 1964-1995 0.62 
Taiwan 1953-1995 0.56 
Malaysia 1970-1995 0.66 
Philippines 1970-1995 0.67 
Thailand 1970-1994 0.75 
 Average: 0.63 
Sources: Alisjahbana (2009); Lau and Park (2003); Van der Eng (2010) 
 
 
5.3 Estimation of aggregate TFP growth 
 
As an appropriate α value has been determined, which in this case is estimated to 
be 0.56, the next step is to substitute the values of the growth rates (output, capital stock 
and labour) and factors‟ share values into Equation (5.3). The method is described as 
follows: 
 
Step 1: taking logs and working out the change (Δ) over time (t) to arrive at  ̇ ,  ̇  and 
  ̇. 
Step 2: providing an estimate for the capital‟s share (α) and the labour‟s share (1 – α) 
(as discussed in the previous section). 
Step 3: substituting the values obtained from Step 1 and Step 2 above into Equation 
(5.3). 
 
Other studies which were being conducted to estimate the aggregate TFP growth 
in Indonesia for the periods before 1991-2010 are presented in Table 5.3 on the 
following page. In this regard, this thesis could be viewed as an update of these previous 
studies. 
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Table 5.3  Various estimations of aggregate TFP growth for Indonesia 
 
Author(s) Methodology TFP estimation (per cent) 
Osada (1994) TFP was estimated using the standard two-
factor inputs of the Solow model.   
 
Period                TFP Growth  
1985-1990           -2.7 
 
Kawai (1994) TFP was estimated using the standard two-
factor inputs of the Solow model.  
Period                TFP Growth 
1970-1980           -0.9 
1980-1990            2.1              
World Bank (1989) TFP was estimated using the standard two-
factor inputs of the Solow model.  TFP growth 
was calculated as the difference between the 
rates of growth of value added output and 
factor inputs (labour and capital). The inputs 
are weighted by their respective income shares. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1973-1981            0.9 
1982-1985           -2.5          
1986-1988            1.0 
 
Drysdale and Huang 
(1997) 
TFP was calculated using a model which 
included real GDP, initial labour productivity, 
investment, growth of workforce and dummy 
variables which represent the periods of 
observation. The coefficient of each 
independent variable was determined using 
regression analysis. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1962-1990            2.1 
 
Aswicahyono, Bird, and 
Hill (1996) 
TFP was estimated using the standard two-
factor inputs of the Solow model.  TFP was 
estimated at the 3 or 4-digit ISIC industrial-
level classification (excluding oil and gas) and 
then aggregated up to 2-digit industrial-level. 
Capital stock was constructed based on the 
annual capital expenditure from government 
statistical publications. Labour was not 
differentiated by skill or education. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1976-1981            0.7 
1982-1985            1.1          
1986-1991            2.1 
 
Bayhaqi (2000) TFP was estimated using a three-factor input of 
production function, with human capital (levels 
of education) included as a third factor of 
production. Capital stock was constructed 
using data from other studies. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1969-1998            -1.9 
Collins, Bosworth, and 
Rodrik (1996) 
TFP was estimated using the standard two-
factor inputs of the Solow model with skill-
adjusted labour input (years of schooling) and 
the inputs weighted by their income shares. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1960-1994             0.8 
Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997) 
TFP was estimated using a three-factor input of 
production function, with human capital 
(quality of education and experience) included 
as a third factor of production. Inputs and 
shares of factor inputs were determined from 
other studies. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1960-1985             1.91 
Madden and Savage 
(2000) 
TFP was calculated not as a residual but from a 
model which relates TFP to domestic and 
foreign research and development activities, 
trade and information technology and 
telecommunications. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1980-1995             2.4 
 
M. Z. A. Karim and Zaini 
(2000) 
TFP was measured using the Mamlquist 
productivity change index. This index 
measures the distance between two data points 
relative to a common technology and the 
difference is treated as the TFP growth. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1978-1990             0.97 
 
Chang and Luh (2000) TFP was measured using the Mamlquist 
productivity change index. 
Period                TFP Growth 
1970-1980             0.970 
1980-1990             0.998 
Page (1994) TFP was estimated using a three-factor input 
production function, with human capital 
(educational attainment) included as a third 
factor of production. The share of each factor 
input was estimated using regression analysis. 
 
Period                TFP Growth 
1960-1989             1.2543 
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The decomposition of the sources of aggregate economic growth is presented in 
Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4  Growth decomposition for the aggregate economy  
(annual average in per cent) 
 
Period
Change in 
Ouput
Due to Capital 
Stock
Due to Labour 
Input
Due to TFP
1991-1997 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.01
1998-2003 -1.07 -0.95 0.02 -0.13
2004-2010 0.65 0.75 0.06 -0.17  
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 
2012); author‟s calculations.  
 
  
As shown in Table 5.4, TFP‟s contribution to aggregate output was very low 
during 1991-1997. During this period, although there was positive growth in TFP, 
economic growth was mostly the result of capital accumulation. The contribution of 
TFP to economic growth decreased in the period of social and political instability of 
1998-2003. During this period, the contribution of capital accumulation to economic 
growth significantly declined compared to the previous period. Economic growth arose 
mostly from labour employment which, on average, consistently showed positive 
growth even after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. During the period 2004-2010, 
the contribution of TFP to aggregate economic growth deteriorated further. On the other 
hand, there was a significant growth of capital accumulation compared to the previous 
period. Thus, economic growth during this time period was mostly the result of capital 
accumulation while the contribution of TFP was getting worse.  
This deterioration in TFP growth after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 
could be linked to three circumstances that were likely to make productivity 
improvements very challenging. First, the quality of institutions in post-crisis Indonesia 
was generally not much better than pre-crisis. Several authors argue that the quality of 
institutions is considered to be one of the factors that can affect TFP growth and studies 
have shown that there is a positive correlation between the quality of institutions and 
productivity (see, for example in Easterly & Levine, 2003; Isaksson, 2007; Rodrik, 
2000; Sachs, 1999). In this regard, one of the proxies that is widely used to measure 
institutional quality is the corruption perceptions index – which scores the perceived 
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levels of the public sector‟s corruption on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very 
clean) (Belasen & Peyton, 2006).  
As seen in Figure 5.1, after the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia‟s corruption 
perceptions index showed no significant improvement over these years – even though 
the trend looks promising. Overall, the scores during the post-crisis years were 
generally the same (at times were even worse) than the scores during pre-crisis years.  
 
Figure 5.1  Indonesia’s corruption perceptions index, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Transparency International via Global Market Information Database (2014) 
 
 
Following the fall of the Soeharto regime and the start of a more open and 
democratic society, bureaucratic reforms were introduced in many government 
institutions. However, institutions that are closely related to the functioning of the legal 
systems are the ones who are strongly resistant to these reforms (Lindsey, 2004). One 
exception to this premise is, of course, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
which has been able to gaol high-profile, previously deemed untouchable, perpetrators 
such as legislators and high ranking government officials (Schütte, 2012). Nevertheless, 
in general, the country‟s legal systems are the area where institutional reforms during 
the post-crisis period show the slowest progress. Very much like what happened during 
the Soeharto era, bribery and the „purchase‟ of court decisions are still quite common 
(Basri & Hill, 2011b). In fact, at the time of this study, the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court (or Mahkamah Konstitusi) chief justice was caught red-handed by the KPK for 
taking bribes (The Jakarta Post, 2014). 
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 Even though the legal systems during the Soeharto era were largely regarded as 
dysfunctional due to widespread and entrenched corrupt practices, at least during this 
period the protection of property rights was more predictable (Aswicahyono et al., 
2009). Whereas the post-crisis legal systems, while still possessing the same corrupt 
characteristics of the old regime, have become more „decentralised‟ with a weaker link 
between payment and „reward‟. In the Soeharto era, bribing a high-ranking official 
might have been enough for a business to secure its interests. In the era reformasi, a 
firm now has to pay several officials – both at lower and higher levels – and even then, 
they cannot be guaranteed that the „results‟ will turn out as expected (Basri & Hill, 
2011b; Olken & Barron, 2009). 
 The second condition that is likely to make productivity improvements in the 
economy after the Asian financial crisis very challenging is the steadily declining 
government expenditure on physical infrastructure, as shown in Figure 5.2. Several 
studies propose that development in physical infrastructure is related to increased 
economic productivity and these studies have shown that there is a positive correlation 
between productivity and the availability of physical infrastructure, for example in 
Aschauer (1989); Berndt and Hansson (1991); Lachler and Aschauer (1998). It is likely 
that better infrastructure leads to the expansion of aggregate productive capacity due to 
the increasing flow of resources and the improvement in the productivity of private 
capital (Isaksson, 2007).  
 
Figure 5.2 Public development expenditure as a percentage of total government 
expenditure, 1990-2010 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia (2014) 
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As shown in Figure 5.2, during the 1990s, the Indonesian government invested 
heavily in infrastructure development which, on average, absorbed around 35 per cent 
of the government‟s annual budget. However, the share of infrastructure development 
decreased significantly in the 2000s with an annual average of only 10 per cent of total 
government spending – this is only a third of the share of infrastructure expenditure that 
occurred during the previous decade. 
The gap in infrastructure development left by the decline in public spending has 
not been filled by private investment, which appears to be consistent with the 
deteriorating investment climate since the crisis of 1997/1998. Indonesians apparently 
still perceive that their constitution requires the government (either directly or through 
state enterprises) to provide infrastructure for the people and thus any private 
participation with this arrangement is being seen as corrupt and crony participation 
(World Bank, 2004).  
One prominent example of this issue is the privatisation of Indosat – once a fully 
state-owned mobile telecommunications company. During the wave of privatisation that 
was mandated by the IMF, in 2002 the government sold a 42 per cent stake in Indosat 
which increased private ownership in the company to a total of 85 per cent. Singapore 
Technologies Telemedia (STT) was willing to buy these shares at 150 per cent of their 
market price. Even with this high selling price and lengthy explanations to the public 
regarding its competitive bidding process, heavy criticisms were still directed towards 
the government with accusations ranging from the potential of corruption to being 
regarded as „selling the country‟ by handing out strategic assets to foreigners 
(Wicaksono, 2008; World Bank, 2004). 
In the 1990s, Indonesia was one of the success stories in terms of private 
participation in infrastructure provision. In the East Asia region, the country ranked 
second in the ability to attract private investment in infrastructure projects, with a 27 per 
cent share of private investment. This was only slightly below the number one in the 
region, the Philippines, with a private share of 28 per cent (World Bank, 2004, p. 52).  
In the post-crisis years, private participation deteriorated rapidly. During the 
1990s, private investment in infrastructure reached its highest peak in 1996 at around 
US$22 billion, whereas during the 2000s the peak was reached at only around US$4 
billion, which happened in 2008, as can be seen in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3  Private Investment in Infrastructure, 1990-2010 (2005=100)  
 
Source: Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (2014) 
 
 
It appears that the combination of the declining government share in infrastructure 
spending and declining private participation in infrastructure investment has delivered 
poor results for the country‟s physical infrastructure availability. By 2010, according to 
data from WDI, 27 per cent of Indonesia‟s population – that is roughly 65 million 
people – were left without connection to electricity, 16 per cent of the population or 
about 40 million people did not have access to clean water and only 10 per cent of 
people in the country had access to an internet connection. 
The third condition which is a challenge to productivity improvement after the 
Asian financial crisis is creeping economic protectionism. Studies have found that there 
is a positive correlation between economic openness and productivity, for example in 
Alcalá and Ciccone (2001); Edwards (1992); Hall and Jones (1996). Further, it has been 
suggested that economic protectionism, either deliberately or not, would protect 
inefficient domestic industries, hence scarce resources would get stuck in inefficient 
sectors (Isaksson, 2007). 
Following the Asian financial crisis, the IMF pushed for some structural 
adjustments in the economy, moving it towards a more open regime. However, Basri 
and Patunru (2012) have noted that since 2001, protectionism in Indonesia has begun to 
creep back. They argued that even though Indonesia‟s tariff barriers are generally 
conforming towards best practices in the East Asia region, there are increasing non-
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tariff barriers (NTBs) in the forms of trade regulations and licensing requirements which 
are imposed on many products such as rice, cloves, salt, sugar, corn, soybean, textiles, 
footwear, electronics and steel.  
It appears that the trend of moving away from trade liberalisation and more 
towards protectionism has become even stronger recently. By measuring the nominal 
rates of protection (NRPs) and the effective rates of protection (ERPs) between 1995 
and 2008, Marks and Rahardja (2012) found an increasing tendency of import 
restrictions by using NTBs such as certificates, licenses and quarantines. One prominent 
example of this creeping protectionism occurs in the case of rice. This crop is the most 
important staple food in Indonesia and the country has been a long-time net importer of 
rice. However, this fact does not stop the government from imposing both tariff barriers 
and NTBs to rice importations. In 2000, the government imposed a specific import tariff 
of Rp430 / kg and in 2005 the tariff was increased to Rp450 / kg. NTBs in the form of 
import arrangements, controls and restrictions are also imposed on rice imports (Basri & 
Patunru, 2012).  
Further, the current political economic configuration in Indonesia seems 
unfavourable to trade reform (Basri & Patunru, 2012). With their generally short-term 
perspectives, politicians are often equivocal about trade reform. If they perceived that 
trade reform may enhance their political position they would support it. But once they 
see that it is becoming unpopular they would be likely to abandon trade reform as their 
political agenda and may even fiercely oppose it. The classic dilemma of trade reform is 
that its benefits can only be seen in medium-to-long-term whereas its costs are 
immediate. Hence it is likely that Indonesian politicians would choose to oppose any 
reformation agenda towards a more open economy. The country‟s civil society, 
including its non-government organisations (NGOs), tend to reject the idea of the open 
market and are often hostile to the ideas of globalisation. Since influential media in 
Indonesia are part of business conglomerates, they can influence and shape public 
opinion to oppose any trade reform policy that may hurt their parent companies‟ 
business interests (Basri & Patunru, 2012). 
 
5.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the model, data sources and model specifications to 
estimate the TFP growth of the aggregate economy during the period under study. 
Analysis on the decomposition of the sources of aggregate economic growth shows that 
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the contribution of TFP to aggregate output was very low during 1991-1997. This 
contribution of TFP decreased during the period of social and political instability of 
1998-2003 and deteriorated further during the period of 2004-2010. These steady 
declines in TFP growth are likely to be linked to three possible circumstances that could 
make productivity improvements in the economy very challenging: low institutional 
quality, declining investment in infrastructure and creeping economic protectionism. 
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  Chapter 6
TFP Growth in the Petroleum Sector 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the TFP growth for the petroleum sector. 
For this study, the period 1991-2010 is examined. The chapter is structured as follows: 
section 6.2 presents the data sources, model specifications and the estimations for 
capital‟s share of output (α) for the petroleum sector. Section 6.3 discusses the 
estimation of the TFP growth in the sector. The growth accounting framework used in 
this chapter follows the model described in Chapter 5. 
 
6.2 Data sources 
 
Data for these estimations are mainly gathered from the publications of Badan 
Pusat Statistik (BPS) or the Central Board of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011b, 2011c, 2012); World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2014); the 
Embassy of the United States of America, Jakarta (U.S. Embassy, 1994, 1998, 2001, 
2008)
18
 and BPMIGAS or the Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Activity 
(BPMIGAS, 2005, 2011). All data, unless otherwise noted, cover the period of 1991-
2010 and the nominal values are adjusted to constant 2005 prices (2005=100).  
 Data for the oil and gas sector are derived from the upstream petroleum industry, 
not the downstream industry. This is because this study is mainly concerned with the 
state of productivity in the lifting of oil and gas (or upstream activities) and not the 
productivity of the conversion processes from crude oil or gas to their derivative 
products (or downstream activities). 
 Following the BPS in its Mining Statistics of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
reports, the definition of upstream oil and gas here includes activities on the 
prospecting, exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas. Prospecting refers 
to the activities of the search for potential underground or underwater crude 
                                                 
18
 The US Embassy compiled its reports based on data provided by Ditjen Migas (or the Directorate 
General of Oil and Gas). 
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oil and natural gas fields, such as gravity surveys, magnetic surveys and three-
dimensional (3D) seismic surveys. Exploration is the further activities from prospecting 
with the aim to determine the size, shape, position, content and potential amount of oil 
and gas in the related fields in order to study their economic feasibilities. Exploitation is 
the activities to recover and bring the crude oil and/or raw natural gas to the surface, 
thus these are the outputs of the upstream oil and gas sector. 
 It is necessary to briefly highlight the activities in the downstream sector in 
order to shed light on the differences between the downstream and upstream petroleum 
industries. The downstream petroleum industry refers to an industry whose activities are 
to refine crude oil and/or raw natural gas as well as activities of the distribution and 
selling of the refined products. The industry provides end consumers with various 
products resulting from the refining processes such as gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, 
lubricants, waxes, asphalt and liquid natural gas or liquid petroleum gas. Hence, its 
activities resemble a close connection to the manufacturing industry and this is why in 
its yearly national account reports, BPS categorises this industry within the 
manufacturing sector and not within the mining sector.  
Since the output of the upstream industry will end up as feedstock for the 
downstream industry, any adverse conditions or problems in the upstream industry will 
affect the downstream industry. Based on this background, this study concentrates on 
Indonesia‟s upstream industry due to the problems that are faced by and in this industry.  
The first problem is the decline in Indonesia‟s oil production. Oil production 
reached its peak in 1994 at just over 1.6 million barrels per day. However, since then 
production has steadily declined and in 2007 production started to fall below 1 million 
barrels per day. That was more than a 40 per cent decline from 1994 level (OECD/IEA, 
2008). Oil production levels have never reached more than 1 million barrels per day 
since then. Gas production is also facing similar declines. Production reached its peak in 
1996 and 1997 with around 8.7 billion cubic feet of gas produced per day, but in 2007 it 
had declined to 7.7 billion cubic feet per day. It is expected to continue to decline unless 
new reserves can be brought into production. It is argued that the causes of these 
declines can be attributed to the combination of the natural maturing of Indonesia‟s oil 
and gas fields as well as the lack of new investment in recent years (OECD/IEA, 2008). 
The second problem faced by Indonesia‟s upstream oil and gas industry is the 
rising sentiment of resource nationalism. It has harmed investment in the industry which 
desperately needs foreign investment to keep the old fields in operation through 
enhanced oil recovery technologies as well as to find and develop new fields. One of the 
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most prominent examples of this problem is what happened with the Oil and Gas Law 
Number 22/2001. The law was introduced by the Government of Indonesia with the 
hope of increasing oil and gas production by attracting new investment into the 
industry. However, the Indonesian Constitutional Court annulled some of the key 
provisions in the law because they were being seen as too liberal and as such had 
violated the state‟s energy sovereignty (see Cornwell & Anas, 2013; M. Karim, 2013). 
In line with this issue, a recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers Indonesia 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012) concluded that uncertainty in contract sanctity and 
interference from various government agencies, among other factors, have hampered 
investment activities in the Indonesian oil and gas industry.  
Third, for the downstream industry, declining domestic production of oil and gas 
can be compensated by importing them from international markets so as not to disturb 
the availability of feedstock for the industry. However, the same cannot be said for the 
upstream industry. Oil and gas basins cannot be moved from one place to another. They 
stay where they were formed, beneath the countries that have the luck of sitting on top 
of them. Combined with their non-renewable nature and their important role in modern 
civilisation, managing a country‟s oil and gas upstream industry is a challenging 
process. Furthermore, the rising sentiment of resource nationalism in Indonesia is 
directed more towards the upstream industry rather than the downstream.  
Lastly, the nature of the upstream oil and gas industry is high capital, long term 
and high risk. Nowadays, exploration activity alone may take at least US$25 million to 
US$45 million over the course of a project in a prospective field (Pudyantoro, 2012, p. 
150). The cost will soar if a company decides to develop a reserve, with total cost 
varying depending on the level of difficulties in each field. Also, it may take years for 
oil and gas investment to eventually yield profit since the life-cycle for an oil and gas 
field may be longer than 30 years. Since oil and gas lie deep beneath the earth‟s surface, 
there is no guarantee that every exploration well will result in an economically feasible 
finding. Globally, over the last decade the success rate in exploration activity has been 
steady at only around 25 per cent of the total number of exploration wells drilled. It 
should also be noted that this number is an optimistic view since it also includes 
discoveries that are not yet commercially viable due to the prices and the available 
technologies (Bret-Rouzaut & Favennec, 2011). Therefore, oil and gas investors need a 
safe and stable environment for their investment, which in the case of Indonesia still 
provides great challenges. All of these issues have added to the complications for both 
the government and business players in the Indonesian upstream oil and gas industry.  
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6.3 Model specifications 
Output 
 
Data on petroleum sector output are constructed from the Statistical Yearbook of 
Indonesia published by BPS. This series compiles crude oil and gas output from all of 
the production wells which are located within the territory of Indonesia. These data are 
adjusted to real prices (2005 = 100) using the consumer price index (CPI) from WDI by 
employing the following formula: 
 
 
           
             
   
   ⁄
 
 
(6.1) 
 
 
Capital stock 
 
Since there is no official estimate on capital stock, in this analysis the capital 
stock series is constructed from investment expenditure in the upstream oil and gas 
industry. Investment expenditure in the upstream oil and gas industry are typically sunk 
in the exploration activities, well development and maintenance activities, along with 
mining support activities. The types of capital goods acquired by this investment 
include buildings or construction (oil or gas pipe networks, on-shore and off-shore oil 
rigs, etc.), machines (derricks, generators, mud pumps, etc.) and other equipment (drill 
bit, wellhead, blowout preventer, etc.). These data are adjusted to constant 2005 prices 
using Equation (6.1).  
Once data on investment expenditure are collected, the capital stock series is 
constructed by summing capital stock from all existing asset vintages using the 
following formula (R. J. Taylor, 2007, p. 189): 
 
 
∑    
 
  1
    ⁄  
(6.2) 
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Here, I represents gross investment in the petroleum sector, t denotes the age of the 
oldest vintage of capital stock in the petroleum sector, i=1 denotes the current capital 
stock in the petroleum sector, δ is the depreciation19, and P is the price level. 
 
Labour 
 
The labour variable is constructed using serially available data on the number of 
workers employed in the Indonesian petroleum sector. Ideally, the number of hours 
worked would be a better proxy for labour inputs, however, reliable data are not 
available. The number of workers in the petroleum sector is derived from the annual 
survey conducted by BPS on all companies which operate in the upstream oil and gas 
industry. The data comprise all workers employed by those companies in all areas of 
mining activities (i.e. prospecting, exploration and exploitation) as well as workers in 
the administrative and managerial functions. The data also cover all levels of education 
of workers in the oil and gas sector, i.e. from senior high school (or lower) to post-
graduates. 
 
6.3.1 Estimation of α (capital’s share) in the petroleum sector 
 
Since the estimation of TFP is highly sensitive to the value of α (R. J. Taylor, 
2007, p. 195), this study will use two estimates of α in order to compare and contrast the 
results. The first value of α used is 0.56, which is the estimated α used to measure TFP 
growth in the aggregate economy, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
The second value of α used is calculated from data on the output and investment 
expenditure in the petroleum sector, as presented in Table 6.1 on the following page. 
 
                                                 
19
 The rate of depreciation used in this study is the same as the implicit rate of depreciation used by BPS 
in its System of National Accounts, which is 5 per cent. 
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Table 6.1  Capital’s share of output in the petroleum sector (2005=100) 
Year
Output (Million 
US$)
Investment 
expenditures 
(Million US$)
Capital's share 
of output
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (3) / (2)
1991 66,315.85           17,079.21              0.26
1992 53,085.79           17,903.23              0.34
1993 46,642.06           14,453.78              0.31
1994 41,383.13           14,109.33              0.34
1995 38,857.58           13,362.92              0.34
1996 36,321.97           11,681.97              0.32
1997 36,107.67           14,731.48              0.41
1998 14,577.36           9,413.26                0.65
1999 14,800.18           6,551.78                0.44
2000 23,937.06           6,132.61                0.26
2001 18,044.20           5,876.92                0.33
2002 12,497.34           6,797.50                0.54
2003 13,020.77           6,733.57                0.52
2004 13,871.65           6,143.65                0.44
2005 17,324.77           6,219.00                0.36
2006 19,314.40           6,702.92                0.35
2007 21,278.80           7,593.02                0.36
2008 22,110.22           8,035.58                0.36
2009 17,716.94           7,527.08                0.42
2010 21,826.93           7,576.24                0.35
0.38Average  
Sources: BPMIGAS (2005, 2011); U.S. Embassy (1994, 1998, 2001, 2008) 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, using the petroleum sector‟s data for output and 
investment expenditure results in an estimated α value of 0.38. Therefore, both the α 
value of 0.56 (as presented in Table 5.1) and the α value of 0.38 (as presented in Table 
6.1) will be used to estimate TFP growth in the petroleum sector. 
 
6.4 Estimation of TFP in the petroleum sector 
 
The next step is to substitute the values of the growth rates (output, capital stock 
and labour) and factors‟ share values into Equation (5.3). The method is described as 
follows: 
Step 1: taking logs and working out the change (Δ) over time (t) to arrive at  ̇ ,  ̇  and 
  ̇. 
Step 2: providing an estimate for capital‟s share (α) and labour‟s share (1 – α) (as 
discussed in the previous section). 
Step 3: substituting the values obtained from Step 1 and Step 2 into Equation (5.3). 
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Table 6.2 shows the decomposition of growth of the petroleum sector using the 
α values of 0.56 and 0.38.  
 
Table 6.2  Petroleum sector growth decomposition 
(annual average in per cent) 
 
Period
Change in 
Ouput
Due to Capital 
Stock
Due to Labour 
Input
Due to TFP
α = 0.56
1991-1997 -0.92 -0.12 -0.41 -0.39
1998-2003 -1.60 -0.77 0.14 -0.97
2004-2010 0.77 0.11 0.08 0.58
α = 0.38
1991-1997 -0.92 -0.08 -0.58 -0.26
1998-2003 -1.60 -0.52 0.20 -1.27
2004-2010 0.77 0.07 0.11 0.59
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012); 
BPMIGAS (2005, 2011); U.S. Embassy (1994, 1998, 2001, 2008); author‟s calculations.  
 
  
As seen in Table 6.2, the contribution of TFP to the output growth in the 
petroleum sector varies depending on the value of α used. Nevertheless, although the 
TFP values may differ in extent, they do follow broadly the same trend. During 1991-
1997, oil and gas output growth was mostly the result of capital stock accumulation. 
This dominant contribution of capital stock is consistent with the generally conducive 
investment climate in the oil and gas sector during the period. 
During the period of transition and adjustment of 1998-2003, the contribution of 
both capital accumulation and TFP declined and the growth of oil and gas output was 
mostly due to the expansion in labour input. This relatively high contribution of labour 
input as compared to other factor inputs appears to be the result of government policy in 
encouraging the development of human resources through the expansion of oil and gas 
education and the opening of many training facilities which were started during the 
second five-year plan or REPELITA II in the 1970s (Indonesian Government, 1974). 
The period from 2004 to 2010 witnessed a surge in the contribution of TFP to oil 
and gas output. This significant progress in the contribution of TFP may be unexpected 
since it occurred during a time full of unfavourable conditions that normally make 
productivity improvements in this sector very challenging. Aside from the unfavourable 
investment environment which may serve as barrier to capital stock accumulation as 
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discussed in other part of this thesis, there are also several circumstances that 
supposedly hampered TFP growth in Indonesia‟s oil and gas sector. 
First, particularly since 1998, there was no coherent and comprehensive 
government policy on the medium-to-long-term development of the country‟s oil and 
gas sector. The main focus of the central government at this time was to deal with social 
unrest and separatism that overwhelmed the country following the Asian financial crisis 
and the resignation of Soeharto. To claim that during this time period there was no 
government supervision of the industry at all would be an exaggeration. The Indonesian 
ministry of resources (Kementerian ESDM) and BPMIGAS (now SKKMIGAS), as the 
technical arms of the government in the upstream oil and gas sector, still played a key 
role in the development of this sector, particularly in short-term planning and 
development. Nevertheless, at the national level there was no comprehensive medium-
to-long-term national strategy that could bind all of the nation‟s stakeholders towards a 
common goal of achieving the optimum benefit from the country‟s endowment in oil 
and gas resources. 
Second, the period from 1998 to 2003 was a period of social and political 
abnormality in Indonesia. In the political sphere, there were three presidents, each with 
their own cabinets. In the social sphere, there were widespread and violent social 
conflicts, imminent terrorism activities and the increasing secessionist movements in 
some regions. Even though social and political normalisation has generally been 
achieved since 2004, some of these problems still exist, albeit at a reduced frequency. 
Moreover, during the 2004-2010 period, the country continued to have the same issues 
which have dragged the economy down for decades, such as corruption and weak legal 
systems (Basri & Hill, 2011a). 
Amid these unfavourable circumstances, the reform in the oil and gas sector in 
the early 2000s appeared to have resulted in this acceleration of TFP growth. This 
significant increase in TFP growth during 2004-2010 occurred following the 
implementation of the oil and gas sector‟s deregulation policy which was marked with 
the introduction of Oil and Gas Law No. 22/2001 and came into effect on 23 November 
2001. This new law practically ended the monopoly power of Pertamina in Indonesian 
petroleum industry. The pro free-market nature of this law encouraged the oil and gas 
sector to shed some of its inefficiencies, as it has been able to stay competitive in a new 
era of market competition. 
During the Soeharto era Pertamina held monopoly power in all areas of the 
petroleum industry in Indonesia. In the area of upstream oil and gas, the company 
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served as licensor, supervisor, regulator and operator all at once (Butt & Siregar, 2013; 
M. Karim, 2013). Even though over 90 per cent of Indonesia‟s oil and gas at this time 
was produced by private oil companies (World Bank, 2000b), under the scheme of 
production sharing contract (PSC) and contract of work (CoW) these private companies 
in effect operated under the control of Pertamina and were subject to its directives. In 
other words, they were no more than just „service providers‟. With all this background, 
the productivity of the Indonesian upstream oil and gas sector before the enactment of 
the new law may best be represented by the conditions of Pertamina itself.  
When Pertamina still held its monopoly power, aside from its main job in 
managing all aspects of the country‟s petroleum industry, the company was also 
burdened by responsibilities to assist the national development efforts. One of the 
prominent examples of such a responsibility was Pertamina‟s financing role in the 
establishment of Krakatau Steel plant, a US$5 billion mega project established with the 
purpose of supporting the country‟s industrialisation process – which unfortunately 
became a misadventure due to gross mismanagement (Dowling & Yap, 2008).  
Further, rather than be obligated only by specific financial performance or 
returns on investment, the company was also burdened by many social obligations such 
as guaranteeing the availability of oil products throughout the vast archipelagic country 
at a uniform subsidised price regardless of the costs (World Bank, 2000b). The 
company was also treated as a cash cow for the high-ranked government officials and 
their cronies – a practice that was very prevalent during the Soeharto regime. During the 
final years of the Soeharto era, the majority of oil and gas contracts were awarded to 
Soeharto‟s family members and their associates. A study by Hertzmark (2007) 
concluded that these practices eventually led to inefficiencies in Indonesia‟s oil and gas 
sector. 
A special audit report revealed that embezzlement, illegal commissions, mark-
ups on procurement contracts and sheer inefficiency had cost Pertamina around $6.1 
billion in lost revenue between 1997 and 1998 alone (OGJ, 1999). Procurement and 
resources allocation processes in Pertamina were lengthy (sometimes over 10 months) 
and were being done without adequate demand planning and forecasting, supply 
planning or good inventory management. Inefficiencies that can be attributed to these 
procurement and resources allocation processes alone were estimated to reach around 
US$1 billion each year (World Bank, 2000b). In the global upstream industry‟s rank, 
Pertamina‟s financial returns from exploration and production activities fell into the 
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bottom quartile. The estimated inefficiencies stemming from exploration and production 
activities alone reached between US$1.3 billion to US$2.0 billion (World Bank, 2000b).  
Also, there was a conflict of interest arising from the position of Pertamina as an 
operator while at the same time also serving as a regulator. As an operator, Pertamina 
engages in exploration, development and production activities; whereas as a regulator, it 
grants new exploration areas to private companies. This arrangement may allow 
Pertamina to hold some specific fields which hold better prospects but not carry out the 
exploration and development activities, while at the same time denying access for 
private companies to the field. Overall, Pertamina was far from implementing sound 
business practices in all aspects of its operations. With all its power and lack of 
accountability, during these times Indonesians liked to satirise Pertamina as „not a 
company but a country within a country‟. 
After the fall of Soeharto and the start of the reformation era, the country‟s 
stakeholders intended to tackle these inefficiencies in Indonesia‟s oil and gas sector with 
the enactment of the Oil and Gas Law No. 22/2001. This law was enacted with three 
key components. First, Pertamina no longer holds a monopoly over all activities in the 
petroleum sector and the company no longer performs the dual functions of regulator 
and industry participant. Second, the country‟s petroleum sector is disaggregated into 
„upstream‟ and „downstream‟, and a new regulator has been established for each of 
those sub-sectors. Third, the „authority to mine‟ which was previously held by 
Pertamina, is now held by the government (Tivey, Habriansyah, & Abrar, 2003). The 
law guarantees that Pertamina holds the same position as other ordinary oil and gas 
companies. The main objective of this arrangement is that the oil and gas sector in 
Indonesia will be subject to competition mechanisms that are reasonable, fair and 
transparent with appropriate pricing in accordance with market forces (Pertamina, 
2013). 
A study by Bridgman et al. (2011) on the sources of TFP growth in Petrobras  
(Brazil‟s national oil company) concluded that even the threat of – despite no immediate 
de facto – privatisation and market competition is enough to force improved 
productivity. In the case of Pertamina, after losing its monopoly power, the company 
has been forced to operate with more focus on performance and efficiency, as any other 
private company should be. Thus, for the Indonesian upstream oil and gas sector, the 
reform brought a level playing field for all players in this sector and this put pressure on 
them to be more efficient in order to survive. 
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In the more democratic Indonesian society after the end of Soeharto era, the 
public demands a more transparent and responsible public governance. Responding to 
these public pressures, many public institutions (including those involved in the oil and 
gas sector) have adopted managerial best practices which can usually be found in large 
and well-managed private corporations. 
According to the Law No. 22/2001, responsibility for three key functions of the 
governance of oil and gas sector – i.e. policy, regulation and commercial (business) 
(Lubiantara, 2012) – which was previously held solely by Pertamina, is now separated 
into three distinct bodies. The policy function became the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (Kementerian ESDM), regulation function (including 
its monitoring and controlling) is the responsibility of BPMIGAS (now SKKMigas), 
while the commercial aspects are the responsibility of Pertamina as a state-owned 
company. 
 For Pertamina, ever since the fall of Soeharto regime, the company has been put 
under intense public scrutiny due to its strategic and important position for the country‟s 
economy. The public demands that Pertamina be more transparent, clean and profitable. 
Further, as Pertamina now does not hold monopoly power and thus becomes an 
ordinary player in Indonesia‟s oil and gas sector, the company is required to be able to 
directly confront its competitors. These combined pressures have pushed the company 
to transform its business process by adopting good corporate governance which usually 
can be found in well-managed private entities. 
 In its stated strategic direction, Pertamina‟s business process transformations 
were focused on building a new corporate culture which includes: instilling anti-
corruption and costumer focussed mind-set among the employees, changing the 
company‟s values from a bureaucratic and monopolistic company to a more competitive 
and entrepreneurship-oriented company, ensuring effective leadership within the 
company and creating a good public image to support the company‟s operations as well 
as to gain the government and public recognition for trustworthiness. Showing its 
seriousness, in 2006 Pertamina established a separate unit called the Management 
Center Program whose tasks are to manage and ensure that these transformation 
programs run smoothly within the company (Pertamina, 2006).  
 It is argued that greater sharing of information through transparency and 
accountability is critical to support a culture of innovation and change (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). In line with this, among the most notable of the transformation steps 
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taken by Pertamina are the efforts of the company to increase its accountability and 
transparency. 
 To improve its transparency, Pertamina adopted a policy to openly announce its 
corporate decisions, and its management is obligated to strictly adhere to the decision 
making mechanism as regulated in the Board Manual. Further, the transparency 
principle is made a priority when Pertamina discloses information and relevant 
materials concerning the actions of the company. This information is disclosed to the 
public through the corporate secretary (Pertamina, 2013). 
 In the effort to improve its accountability, Pertamina established a management 
system which ensures the clarity of functions, implementation and responsibilities of 
each part of the company. This system includes, among others things, the Board of 
Commissioners‟ report to the Board of Directors regarding the annual budget plan, 
submission of financial statements to the annual general meeting of shareholders, 
internal auditing and the appointment of external auditors, the imposition of the 
company‟s business ethics and code of conduct, conflict of interest guidelines, and also 
guidelines for the acceptance of gifts/souvenirs and entertainment (Pertamina, 2013). 
 Further, Pertamina ensures that activities are conducted independently without 
any conflicts of interest and influence or pressure from any party that does not comply 
with the existing legislation and the principles of good corporate governance. On an 
annual basis, top management and all employees are required to declare a statement 
relating to conflict of interest. Further, to bolster the efforts of the company to be 
independent and free from conflict of interest, Pertamina‟s board of commissioners 
currently has two independent commissioners out of five commissioners which are 
appointed to improve the board‟s supervisory capability (Pertamina, 2013). 
 The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Kementerian ESDM) has 
implemented a series of bureaucratic reforms which touches the areas of, among others, 
accountability, human resources and organisation (KESDM, 2014). To improve its 
accountability, the ministry compiles and publishes its financial reports regularly. 
Although a yearly financial report is usual in private sector, in the Indonesian public 
sector this is indeed a significant achievement. Further, in the area of accountability the 
ministry also regularly publishes its performance report (LAKIP). LAKIP is an 
accountability report from public officials of a public organisation to their stakeholders 
which reports the use of resources available to that organisation. 
 In the area of human resource management, Kementerian ESDM has also 
adopted some practices which usually occur in private sector organisations, such as 
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workload analysis, job grading, job competency standards and individual employee 
assessment. In the area of organisational management, Kementerian ESDM has adopted 
the balanced scorecard analysis to evaluate the performance of each echelon within the 
ministry. Also, the ministry has compiled and published a medium term (5-yearly 
period) strategic plan for the organisation. Further, to bolster its transparency, the 
ministry has built a web-based tender system for procurement (KESDM, 2014). For a 
developing country which has gone  through a violent transition from decades of 
autocratic regime to a democracy, these practices are indeed significant steps towards a 
more thorough implementation of sound management principles in public sector 
organisations. 
 Compared to Pertamina and Kementerian ESDM, BPMIGAS is rather slow in 
adopting managerial best practices from private sector organisations. This condition 
might be related to the status of BPMIGAS as a newly established institution. As a new 
government agency which was established in 2002 following the end of Pertamina‟s 
monopoly, one of the problems faced by BPMIGAS was that the regulations necessary 
to support its operations were slow to materialise. One example was the difficulty faced 
by BPMIGAS in compiling its yearly financial report. Until 2008, BPMIGAS has been 
unable to compose its balance sheet because the Ministry of Finance had not decided the 
initial equity of this new agency (BPMIGAS, 2011). Further, regarding the financial 
reports of BPMIGAS, the chairman of Indonesia‟s supreme audit body (BPK) 
commented that the management control for the cost recovery (which is one of the main 
points in BPMIGAS‟ financial reports) was not transparent enough, and BPK therefore 
gave an adverse opinion or disclaimer on BPMIGAS‟s financial reports (BPK, 2009).  
 
6.5 Summary 
 
Findings in this chapter show that during the period of 1991-1997 oil and gas 
output growth was mostly the result of capital stock accumulation. During the period of 
1998-2003, the contribution of both capital accumulation and TFP declined and the 
growth of oil and gas output was mostly due to the growth in labour employment. For 
the period of 2004-2010, the Indonesian petroleum sector experienced a significant 
jump in TFP growth. The reforms of the early 2000s appeared to have resulted in this 
acceleration of TFP growth.  
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  Chapter 7
TFP Growth in the Non-petroleum Sectors 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the TFP growth for the non-petroleum 
sectors. For this study, the period 1991-2010 is examined. The chapter is structured as 
follows: the first section presents the data sources, model specifications and the 
estimations of the capital‟s share of output (α) for the non-petroleum sectors. The 
second section discusses the estimations of the TFP growth in these sectors. The third 
section explores the relationship between TFP and output growth in Indonesia from the 
perspective of the New Keynesian‟s real business cycle framework. The growth 
accounting framework used in this chapter follows the model used in Chapter 5.  
 
7.2 Data sources 
 
Data for these estimations are mainly gathered from the publications of Badan 
Pusat Statistik (BPS) or the Central Board of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, 
2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011b, 2012) and World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank (World Development Indicators, 2014). All data, unless otherwise noted, cover 
the period of 1991-2010 and the nominal values are adjusted at constant 2005 prices 
(2005=100). 
 
7.3 Model specifications 
Output 
 
The value of GDP minus the value of petroleum sector‟s output is used to arrive 
at the value of output for the non-petroleum sectors of the economy. Hence, the result is 
the data on the production output from all economic activities except the upstream oil 
and gas industry. These data are adjusted to real prices (2005 = 100) using the consumer 
price index (CPI) from WDI by employing the following formula: 
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(7.1) 
 
 
Capital stock 
 
Since there is no official estimate of capital stock, in this analysis the capital 
stock series is constructed from investment expenditure in all sectors of the economy 
except for the petroleum sector. The value of aggregate gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) minus the value of investment in the petroleum sector is used as a proxy for the 
level of investment in the non-petroleum sectors.  
BPS classified the capital goods in GFCF data into building or construction 
(factories, offices); machines (prime movers, generators); transportation means 
(vehicles, ships, trains); livestock; equipment (electrical equipment, communication 
equipment, leather, fabrics) and others (optic devices, household appliances, measuring 
devices) (Van der Eng, 2009; Yudanto et al., 2005). These data are adjusted to constant 
2005 prices using Equation (7.1). 
Once data on investment expenditure are collected, the capital stock series is 
constructed by summing capital stock from all existing asset vintages using the 
following formula (R. J. Taylor, 2007, p. 189): 
 
 
∑    
 
  1
    ⁄  
(7.2) 
 
Here, I represents gross investment in the non-petroleum sectors, t denotes the age of 
the oldest vintage of capital stock in the non-petroleum sectors, i=1 denotes the current 
capital stock in the non-petroleum sectors, δ is the depreciation20, and P is the price 
level. 
 
Labour 
 
The labour variable in the non-petroleum sectors is constructed using serially 
available data on aggregate employment minus the number of workers employed in the 
                                                 
20
 The rate of depreciation used in this study is the same as the implicit rate of depreciation used by BPS 
in its System of National Accounts, which is 5 per cent. 
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petroleum sector. Thus, these data comprise all workers employed in all sectors of the 
economy except in the upstream oil and gas industry and cover all levels of education of 
workers, i.e. from non-schooling to university post-graduates. Ideally, the number of 
hours worked would be a better proxy for labour inputs but, as stated earlier, the 
unavailability of such data for Indonesia renders this exercise difficult. 
 
7.3.1 Estimation of α (capital’s share) in the non-petroleum sectors 
 
Since the estimation of TFP is highly sensitive to the value of α (R. J. Taylor, 
2007, p. 195), this study will use two estimates of α in order to compare and contrast the 
results. The first value of α used is 0.56, which is the estimated α used to measure TFP 
growth in the aggregate economy, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
The second value of α used is calculated from data on the output and investment 
expenditure in the non-petroleum sectors, as presented in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1  Capital’s share of output in the non-petroleum sectors (2005=100) 
 
Year
Output (Million 
US$)
Investment 
expenditures 
(Million US$)
Capital's share of 
output
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (3) / (2)
1991 489,391.89          145,102.61            0.30
1992 517,138.04          142,871.76            0.28
1993 542,317.57          143,062.84            0.26
1994 625,519.60          174,923.15            0.28
1995 658,729.72          190,415.45            0.29
1996 616,850.76          208,996.04            0.34
1997 613,211.34          173,767.06            0.28
1998 165,018.40          37,899.19              0.23
1999 204,384.10          40,006.38              0.20
2000 200,323.38          44,972.04              0.22
2001 174,359.02          38,268.78              0.22
2002 222,726.82          40,721.53              0.18
2003 251,905.69          47,016.29              0.19
2004 257,498.84          57,564.99              0.22
2005 253,302.44          61,361.82              0.24
2006 286,416.22          71,081.74              0.25
2007 321,141.40          81,962.51              0.26
2008 345,576.08          98,948.66              0.29
2009 357,289.12          113,692.45            0.32
2010 448,503.14          148,441.16            0.33
0.26Average  
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). 
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As shown in Table 7.1, using the non-petroleum sectors‟ data on output and 
investment expenditure results in an estimated α value of 0.26. Therefore, both the α 
value of 0.56 (as presented in Table 5.1) and the α value of 0.26 (as presented in Table 
7.1) will be used to estimate TFP growth in the non-petroleum sectors. 
 
 
7.4 Estimation of TFP 
 
The next step is to substitute the values of the growth rates (output, capital stock 
and labour) and factors‟ share values into Equation (5.3). The method is described as 
follows: 
Step 1: taking logs and the change (Δ) over time (t) to arrive at  ̇ ,  ̇  and   ̇. 
Step 2: providing an estimate for the capital‟s share (α) and the labour‟s share (1 – α) 
(as discussed in the previous section). 
Step 3: substituting the values obtained from Step 1 and Step 2 above into Equation 
(5.3). 
 
Table 7.2 shows the decomposition of growth of the non-petroleum sectors 
using the α values of 0.56 and 0.26.  
 
Table 7.2  Non-Petroleum sectors growth decomposition 
(annual average in per cent) 
 
Period
Change in 
Ouput
Due to Capital 
Stock
Due to Labour 
Input
Due to TFP
α = 0.56
1991-1997 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.08
1998-2003 -1.06 -0.99 0.02 -0.09
2004-2010 0.65 0.82 0.06 -0.23
α = 0.26
1991-1997 0.24 0.05 0.08 0.11
1998-2003 -1.06 -0.46 0.03 -0.63
2004-2010 0.65 0.38 0.10 0.17
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012); author‟s calculations.  
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 Table 7.2 shows that the contribution of TFP to output growth in the non-
petroleum sectors varies, as expected, depending on the value of α used. When using an 
α value of 0.56, TFP was found to have a very low growth rate during the Soeharto era 
of 1991-1997. The growth rate then dropped in the transition and adjustment period of 
1998-2003 and even deteriorated further during the stabilisation period of 2004-2010. 
 Using an α value of 0.26, TFP is estimated to have a low but positive growth 
rate during 1991-1997. The growth then dropped significantly during the 1998-2003 
period. In 2004-2010, TFP growth bounced back to a similar level as the period of 
1991-1997. However, the sources of output growth in both periods do not share the 
same characteristics. In 1991-1997, output growth was mostly due to TFP whereas in 
the 2004-2010 period, output growth was mostly the result of capital accumulation. 
 The difference in TFP discussed above confirms the notion that TFP estimations 
are sensitive to the ways in which inputs are measured (E. K. Chen, 1997). Hence, one 
of the implications is that while TFP estimations may provide important insights on the 
productivity growth of an economy, it is also important to bear in mind their limitations 
(Mahadevan, 2003). 
 The analysis of TFP based on the Solow-Swan growth framework is further 
extended by using the New Keynesian analysis. The rationale for doing this is that it 
would shed further light on the output growth of the Indonesian economy. 
 
7.5 Real Business Cycles in Indonesia: A New Keynesian Perspective 
 
Real Business Cycle models based their analysis on the premise that aggregate 
economic variables are the outcomes of the decisions made by many individual agents 
who act to maximise their utility subject to production possibilities and resource 
constraints. Explicitly, these models try to find the answers of how rational maximising 
individuals respond to changes in economic environment as well as the implications of 
these responses on the equilibrium outcomes of aggregate variables. Thus, Real 
Business Cycle models need to specify the economic environment and how it evolves 
over time. The criteria that economic agents use in choosing appropriate patterns of 
such variables as consumption, investment and work effort are also necessary to be 
specified in these models since (according to the Real Business Cycle theory) business 
cycles are characterised by changes in the behaviour of economic agents that eventually 
change the equilibrium of supply and demand for various goods and services (Plosser, 
1989).   
 151 
 
Since each economic agent in the Real Business Cycle theory is assumed as 
rational, market failures would never happen and any economic fluctuation is assumed 
to be caused by something outside the agent‟s decision-making process. Real Business 
Cycle theory assumes that economic growth (or contraction) is the natural and efficient 
response of the economy to changes in the available production technology. According 
to this theory, economic fluctuations are mostly due to substantial technological shocks. 
Thus, the reason an economy experiences a reduction in welfare (due to a recession, for 
example) is argued to be the result of a sudden and substantial decline in the 
technological capabilities of the society (Mankiw, 1989; Plosser, 1989). 
Mankiw (1989) suggested, however, that in the New Keynesian perspective the 
accumulation of knowledge and the concurrent increase in the economy‟s technological 
capabilities take place gradually over time. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the economy 
will be subject to such large and sudden technological disturbances. According to the 
New Keynesians, the reduction in welfare is the result of a failure in economic 
coordination: in the case of a contraction or recession, some gains from trade go 
unrealised because wages and prices do not adjust instantaneously to equate supply and 
demand in all markets. These wages and prices stickiness are essential for New 
Keynesian theory. Although, like the Real Business Cycle theory, New Keynesians also 
assumes rational expectations of economic agents, however, according to New 
Keynesians market failures do happen due to the existence of imperfect competition 
(Dixon, 2001).  
As shown in Figure 7.1, Mankiw (1989) investigated the empirical evidence on 
technological disturbances to explore one of the fundamental weaknesses of the Real 
Business Cycle theory: that large technological disturbances are the primary source of 
economic fluctuations. The figure presents the estimations of Solow residual and the per 
cent change in output yearly since 1948. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 152 
 
Figure 7.1  Solow residuals and output growth 
 
 
 
Source: Mankiw (1989, p. 84) 
 
  
As seen in Figure 7.1, there are substantial fluctuations in measured TFP. For 
example, in 1982 TFP decreased by 3.5 per cent, whereas in 1984 it increased by 3.4 
per cent (Mankiw, 1989, p. 84). Although every time output fell, TFP also fell, 
however, Mankiw (1989, p. 84) suggested that the empirical evidence appeared to 
support the standard explanation that productivity disturbance reflects labour hoarding 
and other “off the production function” behaviour. This means that in a recession, 
productivity appears to fall because unnecessary and underutilised labourers are kept by 
firms. These hoarded labourers would then enable an increase in output during a boom 
period without a large increase in measured labour input. 
 
7.5.1 TFP and output growth in Indonesia’s aggregate economy 
 
Figure 7.2 presents the trends of TFP and output growth in the Indonesian 
economy during 1991-2010. 
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Figure 7.2  TFP and output growth in Indonesian economy, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012); author‟s calculations 
 
 
 The economic concept of elasticity is used by economists to measure how 
responsive one economic variable to changes in another economic variable (Hubbard, 
Garnett, Lewis, & O'Brien, 2009, p. 96). Thus, elasticity is a general concept which can 
be applied to various economic variables (Baumol & Blinder, 1988; J. B. Taylor & 
Frost, 2006). The gaps between TFP and output growth as shown in Figure 7.2 can be 
explained by calculating the elasticity of output with respect to changes in productivity 
using the following formula: 
 
    
              
           ⁄  
(7.3) 
 
 
where   denotes the elasticity coefficient and Δ represents the percentage change from 
year to year.  
Data on the values of output and TFP in the aggregate economy are derived 
from Chapter 5. By taking logs and working out the change (Δ) over time, the next step 
is to substitute these values into Equation (7.3). The trend in the elasticity of output with 
respect to changes in the productivity growth in the Indonesian economy is presented in 
Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3  Trend in the elasticity of output with respect to productivity in the 
aggregate economy, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012); author‟s calculations. 
 
  
As shown in Figure 7.3, in the absence of a recession, output appears to be 
inelastic to changes in productivity growth. For example, during 2000-2010 the annual 
average of the elasticity coefficient was 0.37 – which means that, on average, one per 
cent change in aggregate TFP would lead to 0.37 per cent change in aggregate output.  
Figure 7.3 also shows that when the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1998 
output appeared to be significantly elastic to changes in productivity. The elasticity 
coefficient in 1998 was 3.45 – which means that one per cent change in aggregate TFP 
would lead to 3.45 per cent change in aggregate output. At the time, there was a 
substantial fall in productivity which coincided with a significant decline in output 
growth in the same year, as shown in Figure 7.2. 
This substantial fall in productivity in 1998 need not be interpreted as evidence 
pertaining to technological shocks as suggested by the Real Business Cycle theory. The 
empirical data in this study appear to be consistent with the standard explanation of 
Mankiw (1989) for productivity disturbance as stated earlier, i.e. productivity appears to 
fall during recession because firms hoarded labourers which would then enable an 
increase in output during a boom period without a large increase in measured labour 
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input. For example, when the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia, output in 1998 fell by 
72 per cent while employment rose by 0.7 per cent and the value of TFP recorded a 
negative growth rate of 3 per cent. After the crisis, in 1999, output grew significantly at 
22 per cent whereas employment grew by only 1.3 per cent and TFP recorded a positive 
growth of 1.7 per cent. These conditions may suggest that Indonesian firms possibly 
kept unnecessary and underutilised employees amid the recession that was triggered by 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. Hence, when economic growth gained traction 
in 1999, the large increase in output was not followed by a significant increase in 
employment. 
 
7.5.2 TFP and output growth in Indonesia’s petroleum sector 
 
Figure 7.4 presents the trends of output and TFP growth in the Indonesian 
petroleum sector during 1991-2010 using α values of 0.56 and 0.38. 
 
Figure 7.4  TFP and output growth in Indonesian petroleum sector, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012); 
BPMIGAS (2005, 2011); U.S. Embassy (1994, 1998, 2001, 2008); author‟s calculations.  
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 As shown in Figure 7.4, both TFP growths (using an α value of 0.56 and using 
an α value of 0.38) follow broadly the same trend. Further, the gaps between TFP and 
output growth in petroleum sector as shown in Figure 7.4 can be explained by 
calculating the elasticity of output with respect to changes in productivity as presented 
in Equation (7.3). Data on the values of output and TFP in the petroleum sector are 
derived from Chapter 6. By taking logs and working out the change (Δ) over time, the 
next step is to substitute these values into Equation (7.3). The trend in the elasticity of 
output with respect to changes in the productivity growth in Indonesian petroleum 
sector using α=0.56 and α=0.38 is presented in Figure 7.5. 
 
Figure 7.5  Trend in the elasticity of output with respect to productivity in the 
petroleum sector, 1991-2010 
 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012); 
BPMIGAS (2005, 2011); U.S. Embassy (1994, 1998, 2001, 2008); author‟s calculations.  
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Figure 7.5 also shows that during the economic contraction of 1998, the 
coefficient of elasticity rose significantly with a coefficient value of 2.49 (for α=0.56) 
and 3.07 (for α=0.38). At the time, there was a substantial fall in productivity which 
coincided with a significant decline in output growth in the same year, as shown in 
Figure 7.4. In 1998, petroleum output fell by 59 per cent while employment rose by 9 
per cent and TFP recorded negative growth rate (-6 per cent for α=0.56 and -7 per cent 
for α=0.38).  
When the petroleum sector recovered in 2000, output grew significantly by 61 per 
cent whereas employment grew by only 11 per cent and TFP recorded positive growth 
(4 per cent for both α values). Thus, this phenomenon is consistent with the explanation 
of Mankiw (1989) that productivity appears to fall during recession because firms 
hoarded labourers which would then enable an increase in output during a boom period 
without a large increase in measured labour input. 
 
7.6 Summary 
 
This chapter provides estimations of TFP growth of the non-petroleum sectors 
during 1991-2010. The findings confirm the sensitivity of TFP measurement to the 
value of α. Using an α value of 0.56, it was found that the growth of TFP showed a 
consistently declining trend, particularly after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. 
On the other hand, using an α value of 0.26, it was found that after a declining trend 
during 1998-2003, TFP growth during 2004-2010 rebounded to the same level as in 
1991-1997. 
An α value of 0.26 means putting much more weight on labour‟s share of output. 
Indonesia economy after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998, however, is moving 
towards a more capital-intensive production structure and this transition was a 
consequence of the increasingly rigid labour market conditions (Aswicahyono, Brooks, 
et al., 2011; Brummund, 2012; Manning & Roesad, 2007). Hence, putting significantly 
more weight on the share of labour input might not be appropriate. An α value of 0.56 
may provide a more reasonable assumption considering the more capital-intensive 
nature of Indonesia‟s economy after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. Further, an 
α value of 0.56 is more consistent with the α value used in other studies on Indonesian 
economy and the economies of several East Asian countries, which is between 0.50 to 
0.63 (as seen in Table 5.2). 
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This chapter also explores the relationship between TFP and output growth in 
Indonesia from the perspective of the New Keynesian‟s real business cycle framework 
and empirical evidence in this study appeared to be consistent with this framework. 
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  Chapter 8
Summary of Findings and Discussion 
 
8.1 Summary of findings 
 
The main objective of this study is to estimate the TFP growth of the petroleum 
sector as well as of the non-petroleum sectors of the Indonesian economy. With an 
overview of the historical backgrounds, possible causes for fluctuations in productivity 
growth of both sectors have also been identified. These serve as valuable inputs to 
explore the policy implications for improving the productivity of the petroleum sector 
and of the non-petroleum sectors in the future. 
Empirical findings in Chapter 6 reveal that during the final years of the Soeharto 
era of 1991-1997 and during the transition and adjustment period of 1998-2003, the 
growth rate of petroleum TFP was negative. This negative trend was reversed during the 
stabilisation period of 2004-2010 where petroleum TFP showed significant positive 
growth.  
Findings in Chapter 7 show that TFP growth in the non-petroleum sectors varies 
depending on the value of α used. Using an α value of 0.56, the non-petroleum TFP was 
found to have a very low growth rate during the Soeharto era of 1991-1997. The growth 
then became negative during the transition and adjustment period of 1998-2003, and 
deteriorated further during the stabilisation period of 2004-2010. On the other hand, 
when using an α value of 0.26, the non-petroleum TFP was shown to have experienced 
a modest growth rate in 1991-1997. The growth then declined significantly in 1998-
2003. In 2004-2010, the growth of TFP bounced back to approximately the same level 
as the period of 1991-1997. An α value of 0.56 seems to be a more reasonable 
assumption, however, considering the transition of the Indonesian economy towards 
more capital-intensive production structures after the Asian financial crisis of 
1997/1998. 
 
8.2 Policy implications for the petroleum sector 
 
Although Indonesia‟s petroleum TFP experienced significant growth between 
2004-2010, steadily declining petroleum output, the fact that there are still unexplored 
basins and the absence of the application of advanced extraction technologies indicate 
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that there remains room for further improvement in the productivity of the petroleum 
sector. One of the challenges in Indonesia‟s oil and gas development is the rising 
sentiment of resource nationalism. The adverse impact of the resurgence of resource 
nationalism can be seen in the declining growth in capital stock accumulation in the 
petroleum sector, which is occurring at a time when the country needs new investment 
due to the maturity of many of its existing oil and gas fields. Further, according to the 
Assimilation School of Thought
21
, technological progress may be inseparable from the 
growth in capital input since the introduction of new, more advanced technology would 
induce productivity growth. Hence, if this declining trend in capital stock formation 
continues, it is possible that productivity growth in the petroleum sector might not be 
sustainable in the long-run. 
There are several measures that could be taken by both international oil 
companies (IOCs) and the host government to deal with resource nationalism 
(Maniruzzaman, 2009). First, a progressive taxation or profit-sharing method inherent in 
the initial exploitation agreement may be able to save time and trouble for the parties 
involved in the event of high oil prices, which usually serves as a trigger for the 
resurgence of resource nationalism. Second, equity participation in oil and gas 
exploitation by the host government may be diplomatically and strategically necessary 
to serve as a protection against the wave of resource nationalism, because failing to 
protect the government‟s investment would typically mean inviting unnecessary 
domestic political scrutiny. Third, corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs may 
be able to serve as a buffer for IOCs and the government against nationalistic demands, 
especially from the local population where the oil and gas resources lie. Fourth, 
transparency of corporate activities could be improved in order to minimise the lack of 
trust on the operational conducts of IOCs. Fifth, an early detection and prevention 
mechanism for disputes could be implemented so that immediate and appropriate 
solutions can be quickly devised whenever there are early signs of friction among 
parties. Sixth, it could be better for IOCs to include international financial institutions 
(such as the Wold Bank or ADB) in their investment efforts, either as guarantor, lender 
or investor, in order to bring more leverage in dealing with the rising sentiment of 
resource nationalism. Losing important development aid from these international 
financial institutions may invoke domestic political pressures for the host government. 
Hence the presence of these institutions might deter any hostile action against IOCs that 
are operating in a foreign country (Maniruzzaman, 2009). 
                                                 
21
 This topic is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
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Even though there are several ways to manage the risks associated with resource 
nationalism, given that this sentiment is prevalent in Indonesia, it might not be able to 
be managed easily. Therefore, even though keeping Indonesia‟s petroleum sector open 
to fair competition should be the prime policy, it may be better if resource nationalism 
is also taken into account in designing the strategy or policy to develop the 
technological capability of Indonesia‟s oil and gas sector.  
Hence, perhaps the reasonable strategic policy would be to encourage Pertamina 
to be the driver for the development of the petroleum sector while still keeping the 
sector open for competition. It might be important to also note that proposing policies 
for the development of the petroleum sector often involves trade-offs between short-
term and long-term objectives. Therefore, it might be necessary for the government – as 
the sole owner of Pertamina – to provide greater financial freedom to the company to be 
able to develop its own choice of technological core competencies. Drawing lessons 
from the success story of Statoil (Norwegian NOC) in building its unique technological 
competence, this policy requires government support in shaping the innovative 
mentality and long-term outlook of Pertamina.  
In the case of Statoil, the Norwegian government granted the company full 
discretion over its cash flow
22
. Of course, just as in any other frontier technological 
development, there are cost overruns and project delays, but repercussions for failures 
were non-existent, especially for the technical personnel. Hence, these arrangements 
create ideal conditions for technological risk-taking and the result is Statoil‟s core 
technological competencies in deepwater exploitation, operations in harsh environment, 
integration of complex value chains for natural gas projects and in producing as well as 
refining heavy oil (Thurber & Istad, 2010).  
To support Pertamina in building its technological competencies, it might be 
appropriate for the government of Indonesia to issue government regulation, hence 
reducing the legal uncertainty, that places a maximum cap (for example at a certain 
percentage of Pertamina‟s retained earnings) for a research and development fund that is 
available for technological development and investment purposes which Pertamina 
could use without having to be liable for negative results in their field applications. 
However, one of the challenges of this policy is that it may adversely affect the 
government‟s ability to collect rent from its oil and gas resources, at least in short-term. 
                                                 
22
 In contrast, an Indonesian energy analyst stated that only 10 per cent of Pertamina‟s profit is reinvested 
back to the company by the government, whereas as a comparison, the Malaysian government reinvested 
70 per cent of Petronas‟ profit back to the company (Dhany, 2013). 
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Accordingly, significant reduction in tax revenue and dividends from Pertamina, with 
all of its political consequences, may have to be endured by the government. 
Lastly, it might be important for the government to consider offering fiscal 
incentives as an instrument to encourage technological progress in the petroleum sector. 
Drawing lessons from the successful development of fracking technology which was 
spurred by fiscal incentive in the form of tax credits for unconventional gas exploration 
and exploitation (Graves, 2012), this pattern could also be applied in some Indonesian 
basins which, due to their characteristics, present a high level of technological 
challenge. A report by the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources stated 
that there are 22 basins in Indonesia that have not been explored and most of them are 
located in deepwater areas in the eastern regions of the country (KESDM, 2011). These 
regions are infamous for their lack of infrastructure facilities. Therefore, fiscal 
incentives could be devised with the aim to develop the exploitation of hydrocarbon 
reserves in these areas. These incentives could also focus on spurring the development 
of more advanced and complicated extraction technologies, such as hydraulic fracturing, 
for the exploitations of oil and gas resources in other regions of Indonesia. 
 
8.3 Policy implications for the aggregate economy 
 
Findings in Chapter 5 reveal that the growth of aggregate TFP shows a steadily 
declining trend after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. If this declining trend in 
TFP growth continues, it could be a source of major concern for the sustainability of 
long-run economic growth in Indonesia. 
 The declines in aggregate TFP growth amid low institutional quality, declining 
infrastructure investment and creeping economic protectionism show that these factors 
should be addressed by the country‟s stakeholders in order to put a halt to and reverse 
this negative trend. It will be necessary for the government to design policies for the 
improvement in the quality of institutions with more focus directed towards ensuring 
the enforcement of property rights, as this will encourage investment. These policies 
should also put constraints on the actions of elitist, political and other groups which 
possess power, thereby reducing the risks of expropriation of incomes and of others‟ 
investment. Also, policies which target a more equal economic opportunity for broad 
segments of society may be important to consider because they would enhance the 
investment in human capital and public participation in productive activities (Isaksson, 
2007).  
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Policies aimed at increasing the investment expenditure in physical 
infrastructure is important for TFP growth since this would enable the expansion of 
productive capacity through increases in resource availability and enhancements in the 
productivity of private capital. Moreover, pushing the economy towards a more open 
trade regime and reduced protectionism would enhance productivity growth by 
providing better access to imported intermediate inputs of higher quality and/ or broader 
variety, enabling product specialisation and the exploitation of economies of scale, as 
well as providing more exposure to better imported technologies which would increase 
learning-by-doing activities (R. J. Taylor, 2007). A more open economy would also 
enhance productivity growth by providing increased export opportunities which would 
relax the constraints on foreign exchange and thus allow the import of more capital 
goods. At the sectoral level, trade liberalisation would lead to an increasingly 
competitive environment which would force firms to use inputs more efficiently and 
push low-productivity firms to exit the market, leaving firms with relatively higher 
productivity rates more rooms in the market (Isaksson, 2007). 
 
8.4 Limitations and direction for further research 
 
The findings in this study aim to enrich and expand the literature on productivity 
and economic growth by drawing from the experience of an oil producing country. 
However, there are some limitations which need to be pointed out. The first limitation is 
related to the system of sharing the rents provided by the petroleum sector between the 
government and oil companies. This study treats the Indonesian petroleum fiscal system 
as exogenous to the petroleum sector‟s productivity. It does not take into account the 
possibility that different fiscal systems may affect the productivity of this sector 
differently. Therefore, for future study, it might be necessary to do ex ante research on 
how different fiscal regimes may affect TFP growth in the Indonesian petroleum sector. 
These kinds of studies would be able to provide policy suggestions regarding the 
optimum fiscal regime for oil and gas resources that can balance the interests of the host 
government as well as the investors.  
The second limitation involves the use of aggregate data in the non-oil and gas 
sectors of the economy. In this study all of the outputs and inputs in the various non-
petroleum industries are aggregated, thus it cannot trace each industry‟s TFP growth 
before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. Future research could be aimed 
at disaggregating the non-petroleum sectors‟ TFP growth into each individual sector in 
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order to be able to assess the productivity growth in each respective sector. This way, 
the level of contribution of each sector to the overall productivity in the non-oil and gas 
sectors would be able to be determined and analysed in more detail. 
 
8.5 Final remarks 
 
Opening the petroleum sector to fair competition seems to have resulted in better 
productivity of the sector. The main challenge remaining, however, is the increasing 
sentiment of resource nationalism which has deteriorated capital formation and 
jeopardising productivity growth in the long-run. Thus, management of this issue would 
be a key factor in the development of the country‟s petroleum sector in the future.  
For the aggregate economy, the persistently declining trend in productivity may 
provide a serious challenge for the sustainability of long-run economic growth in 
Indonesia. The problems of low institutional quality, declining infrastructure investment 
and creeping economic protectionism need to be addressed to reverse this declining 
trend.  
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